Differences

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+====== Categories ======
+by [[aristotle|Aristotle]]
+BC
+translated by E. M. Edghill
+Things are said to be named 'equivocally' when, though they have a
+common name, the definition corresponding with the name differs for
+each. Thus, a real man and a figure in a picture can both lay claim to
+the name 'animal'; yet these are equivocally so named, for, though
+they have a common name, the definition corresponding with the name
+differs for each. For should any one define in what sense each is an
+animal, his definition in the one case will be appropriate to that
+case only.
+On the other hand, things are said to be named 'univocally' which
+have both the name and the definition answering to the name in common.
+A man and an ox are both 'animal', and these are univocally so
+named, inasmuch as not only the name, but also the definition, is
+the same in both cases: for if a man should state in what sense each
+is an animal, the statement in the one case would be identical with
+that in the other.
+Things are said to be named 'derivatively', which derive their
+name from some other name, but differ from it in termination. Thus the
+grammarian derives his name from the word 'grammar', and the
+courageous man from the word 'courage'.
+Forms of speech are either simple or composite. Examples of the
+latter are such expressions as 'the man runs', 'the man wins'; of the
+former 'man', 'ox', 'runs', 'wins'.
+Of things themselves some are predicable of a subject, and are never
+present in a subject. Thus 'man' is predicable of the individual
+man, and is never present in a subject.
+By being 'present in a subject' I do not mean present as parts are
+present in a whole, but being incapable of existence apart from the
+said subject.
+Some things, again, are present in a subject, but are never
+predicable of a subject. For instance, a certain point of
+grammatical knowledge is present in the mind, but is not predicable of
+any subject; or again, a certain whiteness may be present in the
+body (for colour requires a material basis), yet it is never
+predicable of anything.
+Other things, again, are both predicable of a subject and present in
+a subject. Thus while knowledge is present in the human mind, it is
+predicable of grammar.
+There is, lastly, a class of things which are neither present in a
+subject nor predicable of a subject, such as the individual man or the
+individual horse. But, to speak more generally, that which is
+individual and has the character of a unit is never predicable of a
+subject. Yet in some cases there is nothing to prevent such being
+present in a subject. Thus a certain point of grammatical knowledge is
+present in a subject.
+When one thing is predicated of another, all that which is
+predicable of the predicate will be predicable also of the subject.
+Thus, 'man' is predicated of the individual man; but 'animal' is
+predicated of 'man'; it will, therefore, be predicable of the
+individual man also: for the individual man is both 'man' and
+'animal'.
+If genera are different and co-ordinate, their differentiae are
+themselves different in kind. Take as an instance the genus 'animal'
+and the genus 'knowledge'. 'With feet', 'two-footed', 'winged',
+'aquatic', are differentiae of 'animal'; the species of knowledge
+are not distinguished by the same differentiae. One species of
+knowledge does not differ from another in being 'two-footed'.
+But where one genus is subordinate to another, there is nothing to
+prevent their having the same differentiae: for the greater class is
+predicated of the lesser, so that all the differentiae of the
+predicate will be differentiae also of the subject.
+Expressions which are in no way composite signify substance,
+quantity, quality, relation, place, time, position, state, action,
+or affection. To sketch my meaning roughly, examples of substance
+are 'man' or 'the horse', of quantity, such terms as 'two cubits long'
+or 'three cubits long', of quality, such attributes as 'white',
+'grammatical'. 'Double', 'half', 'greater', fall under the category of
+relation; 'in a the market place', 'in the Lyceum', under that of
+place; 'yesterday', 'last year', under that of time. 'Lying',
+'sitting', are terms indicating position, 'shod', 'armed', state;
+'to lance', 'to cauterize', action; 'to be lanced', 'to be
+cauterized', affection.
+No one of these terms, in and by itself, involves an affirmation; it
+is by the combination of such terms that positive or negative
+statements arise. For every assertion must, as is admitted, be
+either true or false, whereas expressions which are not in any way
+composite such as 'man', 'white', 'runs', 'wins', cannot be either
+true or false.
+Substance, in the truest and primary and most definite sense of
+the word, is that which is neither predicable of a subject nor present
+in a subject; for instance, the individual man or horse. But in a
+secondary sense those things are called substances within which, as
+species, the primary substances are included; also those which, as
+genera, include the species. For instance, the individual man is
+included in the species 'man', and the genus to which the species
+belongs is 'animal'; these, therefore-that is to say, the species
+'man' and the genus 'animal,-are termed secondary substances.
+It is plain from what has been said that both the name and the
+definition of the predicate must be predicable of the subject. For
+instance, 'man' is predicted of the individual man. Now in this case
+the name of the species man' is applied to the individual, for we
+use the term 'man' in describing the individual; and the definition of
+'man' will also be predicated of the individual man, for the
+individual man is both man and animal. Thus, both the name and the
+definition of the species are predicable of the individual.
+With regard, on the other hand, to those things which are present in
+a subject, it is generally the case that neither their name nor
+their definition is predicable of that in which they are present.
+Though, however, the definition is never predicable, there is
+nothing in certain cases to prevent the name being used. For instance,
+'white' being present in a body is predicated of that in which it is
+present, for a body is called white: the definition, however, of the
+colour white' is never predicable of the body.
+Everything except primary substances is either predicable of a
+primary substance or present in a primary substance. This becomes
+evident by reference to particular instances which occur. 'Animal'
+is predicated of the species 'man', therefore of the individual man,
+for if there were no individual man of whom it could be predicated, it
+could not be predicated of the species 'man' at all. Again, colour
+is present in body, therefore in individual bodies, for if there
+were no individual body in which it was present, it could not be
+present in body at all. Thus everything except primary substances is
+either predicated of primary substances, or is present in them, and if
+these last did not exist, it would be impossible for anything else
+to exist.
+Of secondary substances, the species is more truly substance than
+the genus, being more nearly related to primary substance. For if
+any one should render an account of what a primary substance is, he
+would render a more instructive account, and one more proper to the
+subject, by stating the species than by stating the genus. Thus, he
+would give a more instructive account of an individual man by
+stating that he was man than by stating that he was animal, for the
+former description is peculiar to the individual in a greater
+degree, while the latter is too general. Again, the man who gives an
+account of the nature of an individual tree will give a more
+instructive account by mentioning the species 'tree' than by
+mentioning the genus 'plant'.
+Moreover, primary substances are most properly called substances
+in virtue of the fact that they are the entities which underlie every.
+else, and that everything else is either predicated of them or present
+in them. Now the same relation which subsists between primary
+substance and everything else subsists also between the species and
+the genus: for the species is to the genus as subject is to predicate,
+since the genus is predicated of the species, whereas the species
+cannot be predicated of the genus. Thus we have a second ground for
+asserting that the species is more truly substance than the genus.
+Of species themselves, except in the case of such as are genera,
+no one is more truly substance than another. We should not give a more
+appropriate account of the individual man by stating the species to
+which he belonged, than we should of an individual horse by adopting
+the same method of definition. In the same way, of primary substances,
+no one is more truly substance than another; an individual man is
+not more truly substance than an individual ox.
+It is, then, with good reason that of all that remains, when we
+exclude primary substances, we concede to species and genera alone the
+name 'secondary substance', for these alone of all the predicates
+convey a knowledge of primary substance. For it is by stating the
+species or the genus that we appropriately define any individual
+man; and we shall make our definition more exact by stating the former
+than by stating the latter. All other things that we state, such as
+that he is white, that he runs, and so on, are irrelevant to the
+definition. Thus it is just that these alone, apart from primary
+substances, should be called substances.
+Further, primary substances are most properly so called, because
+they underlie and are the subjects of everything else. Now the same
+relation that subsists between primary substance and everything else
+subsists also between the species and the genus to which the primary
+substance belongs, on the one hand, and every attribute which is not
+included within these, on the other. For these are the subjects of all
+such. If we call an individual man 'skilled in grammar', the predicate
+is applicable also to the species and to the genus to which he
+belongs. This law holds good in all cases.
+It is a common characteristic of all sub. stance that it is never
+present in a subject. For primary substance is neither present in a
+subject nor predicated of a subject; while, with regard to secondary
+substances, it is clear from the following arguments (apart from
+others) that they are not present in a subject. For 'man' is
+predicated of the individual man, but is not present in any subject:
+for manhood is not present in the individual man. In the same way,
+'animal' is also predicated of the individual man, but is not
+present in him. Again, when a thing is present in a subject, though
+the name may quite well be applied to that in which it is present, the
+definition cannot be applied. Yet of secondary substances, not only
+the name, but also the definition, applies to the subject: we should
+use both the definition of the species and that of the genus with
+reference to the individual man. Thus substance cannot be present in a
+subject.
+Yet this is not peculiar to substance, for it is also the case
+that differentiae cannot be present in subjects. The characteristics
+'terrestrial' and 'two-footed' are predicated of the species 'man',
+but not present in it. For they are not in man. Moreover, the
+definition of the differentia may be predicated of that of which the
+differentia itself is predicated. For instance, if the
+characteristic 'terrestrial' is predicated of the species 'man', the
+definition also of that characteristic may be used to form the
+predicate of the species 'man': for 'man' is terrestrial.
+The fact that the parts of substances appear to be present in the
+whole, as in a subject, should not make us apprehensive lest we should
+have to admit that such parts are not substances: for in explaining
+the phrase 'being present in a subject', we stated' that we meant
+'otherwise than as parts in a whole'.
+It is the mark of substances and of differentiae that, in all
+propositions of which they form the predicate, they are predicated
+univocally. For all such propositions have for their subject either
+the individual or the species. It is true that, inasmuch as primary
+substance is not predicable of anything, it can never form the
+predicate of any proposition. But of secondary substances, the species
+is predicated of the individual, the genus both of the species and
+of the individual. Similarly the differentiae are predicated of the
+species and of the individuals. Moreover, the definition of the
+species and that of the genus are applicable to the primary substance,
+and that of the genus to the species. For all that is predicated of
+the predicate will be predicated also of the subject. Similarly, the
+definition of the differentiae will be applicable to the species and
+to the individuals. But it was stated above that the word 'univocal'
+was applied to those things which had both name and definition in
+common. It is, therefore, established that in every proposition, of
+which either substance or a differentia forms the predicate, these are
+predicated univocally.
+All substance appears to signify that which is individual. In the
+case of primary substance this is indisputably true, for the thing
+is a unit. In the case of secondary substances, when we speak, for
+instance, of 'man' or 'animal', our form of speech gives the
+impression that we are here also indicating that which is
+individual, but the impression is not strictly true; for a secondary
+substance is not an individual, but a class with a certain
+qualification; for it is not one and single as a primary substance is;
+the words 'man', 'animal', are predicable of more than one subject.
+Yet species and genus do not merely indicate quality, like the
+term 'white'; 'white' indicates quality and nothing further, but
+species and genus determine the quality with reference to a substance:
+they signify substance qualitatively differentiated. The determinate
+qualification covers a larger field in the case of the genus that in
+that of the species: he who uses the word 'animal' is herein using a
+word of wider extension than he who uses the word 'man'.
+Another mark of substance is that it has no contrary. What could
+be the contrary of any primary substance, such as the individual man
+or animal? It has none. Nor can the species or the genus have a
+contrary. Yet this characteristic is not peculiar to substance, but is
+true of many other things, such as quantity. There is nothing that
+forms the contrary of 'two cubits long' or of 'three cubits long',
+or of 'ten', or of any such term. A man may contend that 'much' is the
+contrary of 'little', or 'great' of 'small', but of definite
+quantitative terms no contrary exists.
+Substance, again, does not appear to admit of variation of degree. I
+do not mean by this that one substance cannot be more or less truly
+substance than another, for it has already been stated' that this is
+the case; but that no single substance admits of varying degrees
+within itself. For instance, one particular substance, 'man', cannot
+be more or less man either than himself at some other time or than
+some other man. One man cannot be more man than another, as that which
+is white may be more or less white than some other white object, or as
+that which is beautiful may be more or less beautiful than some
+other beautiful object. The same quality, moreover, is said to subsist
+in a thing in varying degrees at different times. A body, being white,
+is said to be whiter at one time than it was before, or, being warm,
+is said to be warmer or less warm than at some other time. But
+substance is not said to be more or less that which it is: a man is
+not more truly a man at one time than he was before, nor is
+anything, if it is substance, more or less what it is. Substance,
+then, does not admit of variation of degree.
+The most distinctive mark of substance appears to be that, while
+remaining numerically one and the same, it is capable of admitting
+contrary qualities. From among things other than substance, we
+should find ourselves unable to bring forward any which possessed this
+mark. Thus, one and the same colour cannot be white and black. Nor can
+the same one action be good and bad: this law holds good with
+everything that is not substance. But one and the selfsame
+substance, while retaining its identity, is yet capable of admitting
+contrary qualities. The same individual person is at one time white,
+at another black, at one time warm, at another cold, at one time good,
+at another bad. This capacity is found nowhere else, though it might
+be maintained that a statement or opinion was an exception to the
+rule. The same statement, it is agreed, can be both true and false.
+For if the statement 'he is sitting' is true, yet, when the person
+in question has risen, the same statement will be false. The same
+applies to opinions. For if any one thinks truly that a person is
+sitting, yet, when that person has risen, this same opinion, if
+still held, will be false. Yet although this exception may be allowed,
+there is, nevertheless, a difference in the manner in which the
+thing takes place. It is by themselves changing that substances
+admit contrary qualities. It is thus that that which was hot becomes
+cold, for it has entered into a different state. Similarly that
+which was white becomes black, and that which was bad good, by a
+process of change; and in the same way in all other cases it is by
+changing that substances are capable of admitting contrary
+qualities. But statements and opinions themselves remain unaltered
+in all respects: it is by the alteration in the facts of the case that
+the contrary quality comes to be theirs. The statement 'he is sitting'
+remains unaltered, but it is at one time true, at another false,
+according to circumstances. What has been said of statements applies
+also to opinions. Thus, in respect of the manner in which the thing
+takes place, it is the peculiar mark of substance that it should be
+capable of admitting contrary qualities; for it is by itself
+changing that it does so.
+If, then, a man should make this exception and contend that
+statements and opinions are capable of admitting contrary qualities,
+his contention is unsound. For statements and opinions are said to
+have this capacity, not because they themselves undergo
+modification, but because this modification occurs in the case of
+something else. The truth or falsity of a statement depends on
+facts, and not on any power on the part of the statement itself of
+admitting contrary qualities. In short, there is nothing which can
+alter the nature of statements and opinions. As, then, no change takes
+place in themselves, these cannot be said to be capable of admitting
+contrary qualities.
+But it is by reason of the modification which takes place within the
+substance itself that a substance is said to be capable of admitting
+contrary qualities; for a substance admits within itself either
+disease or health, whiteness or blackness. It is in this sense that it
+is said to be capable of admitting contrary qualities.
+To sum up, it is a distinctive mark of substance, that, while
+remaining numerically one and the same, it is capable of admitting
+contrary qualities, the modification taking place through a change
+in the substance itself.
+Let these remarks suffice on the subject of substance.
+Quantity is either discrete or continuous. Moreover, some quantities
+are such that each part of the whole has a relative position to the
+other parts: others have within them no such relation of part to part.
+Instances of discrete quantities are number and speech; of
+continuous, lines, surfaces, solids, and, besides these, time and
+place.
+In the case of the parts of a number, there is no common boundary at
+which they join. For example: two fives make ten, but the two fives
+have no common boundary, but are separate; the parts three and seven
+also do not join at any boundary. Nor, to generalize, would it ever be
+possible in the case of number that there should be a common
+boundary among the parts; they are always separate. Number, therefore,
+is a discrete quantity.
+The same is true of speech. That speech is a quantity is evident:
+for it is measured in long and short syllables. I mean here that
+speech which is vocal. Moreover, it is a discrete quantity for its
+parts have no common boundary. There is no common boundary at which
+the syllables join, but each is separate and distinct from the rest.
+A line, on the other hand, is a continuous quantity, for it is
+possible to find a common boundary at which its parts join. In the
+case of the line, this common boundary is the point; in the case of
+the plane, it is the line: for the parts of the plane have also a
+common boundary. Similarly you can find a common boundary in the
+case of the parts of a solid, namely either a line or a plane.
+Space and time also belong to this class of quantities. Time,
+past, present, and future, forms a continuous whole. Space,
+likewise, is a continuous quantity; for the parts of a solid occupy
+a certain space, and these have a common boundary; it follows that the
+parts of space also, which are occupied by the parts of the solid,
+have the same common boundary as the parts of the solid. Thus, not
+only time, but space also, is a continuous quantity, for its parts
+have a common boundary.
+Quantities consist either of parts which bear a relative position
+each to each, or of parts which do not. The parts of a line bear a
+relative position to each other, for each lies somewhere, and it would
+be possible to distinguish each, and to state the position of each
+on the plane and to explain to what sort of part among the rest each
+was contiguous. Similarly the parts of a plane have position, for it
+could similarly be stated what was the position of each and what
+sort of parts were contiguous. The same is true with regard to the
+solid and to space. But it would be impossible to show that the arts
+of a number had a relative position each to each, or a particular
+position, or to state what parts were contiguous. Nor could this be
+done in the case of time, for none of the parts of time has an abiding
+existence, and that which does not abide can hardly have position.
+It would be better to say that such parts had a relative order, in
+virtue of one being prior to another. Similarly with number: in
+counting, 'one' is prior to 'two', and 'two' to 'three', and thus
+the parts of number may be said to possess a relative order, though it
+would be impossible to discover any distinct position for each. This
+holds good also in the case of speech. None of its parts has an
+abiding existence: when once a syllable is pronounced, it is not
+possible to retain it, so that, naturally, as the parts do not
+abide, they cannot have position. Thus, some quantities consist of
+parts which have position, and some of those which have not.
+Strictly speaking, only the things which I have mentioned belong
+to the category of quantity: everything else that is called
+quantitative is a quantity in a secondary sense. It is because we have
+in mind some one of these quantities, properly so called, that we
+apply quantitative terms to other things. We speak of what is white as
+large, because the surface over which the white extends is large; we
+speak of an action or a process as lengthy, because the time covered
+is long; these things cannot in their own right claim the quantitative
+epithet. For instance, should any one explain how long an action
+was, his statement would be made in terms of the time taken, to the
+effect that it lasted a year, or something of that sort. In the same
+way, he would explain the size of a white object in terms of
+surface, for he would state the area which it covered. Thus the things
+already mentioned, and these alone, are in their intrinsic nature
+quantities; nothing else can claim the name in its own right, but,
+if at all, only in a secondary sense.
+Quantities have no contraries. In the case of definite quantities
+this is obvious; thus, there is nothing that is the contrary of 'two
+cubits long' or of 'three cubits long', or of a surface, or of any
+such quantities. A man might, indeed, argue that 'much' was the
+contrary of 'little', and 'great' of 'small'. But these are not
+quantitative, but relative; things are not great or small
+absolutely, they are so called rather as the result of an act of
+comparison. For instance, a mountain is called small, a grain large,
+in virtue of the fact that the latter is greater than others of its
+kind, the former less. Thus there is a reference here to an external
+standard, for if the terms 'great' and 'small' were used absolutely, a
+mountain would never be called small or a grain large. Again, we say
+that there are many people in a village, and few in Athens, although
+those in the city are many times as numerous as those in the
+village: or we say that a house has many in it, and a theatre few,
+though those in the theatre far outnumber those in the house. The
+terms 'two cubits long, "three cubits long,' and so on indicate
+quantity, the terms 'great' and 'small' indicate relation, for they
+have reference to an external standard. It is, therefore, plain that
+these are to be classed as relative.
+Again, whether we define them as quantitative or not, they have no
+contraries: for how can there be a contrary of an attribute which is
+not to be apprehended in or by itself, but only by reference to
+something external? Again, if 'great' and 'small' are contraries, it
+will come about that the same subject can admit contrary qualities
+at one and the same time, and that things will themselves be
+contrary to themselves. For it happens at times that the same thing is
+both small and great. For the same thing may be small in comparison
+with one thing, and great in comparison with another, so that the same
+thing comes to be both small and great at one and the same time, and
+is of such a nature as to admit contrary qualities at one and the same
+moment. Yet it was agreed, when substance was being discussed, that
+nothing admits contrary qualities at one and the same moment. For
+though substance is capable of admitting contrary qualities, yet no
+one is at the same time both sick and healthy, nothing is at the
+same time both white and black. Nor is there anything which is
+qualified in contrary ways at one and the same time.
+Moreover, if these were contraries, they would themselves be
+contrary to themselves. For if 'great' is the contrary of 'small', and
+the same thing is both great and small at the same time, then
+'small' or 'great' is the contrary of itself. But this is
+impossible. The term 'great', therefore, is not the contrary of the
+term 'small', nor 'much' of 'little'. And even though a man should
+call these terms not relative but quantitative, they would not have
+contraries.
+It is in the case of space that quantity most plausibly appears to
+admit of a contrary. For men define the term 'above' as the contrary
+of 'below', when it is the region at the centre they mean by
+'below'; and this is so, because nothing is farther from the
+extremities of the universe than the region at the centre. Indeed,
+it seems that in defining contraries of every kind men have recourse
+to a spatial metaphor, for they say that those things are contraries
+which, within the same class, are separated by the greatest possible
+distance.
+Quantity does not, it appears, admit of variation of degree. One
+thing cannot be two cubits long in a greater degree than another.
+Similarly with regard to number: what is 'three' is not more truly
+three than what is 'five' is five; nor is one set of three more
+truly three than another set. Again, one period of time is not said to
+be more truly time than another. Nor is there any other kind of
+quantity, of all that have been mentioned, with regard to which
+variation of degree can be predicated. The category of quantity,
+therefore, does not admit of variation of degree.
+The most distinctive mark of quantity is that equality and
+inequality are predicated of it. Each of the aforesaid quantities is
+said to be equal or unequal. For instance, one solid is said to be
+equal or unequal to another; number, too, and time can have these
+terms applied to them, indeed can all those kinds of quantity that
+have been mentioned.
+That which is not a quantity can by no means, it would seem, be
+termed equal or unequal to anything else. One particular disposition
+or one particular quality, such as whiteness, is by no means
+compared with another in terms of equality and inequality but rather
+in terms of similarity. Thus it is the distinctive mark of quantity
+that it can be called equal and unequal.
+Those things are called relative, which, being either said to be
+of something else or related to something else, are explained by
+reference to that other thing. For instance, the word 'superior' is
+explained by reference to something else, for it is superiority over
+something else that is meant. Similarly, the expression 'double' has
+this external reference, for it is the double of something else that
+is meant. So it is with everything else of this kind. There are,
+moreover, other relatives, e.g. habit, disposition, perception,
+knowledge, and attitude. The significance of all these is explained by
+a reference to something else and in no other way. Thus, a habit is
+a habit of something, knowledge is knowledge of something, attitude is
+the attitude of something. So it is with all other relatives that have
+been mentioned. Those terms, then, are called relative, the nature
+of which is explained by reference to something else, the
+preposition 'of' or some other preposition being used to indicate
+the relation. Thus, one mountain is called great in comparison with
+son with another; for the mountain claims this attribute by comparison
+with something. Again, that which is called similar must be similar to
+something else, and all other such attributes have this external
+reference. It is to be noted that lying and standing and sitting are
+particular attitudes, but attitude is itself a relative term. To
+lie, to stand, to be seated, are not themselves attitudes, but take
+their name from the aforesaid attitudes.
+It is possible for relatives to have contraries. Thus virtue has a
+contrary, vice, these both being relatives; knowledge, too, has a
+contrary, ignorance. But this is not the mark of all relatives;
+'double' and 'triple' have no contrary, nor indeed has any such term.
+It also appears that relatives can admit of variation of degree. For
+'like' and 'unlike', 'equal' and 'unequal', have the modifications
+'more' and 'less' applied to them, and each of these is relative in
+character: for the terms 'like' and 'unequal' bear 'unequal' bear a
+reference to something external. Yet, again, it is not every
+relative term that admits of variation of degree. No term such as
+'double' admits of this modification. All relatives have correlatives:
+by the term 'slave' we mean the slave of a master, by the term
+'master', the master of a slave; by 'double', the double of its
+hall; by 'half', the half of its double; by 'greater', greater than
+that which is less; by 'less,' less than that which is greater.
+So it is with every other relative term; but the case we use to
+express the correlation differs in some instances. Thus, by
+knowledge we mean knowledge the knowable; by the knowable, that
+which is to be apprehended by knowledge; by perception, perception
+of the perceptible; by the perceptible, that which is apprehended by
+perception.
+Sometimes, however, reciprocity of correlation does not appear to
+exist. This comes about when a blunder is made, and that to which
+the relative is related is not accurately stated. If a man states that
+a wing is necessarily relative to a bird, the connexion between
+these two will not be reciprocal, for it will not be possible to say
+that a bird is a bird by reason of its wings. The reason is that the
+original statement was inaccurate, for the wing is not said to be
+relative to the bird qua bird, since many creatures besides birds have
+wings, but qua winged creature. If, then, the statement is made
+accurate, the connexion will be reciprocal, for we can speak of a
+wing, having reference necessarily to a winged creature, and of a
+winged creature as being such because of its wings.
+Occasionally, perhaps, it is necessary to coin words, if no word
+exists by which a correlation can adequately be explained. If we
+define a rudder as necessarily having reference to a boat, our
+definition will not be appropriate, for the rudder does not have
+this reference to a boat qua boat, as there are boats which have no
+rudders. Thus we cannot use the terms reciprocally, for the word
+'boat' cannot be said to find its explanation in the word 'rudder'. As
+there is no existing word, our definition would perhaps be more
+accurate if we coined some word like 'ruddered' as the correlative
+of 'rudder'. If we express ourselves thus accurately, at any rate
+the terms are reciprocally connected, for the 'ruddered' thing is
+'ruddered' in virtue of its rudder. So it is in all other cases. A
+head will be more accurately defined as the correlative of that
+which is 'headed', than as that of an animal, for the animal does
+not have a head qua animal, since many animals have no head.
+Thus we may perhaps most easily comprehend that to which a thing
+is related, when a name does not exist, if, from that which has a
+name, we derive a new name, and apply it to that with which the
+first is reciprocally connected, as in the aforesaid instances, when
+we derived the word 'winged' from 'wing' and from 'rudder'.
+All relatives, then, if properly defined, have a correlative. I
+add this condition because, if that to which they are related is
+stated as haphazard and not accurately, the two are not found to be
+interdependent. Let me state what I mean more clearly. Even in the
+case of acknowledged correlatives, and where names exist for each,
+there will be no interdependence if one of the two is denoted, not
+by that name which expresses the correlative notion, but by one of
+irrelevant significance. The term 'slave,' if defined as related,
+not to a master, but to a man, or a biped, or anything of that sort,
+is not reciprocally connected with that in relation to which it is
+defined, for the statement is not exact. Further, if one thing is said
+to be correlative with another, and the terminology used is correct,
+then, though all irrelevant attributes should be removed, and only
+that one attribute left in virtue of which it was correctly stated
+to be correlative with that other, the stated correlation will still
+exist. If the correlative of 'the slave' is said to be 'the master',
+then, though all irrelevant attributes of the said 'master', such as
+'biped', 'receptive of knowledge', 'human', should be removed, and the
+attribute 'master' alone left, the stated correlation existing between
+him and the slave will remain the same, for it is of a master that a
+slave is said to be the slave. On the other hand, if, of two
+correlatives, one is not correctly termed, then, when all other
+attributes are removed and that alone is left in virtue of which it
+was stated to be correlative, the stated correlation will be found
+to have disappeared.
+For suppose the correlative of 'the slave' should be said to be 'the
+man', or the correlative of 'the wing"the bird'; if the attribute
+'master' be withdrawn from' the man', the correlation between 'the
+man' and 'the slave' will cease to exist, for if the man is not a
+master, the slave is not a slave. Similarly, if the attribute 'winged'
+be withdrawn from 'the bird', 'the wing' will no longer be relative;
+for if the so-called correlative is not winged, it follows that 'the
+wing' has no correlative.
+Thus it is essential that the correlated terms should be exactly
+designated; if there is a name existing, the statement will be easy;
+if not, it is doubtless our duty to construct names. When the
+terminology is thus correct, it is evident that all correlatives are
+interdependent.
+Correlatives are thought to come into existence simultaneously. This
+is for the most part true, as in the case of the double and the
+half. The existence of the half necessitates the existence of that
+of which it is a half. Similarly the existence of a master
+necessitates the existence of a slave, and that of a slave implies
+that of a master; these are merely instances of a general rule.
+Moreover, they cancel one another; for if there is no double it
+follows that there is no half, and vice versa; this rule also
+applies to all such correlatives. Yet it does not appear to be true in
+all cases that correlatives come into existence simultaneously. The
+object of knowledge would appear to exist before knowledge itself, for
+it is usually the case that we acquire knowledge of objects already
+existing; it would be difficult, if not impossible, to find a branch
+of knowledge the beginning of the existence of which was
+contemporaneous with that of its object.
+Again, while the object of knowledge, if it ceases to exist, cancels
+at the same time the knowledge which was its correlative, the converse
+of this is not true. It is true that if the object of knowledge does
+not exist there can be no knowledge: for there will no longer be
+anything to know. Yet it is equally true that, if knowledge of a
+certain object does not exist, the object may nevertheless quite
+well exist. Thus, in the case of the squaring of the circle, if indeed
+that process is an object of knowledge, though it itself exists as
+an object of knowledge, yet the knowledge of it has not yet come
+into existence. Again, if all animals ceased to exist, there would
+be no knowledge, but there might yet be many objects of knowledge.
+This is likewise the case with regard to perception: for the
+object of perception is, it appears, prior to the act of perception.
+If the perceptible is annihilated, perception also will cease to
+exist; but the annihilation of perception does not cancel the
+existence of the perceptible. For perception implies a body
+perceived and a body in which perception takes place. Now if that
+which is perceptible is annihilated, it follows that the body is
+annihilated, for the body is a perceptible thing; and if the body does
+not exist, it follows that perception also ceases to exist. Thus the
+annihilation of the perceptible involves that of perception.
+But the annihilation of perception does not involve that of the
+perceptible. For if the animal is annihilated, it follows that
+perception also is annihilated, but perceptibles such as body, heat,
+sweetness, bitterness, and so on, will remain.
+Again, perception is generated at the same time as the perceiving
+subject, for it comes into existence at the same time as the animal.
+But the perceptible surely exists before perception; for fire and
+water and such elements, out of which the animal is itself composed,
+exist before the animal is an animal at all, and before perception.
+Thus it would seem that the perceptible exists before perception.
+It may be questioned whether it is true that no substance is
+relative, as seems to be the case, or whether exception is to be
+made in the case of certain secondary substances. With regard to
+primary substances, it is quite true that there is no such
+possibility, for neither wholes nor parts of primary substances are
+relative. The individual man or ox is not defined with reference to
+something external. Similarly with the parts: a particular hand or
+head is not defined as a particular hand or head of a particular
+person, but as the hand or head of a particular person. It is true
+also, for the most part at least, in the case of secondary substances;
+the species 'man' and the species 'ox' are not defined with
+reference to anything outside themselves. Wood, again, is only
+relative in so far as it is some one's property, not in so far as it
+is wood. It is plain, then, that in the cases mentioned substance is
+not relative. But with regard to some secondary substances there is
+a difference of opinion; thus, such terms as 'head' and 'hand' are
+defined with reference to that of which the things indicated are a
+part, and so it comes about that these appear to have a relative
+character. Indeed, if our definition of that which is relative was
+complete, it is very difficult, if not impossible, to prove that no
+substance is relative. If, however, our definition was not complete,
+if those things only are properly called relative in the case of which
+relation to an external object is a necessary condition of
+existence, perhaps some explanation of the dilemma may be found.
+The former definition does indeed apply to all relatives, but the
+fact that a thing is explained with reference to something else does
+not make it essentially relative.
+From this it is plain that, if a man definitely apprehends a
+relative thing, he will also definitely apprehend that to which it
+is relative. Indeed this is self-evident: for if a man knows that some
+particular thing is relative, assuming that we call that a relative in
+the case of which relation to something is a necessary condition of
+existence, he knows that also to which it is related. For if he does
+not know at all that to which it is related, he will not know
+whether or not it is relative. This is clear, moreover, in
+particular instances. If a man knows definitely that such and such a
+thing is 'double', he will also forthwith know definitely that of
+which it is the double. For if there is nothing definite of which he
+knows it to be the double, he does not know at all that it is
+double. Again, if he knows that a thing is more beautiful, it
+follows necessarily that he will forthwith definitely know that also
+than which it is more beautiful. He will not merely know
+indefinitely that it is more beautiful than something which is less
+beautiful, for this would be supposition, not knowledge. For if he
+does not know definitely that than which it is more beautiful, he
+can no longer claim to know definitely that it is more beautiful
+than something else which is less beautiful: for it might be that
+nothing was less beautiful. It is, therefore, evident that if a man
+apprehends some relative thing definitely, he necessarily knows that
+also definitely to which it is related.
+Now the head, the hand, and such things are substances, and it is
+possible to know their essential character definitely, but it does not
+necessarily follow that we should know that to which they are related.
+It is not possible to know forthwith whose head or hand is meant. Thus
+these are not relatives, and, this being the case, it would be true to
+say that no substance is relative in character. It is perhaps a
+difficult matter, in such cases, to make a positive statement
+without more exhaustive examination, but to have raised questions with
+regard to details is not without advantage.
+By 'quality' I mean that in virtue of which people are said to be
+such and such.
+Quality is a term that is used in many senses. One sort of quality
+let us call 'habit' or 'disposition'. Habit differs from disposition
+in being more lasting and more firmly established. The various kinds
+of knowledge and of virtue are habits, for knowledge, even when
+acquired only in a moderate degree, is, it is agreed, abiding in its
+character and difficult to displace, unless some great mental upheaval
+takes place, through disease or any such cause. The virtues, also,
+such as justice, self-restraint, and so on, are not easily dislodged
+or dismissed, so as to give place to vice.
+By a disposition, on the other hand, we mean a condition that is
+easily changed and quickly gives place to its opposite. Thus, heat,
+cold, disease, health, and so on are dispositions. For a man is
+disposed in one way or another with reference to these, but quickly
+changes, becoming cold instead of warm, ill instead of well. So it
+is with all other dispositions also, unless through lapse of time a
+disposition has itself become inveterate and almost impossible to
+dislodge: in which case we should perhaps go so far as to call it a
+habit.
+It is evident that men incline to call those conditions habits which
+are of a more or less permanent type and difficult to displace; for
+those who are not retentive of knowledge, but volatile, are not said
+to have such and such a 'habit' as regards knowledge, yet they are
+disposed, we may say, either better or worse, towards knowledge.
+Thus habit differs from disposition in this, that while the latter
+in ephemeral, the former is permanent and difficult to alter.
+Habits are at the same time dispositions, but dispositions are not
+necessarily habits. For those who have some specific habit may be said
+also, in virtue of that habit, to be thus or thus disposed; but
+those who are disposed in some specific way have not in all cases
+the corresponding habit.
+Another sort of quality is that in virtue of which, for example,
+we call men good boxers or runners, or healthy or sickly: in fact it
+includes all those terms which refer to inborn capacity or incapacity.
+Such things are not predicated of a person in virtue of his
+disposition, but in virtue of his inborn capacity or incapacity to
+do something with ease or to avoid defeat of any kind. Persons are
+called good boxers or good runners, not in virtue of such and such a
+disposition, but in virtue of an inborn capacity to accomplish
+something with ease. Men are called healthy in virtue of the inborn
+capacity of easy resistance to those unhealthy influences that may
+ordinarily arise; unhealthy, in virtue of the lack of this capacity.
+Similarly with regard to softness and hardness. Hardness is predicated
+of a thing because it has that capacity of resistance which enables it
+to withstand disintegration; softness, again, is predicated of a thing
+by reason of the lack of that capacity.
+A third class within this category is that of affective qualities
+and affections. Sweetness, bitterness, sourness, are examples of
+this sort of quality, together with all that is akin to these; heat,
+moreover, and cold, whiteness, and blackness are affective
+qualities. It is evident that these are qualities, for those things
+that possess them are themselves said to be such and such by reason of
+their presence. Honey is called sweet because it contains sweetness;
+the body is called white because it contains whiteness; and so in
+all other cases.
+The term 'affective quality' is not used as indicating that those
+things which admit these qualities are affected in any way. Honey is
+not called sweet because it is affected in a specific way, nor is this
+what is meant in any other instance. Similarly heat and cold are
+called affective qualities, not because those things which admit
+them are affected. What is meant is that these said qualities are
+capable of producing an 'affection' in the way of perception. For
+sweetness has the power of affecting the sense of taste; heat, that of
+touch; and so it is with the rest of these qualities.
+Whiteness and blackness, however, and the other colours, are not
+said to be affective qualities in this sense, but -because they
+themselves are the results of an affection. It is plain that many
+changes of colour take place because of affections. When a man is
+ashamed, he blushes; when he is afraid, he becomes pale, and so on. So
+true is this, that when a man is by nature liable to such
+affections, arising from some concomitance of elements in his
+constitution, it is a probable inference that he has the corresponding
+complexion of skin. For the same disposition of bodily elements, which
+in the former instance was momentarily present in the case of an
+access of shame, might be a result of a man's natural temperament,
+so as to produce the corresponding colouring also as a natural
+characteristic. All conditions, therefore, of this kind, if caused
+by certain permanent and lasting affections, are called affective
+qualities. For pallor and duskiness of complexion are called
+qualities, inasmuch as we are said to be such and such in virtue of
+them, not only if they originate in natural constitution, but also
+if they come about through long disease or sunburn, and are
+difficult to remove, or indeed remain throughout life. For in the same
+way we are said to be such and such because of these.
+Those conditions, however, which arise from causes which may
+easily be rendered ineffective or speedily removed, are called, not
+qualities, but affections: for we are not said to be such virtue of
+them. The man who blushes through shame is not said to be a
+constitutional blusher, nor is the man who becomes pale through fear
+said to be constitutionally pale. He is said rather to have been
+affected.
+Thus such conditions are called affections, not qualities.
+In like manner there are affective qualities and affections of the
+soul. That temper with which a man is born and which has its origin in
+certain deep-seated affections is called a quality. I mean such
+conditions as insanity, irascibility, and so on: for people are said
+to be mad or irascible in virtue of these. Similarly those abnormal
+psychic states which are not inborn, but arise from the concomitance
+of certain other elements, and are difficult to remove, or
+altogether permanent, are called qualities, for in virtue of them
+men are said to be such and such.
+Those, however, which arise from causes easily rendered
+ineffective are called affections, not qualities. Suppose that a man
+is irritable when vexed: he is not even spoken of as a bad-tempered
+man, when in such circumstances he loses his temper somewhat, but
+rather is said to be affected. Such conditions are therefore termed,
+not qualities, but affections.
+The fourth sort of quality is figure and the shape that belongs to a
+thing; and besides this, straightness and curvedness and any other
+qualities of this type; each of these defines a thing as being such
+and such. Because it is triangular or quadrangular a thing is said
+to have a specific character, or again because it is straight or
+curved; in fact a thing's shape in every case gives rise to a
+qualification of it.
+Rarity and density, roughness and smoothness, seem to be terms
+indicating quality: yet these, it would appear, really belong to a
+class different from that of quality. For it is rather a certain
+relative position of the parts composing the thing thus qualified
+which, it appears, is indicated by each of these terms. A thing is
+dense, owing to the fact that its parts are closely combined with
+one another; rare, because there are interstices between the parts;
+smooth, because its parts lie, so to speak, evenly; rough, because
+some parts project beyond others.
+There may be other sorts of quality, but those that are most
+properly so called have, we may safely say, been enumerated.
+These, then, are qualities, and the things that take their name from
+them as derivatives, or are in some other way dependent on them, are
+said to be qualified in some specific way. In most, indeed in almost
+all cases, the name of that which is qualified is derived from that of
+the quality. Thus the terms 'whiteness', 'grammar', 'justice', give us
+the adjectives 'white', 'grammatical', 'just', and so on.
+There are some cases, however, in which, as the quality under
+consideration has no name, it is impossible that those possessed of it
+should have a name that is derivative. For instance, the name given to
+the runner or boxer, who is so called in virtue of an inborn capacity,
+is not derived from that of any quality; for lob those capacities have
+no name assigned to them. In this, the inborn capacity is distinct
+from the science, with reference to which men are called, e.g.
+boxers or wrestlers. Such a science is classed as a disposition; it
+has a name, and is called 'boxing' or 'wrestling' as the case may
+be, and the name given to those disposed in this way is derived from
+that of the science. Sometimes, even though a name exists for the
+quality, that which takes its character from the quality has a name
+that is not a derivative. For instance, the upright man takes his
+character from the possession of the quality of integrity, but the
+name given him is not derived from the word 'integrity'. Yet this does
+not occur often.
+We may therefore state that those things are said to be possessed of
+some specific quality which have a name derived from that of the
+aforesaid quality, or which are in some other way dependent on it.
+One quality may be the contrary of another; thus justice is the
+contrary of injustice, whiteness of blackness, and so on. The
+things, also, which are said to be such and such in virtue of these
+qualities, may be contrary the one to the other; for that which is
+unjust is contrary to that which is just, that which is white to
+that which is black. This, however, is not always the case. Red,
+yellow, and such colours, though qualities, have no contraries.
+If one of two contraries is a quality, the other will also be a
+quality. This will be evident from particular instances, if we apply
+the names
+used to denote the other categories; for instance, granted that
+justice is the contrary of injustice and justice is a quality,
+injustice will also be a quality: neither quantity, nor relation,
+nor place, nor indeed any other category but that of quality, will
+be applicable properly to injustice. So it is with all other
+contraries falling under the category of quality.
+Qualities admit of variation of degree. Whiteness is predicated of
+one thing in a greater or less degree than of another. This is also
+the case with reference to justice. Moreover, one and the same thing
+may exhibit a quality in a greater degree than it did before: if a
+thing is white, it may become whiter.
+Though this is generally the case, there are exceptions. For if we
+should say that justice admitted of variation of degree,
+difficulties might ensue, and this is true with regard to all those
+qualities which are dispositions. There are some, indeed, who
+dispute the possibility of variation here. They maintain that
+justice and health cannot very well admit of variation of degree
+themselves, but that people vary in the degree in which they possess
+these qualities, and that this is the case with grammatical learning
+and all those qualities which are classed as dispositions. However
+that may be, it is an incontrovertible fact that the things which in
+virtue of these qualities are said to be what they are vary in the
+degree in which they possess them; for one man is said to be better
+versed in grammar, or more healthy or just, than another, and so on.
+The qualities expressed by the terms 'triangular' and 'quadrangular'
+do not appear to admit of variation of degree, nor indeed do any
+that have to do with figure. For those things to which the
+definition of the triangle or circle is applicable are all equally
+triangular or circular. Those, on the other hand, to which the same
+definition is not applicable, cannot be said to differ from one
+another in degree; the square is no more a circle than the
+rectangle, for to neither is the definition of the circle appropriate.
+In short, if the definition of the term proposed is not applicable
+to both objects, they cannot be compared. Thus it is not all qualities
+which admit of variation of degree.
+Whereas none of the characteristics I have mentioned are peculiar to
+quality, the fact that likeness and unlikeness can be predicated
+with reference to quality only, gives to that category its distinctive
+feature. One thing is like another only with reference to that in
+virtue of which it is such and such; thus this forms the peculiar mark
+of quality.
+We must not be disturbed because it may be argued that, though
+proposing to discuss the category of quality, we have included in it
+many relative terms. We did say that habits and dispositions were
+relative. In practically all such cases the genus is relative, the
+individual not. Thus knowledge, as a genus, is explained by
+reference to something else, for we mean a knowledge of something. But
+particular branches of knowledge are not thus explained. The knowledge
+of grammar is not relative to anything external, nor is the
+knowledge of music, but these, if relative at all, are relative only
+in virtue of their genera; thus grammar is said be the knowledge of
+something, not the grammar of something; similarly music is the
+knowledge of something, not the music of something.
+Thus individual branches of knowledge are not relative. And it is
+because we possess these individual branches of knowledge that we
+are said to be such and such. It is these that we actually possess: we
+are called experts because we possess knowledge in some particular
+branch. Those particular branches, therefore, of knowledge, in
+virtue of which we are sometimes said to be such and such, are
+themselves qualities, and are not relative. Further, if anything
+should happen to fall within both the category of quality and that
+of relation, there would be nothing extraordinary in classing it under
+both these heads.
+Action and affection both admit of contraries and also of
+variation of degree. Heating is the contrary of cooling, being
+heated of being cooled, being glad of being vexed. Thus they admit
+of contraries. They also admit of variation of degree: for it is
+possible to heat in a greater or less degree; also to be heated in a
+greater or less degree. Thus action and affection also admit of
+variation of degree. So much, then, is stated with regard to these
+categories.
+We spoke, moreover, of the category of position when we were dealing
+with that of relation, and stated that such terms derived their
+names from those of the corresponding attitudes.
+As for the rest, time, place, state, since they are easily
+intelligible, I say no more about them than was said at the beginning,
+that in the category of state are included such states as 'shod',
+'armed', in that of place 'in the Lyceum' and so on, as was
+explained before.
+The proposed categories have, then, been adequately dealt with.
+We must next explain the various senses in which the term 'opposite'
+is used. Things are said to be opposed in four senses: (i) as
+correlatives to one another, (ii) as contraries to one another,
+(iii) as privatives to positives, (iv) as affirmatives to negatives.
+Let me sketch my meaning in outline. An instance of the use of the
+word 'opposite' with reference to correlatives is afforded by the
+expressions 'double' and 'half'; with reference to contraries by 'bad'
+and 'good'. Opposites in the sense of 'privatives' and 'positives'
+are' blindness' and 'sight'; in the sense of affirmatives and
+negatives, the propositions 'he sits', 'he does not sit'.
+(i) Pairs of opposites which fall under the category of relation are
+explained by a reference of the one to the other, the reference
+being indicated by the preposition 'of' or by some other
+preposition. Thus, double is a relative term, for that which is double
+is explained as the double of something. Knowledge, again, is the
+opposite of the thing known, in the same sense; and the thing known
+also is explained by its relation to its opposite, knowledge. For
+the thing known is explained as that which is known by something, that
+is, by knowledge. Such things, then, as are opposite the one to the
+other in the sense of being correlatives are explained by a
+reference of the one to the other.
+(ii) Pairs of opposites which are contraries are not in any way
+interdependent, but are contrary the one to the other. The good is not
+spoken of as the good of the had, but as the contrary of the bad,
+nor is white spoken of as the white of the black, but as the
+contrary of the black. These two types of opposition are therefore
+distinct. Those contraries which are such that the subjects in which
+they are naturally present, or of which they are predicated, must
+necessarily contain either the one or the other of them, have no
+intermediate, but those in the case of which no such necessity
+obtains, always have an intermediate. Thus disease and health are
+naturally present in the body of an animal, and it is necessary that
+either the one or the other should be present in the body of an
+animal. Odd and even, again, are predicated of number, and it is
+necessary that the one or the other should be present in numbers.
+Now there is no intermediate between the terms of either of these
+two pairs. On the other hand, in those contraries with regard to which
+no such necessity obtains, we find an intermediate. Blackness and
+whiteness are naturally present in the body, but it is not necessary
+that either the one or the other should be present in the body,
+inasmuch as it is not true to say that everybody must be white or
+black. Badness and goodness, again, are predicated of man, and of many
+other things, but it is not necessary that either the one quality or
+the other should be present in that of which they are predicated: it
+is not true to say that everything that may be good or bad must be
+either good or bad. These pairs of contraries have intermediates:
+the intermediates between white and black are grey, sallow, and all
+the other colours that come between; the intermediate between good and
+bad is that which is neither the one nor the other.
+Some intermediate qualities have names, such as grey and sallow
+and all the other colours that come between white and black; in
+other cases, however, it is not easy to name the intermediate, but
+we must define it as that which is not either extreme, as in the
+case of that which is neither good nor bad, neither just nor unjust.
+(iii) 'privatives' and 'Positives' have reference to the same
+subject. Thus, sight and blindness have reference to the eye. It is
+a universal rule that each of a pair of opposites of this type has
+reference to that to which the particular 'positive' is natural. We
+say that that is capable of some particular faculty or possession
+has suffered privation when the faculty or possession in question is
+in no way present in that in which, and at the time at which, it
+should naturally be present. We do not call that toothless which has
+not teeth, or that blind which has not sight, but rather that which
+has not teeth or sight at the time when by nature it should. For there
+are some creatures which from birth are without sight, or without
+teeth, but these are not called toothless or blind.
+To be without some faculty or to possess it is not the same as the
+corresponding 'privative' or 'positive'. 'Sight' is a 'positive',
+'blindness' a 'privative', but 'to possess sight' is not equivalent to
+'sight', 'to be blind' is not equivalent to 'blindness'. Blindness
+is a 'privative', to be blind is to be in a state of privation, but is
+not a 'privative'. Moreover, if 'blindness' were equivalent to
+'being blind', both would be predicated of the same subject; but
+though a man is said to be blind, he is by no means said to be
+blindness.
+To be in a state of 'possession' is, it appears, the opposite of
+being in a state of 'privation', just as 'positives' and
+'privatives' themselves are opposite. There is the same type of
+antithesis in both cases; for just as blindness is opposed to sight,
+so is being blind opposed to having sight.
+That which is affirmed or denied is not itself affirmation or
+denial. By 'affirmation' we mean an affirmative proposition, by
+'denial' a negative. Now, those facts which form the matter of the
+affirmation or denial are not propositions; yet these two are said
+to be opposed in the same sense as the affirmation and denial, for
+in this case also the type of antithesis is the same. For as the
+affirmation is opposed to the denial, as in the two propositions 'he
+sits', 'he does not sit', so also the fact which constitutes the
+matter of the proposition in one case is opposed to that in the other,
+his sitting, that is to say, to his not sitting.
+It is evident that 'positives' and 'privatives' are not opposed each
+to each in the same sense as relatives. The one is not explained by
+reference to the other; sight is not sight of blindness, nor is any
+other preposition used to indicate the relation. Similarly blindness
+is not said to be blindness of sight, but rather, privation of
+sight. Relatives, moreover, reciprocate; if blindness, therefore, were
+a relative, there would be a reciprocity of relation between it and
+that with which it was correlative. But this is not the case. Sight is
+not called the sight of blindness.
+That those terms which fall under the heads of 'positives' and
+'privatives' are not opposed each to each as contraries, either, is
+plain from the following facts: Of a pair of contraries such that they
+have no intermediate, one or the other must needs be present in the
+subject in which they naturally subsist, or of which they are
+predicated; for it is those, as we proved,' in the case of which
+this necessity obtains, that have no intermediate. Moreover, we
+cited health and disease, odd and even, as instances. But those
+contraries which have an intermediate are not subject to any such
+necessity. It is not necessary that every substance, receptive of such
+qualities, should be either black or white, cold or hot, for something
+intermediate between these contraries may very well be present in
+the subject. We proved, moreover, that those contraries have an
+intermediate in the case of which the said necessity does not
+obtain. Yet when one of the two contraries is a constitutive
+property of the subject, as it is a constitutive property of fire to
+be hot, of snow to be white, it is necessary determinately that one of
+the two contraries, not one or the other, should be present in the
+subject; for fire cannot be cold, or snow black. Thus, it is not the
+case here that one of the two must needs be present in every subject
+receptive of these qualities, but only in that subject of which the
+one forms a constitutive property. Moreover, in such cases it is one
+member of the pair determinately, and not either the one or the other,
+which must be present.
+In the case of 'positives' and 'privatives', on the other hand,
+neither of the aforesaid statements holds good. For it is not
+necessary that a subject receptive of the qualities should always have
+either the one or the other; that which has not yet advanced to the
+state when sight is natural is not said either to be blind or to
+see. Thus 'positives' and 'privatives' do not belong to that class
+of contraries which consists of those which have no intermediate. On
+the other hand, they do not belong either to that class which consists
+of contraries which have an intermediate. For under certain conditions
+it is necessary that either the one or the other should form part of
+the constitution of every appropriate subject. For when a thing has
+reached the stage when it is by nature capable of sight, it will be
+said either to see or to be blind, and that in an indeterminate sense,
+signifying that the capacity may be either present or absent; for it
+is not necessary either that it should see or that it should be blind,
+but that it should be either in the one state or in the other. Yet
+in the case of those contraries which have an intermediate we found
+that it was never necessary that either the one or the other should be
+present in every appropriate subject, but only that in certain
+subjects one of the pair should be present, and that in a
+determinate sense. It is, therefore, plain that 'positives' and
+'privatives' are not opposed each to each in either of the senses in
+which contraries are opposed.
+Again, in the case of contraries, it is possible that there should
+be changes from either into the other, while the subject retains its
+identity, unless indeed one of the contraries is a constitutive
+property of that subject, as heat is of fire. For it is possible
+that that that which is healthy should become diseased, that which
+is white, black, that which is cold, hot, that which is good, bad,
+that which is bad, good. The bad man, if he is being brought into a
+better way of life and thought, may make some advance, however slight,
+and if he should once improve, even ever so little, it is plain that
+he might change completely, or at any rate make very great progress;
+for a man becomes more and more easily moved to virtue, however
+small the improvement was at first. It is, therefore, natural to
+suppose that he will make yet greater progress than he has made in the
+past; and as this process goes on, it will change him completely and
+establish him in the contrary state, provided he is not hindered by
+lack of time. In the case of 'positives' and 'privatives', however,
+change in both directions is impossible. There may be a change from
+possession to privation, but not from privation to possession. The man
+who has become blind does not regain his sight; the man who has become
+bald does not regain his hair; the man who has lost his teeth does not
+grow his grow a new set. (iv) Statements opposed as affirmation and
+negation belong manifestly to a class which is distinct, for in this
+case, and in this case only, it is necessary for the one opposite to
+be true and the other false.
+Neither in the case of contraries, nor in the case of
+correlatives, nor in the case of 'positives' and 'privatives', is it
+necessary for one to be true and the other false. Health and disease
+are contraries: neither of them is true or false. 'Double' and
+'half' are opposed to each other as correlatives: neither of them is
+true or false. The case is the same, of course, with regard to
+'positives' and 'privatives' such as 'sight' and 'blindness'. In
+short, where there is no sort of combination of words, truth and
+falsity have no place, and all the opposites we have mentioned so
+far consist of simple words.
+At the same time, when the words which enter into opposed statements
+are contraries, these, more than any other set of opposites, would
+seem to claim this characteristic. 'Socrates is ill' is the contrary
+of 'Socrates is well', but not even of such composite expressions is
+it true to say that one of the pair must always be true and the
+other false. For if Socrates exists, one will be true and the other
+false, but if he does not exist, both will be false; for neither
+'Socrates is ill' nor 'Socrates is well' is true, if Socrates does not
+exist at all.
+In the case of 'positives' and 'privatives', if the subject does not
+exist at all, neither proposition is true, but even if the subject
+exists, it is not always the fact that one is true and the other
+false. For 'Socrates has sight' is the opposite of 'Socrates is blind'
+in the sense of the word 'opposite' which applies to possession and
+privation. Now if Socrates exists, it is not necessary that one should
+be true and the other false, for when he is not yet able to acquire
+the power of vision, both are false, as also if Socrates is altogether
+non-existent.
+But in the case of affirmation and negation, whether the subject
+exists or not, one is always false and the other true. For manifestly,
+if Socrates exists, one of the two propositions 'Socrates is ill',
+'Socrates is not ill', is true, and the other false. This is
+likewise the case if he does not exist; for if he does not exist, to
+say that he is ill is false, to say that he is not ill is true. Thus
+it is in the case of those opposites only, which are opposite in the
+sense in which the term is used with reference to affirmation and
+negation, that the rule holds good, that one of the pair must be
+true and the other false.
+That the contrary of a good is an evil is shown by induction: the
+contrary of health is disease, of courage, cowardice, and so on. But
+the contrary of an evil is sometimes a good, sometimes an evil. For
+defect, which is an evil, has excess for its contrary, this also being
+an evil, and the mean. which is a good, is equally the contrary of the
+one and of the other. It is only in a few cases, however, that we
+see instances of this: in most, the contrary of an evil is a good.
+In the case of contraries, it is not always necessary that if one
+exists the other should also exist: for if all become healthy there
+will be health and no disease, and again, if everything turns white,
+there will be white, but no black. Again, since the fact that Socrates
+is ill is the contrary of the fact that Socrates is well, and two
+contrary conditions cannot both obtain in one and the same
+individual at the same time, both these contraries could not exist
+at once: for if that Socrates was well was a fact, then that
+Socrates was ill could not possibly be one.
+It is plain that contrary attributes must needs be present in
+subjects which belong to the same species or genus. Disease and health
+require as their subject the body of an animal; white and black
+require a body, without further qualification; justice and injustice
+require as their subject the human soul.
+Moreover, it is necessary that pairs of contraries should in all
+cases either belong to the same genus or belong to contrary genera
+or be themselves genera. White and black belong to the same genus,
+colour; justice and injustice, to contrary genera, virtue and vice;
+while good and evil do not belong to genera, but are themselves actual
+genera, with terms under them.
+There are four senses in which one thing can be said to be 'prior'
+to another. Primarily and most properly the term has reference to
+time: in this sense the word is used to indicate that one thing is
+older or more ancient than another, for the expressions 'older' and
+'more ancient' imply greater length of time.
+Secondly, one thing is said to be 'prior' to another when the
+sequence of their being cannot be reversed. In this sense 'one' is
+'prior' to 'two'. For if 'two' exists, it follows directly that
+'one' must exist, but if 'one' exists, it does not follow
+necessarily that 'two' exists: thus the sequence subsisting cannot
+be reversed. It is agreed, then, that when the sequence of two
+things cannot be reversed, then that one on which the other depends is
+called 'prior' to that other.
+In the third place, the term 'prior' is used with reference to any
+order, as in the case of science and of oratory. For in sciences which
+use demonstration there is that which is prior and that which is
+posterior in order; in geometry, the elements are prior to the
+propositions; in reading and writing, the letters of the alphabet
+are prior to the syllables. Similarly, in the case of speeches, the
+exordium is prior in order to the narrative.
+Besides these senses of the word, there is a fourth. That which is
+better and more honourable is said to have a natural priority. In
+common parlance men speak of those whom they honour and love as
+'coming first' with them. This sense of the word is perhaps the most
+far-fetched.
+Such, then, are the different senses in which the term 'prior' is
+used.
+Yet it would seem that besides those mentioned there is yet another.
+For in those things, the being of each of which implies that of the
+other, that which is in any way the cause may reasonably be said to be
+by nature 'prior' to the effect. It is plain that there are
+instances of this. The fact of the being of a man carries with it
+the truth of the proposition that he is, and the implication is
+reciprocal: for if a man is, the proposition wherein we allege that he
+is true, and conversely, if the proposition wherein we allege that
+he is true, then he is. The true proposition, however, is in no way
+the cause of the being of the man, but the fact of the man's being
+does seem somehow to be the cause of the truth of the proposition, for
+the truth or falsity of the proposition depends on the fact of the
+man's being or not being.
+Thus the word 'prior' may be used in five senses.
+The term 'simultaneous' is primarily and most appropriately
+applied to those things the genesis of the one of which is
+simultaneous with that of the other; for in such cases neither is
+prior or posterior to the other. Such things are said to be
+simultaneous in point of time. Those things, again, are 'simultaneous'
+in point of nature, the being of each of which involves that of the
+other, while at the same time neither is the cause of the other's
+being. This is the case with regard to the double and the half, for
+these are reciprocally dependent, since, if there is a double, there
+is also a half, and if there is a half, there is also a double,
+while at the same time neither is the cause of the being of the other.
+Again, those species which are distinguished one from another and
+opposed one to another within the same genus are said to be
+'simultaneous' in nature. I mean those species which are
+distinguished each from each by one and the same method of division.
+Thus the 'winged' species is simultaneous with the 'terrestrial' and
+the 'water' species. These are distinguished within the same genus,
+and are opposed each to each, for the genus 'animal' has the 'winged',
+the 'terrestrial', and the 'water' species, and no one of these is
+prior or posterior to another; on the contrary, all such things appear
+to be 'simultaneous' in nature. Each of these also, the terrestrial,
+the winged, and the water species, can be divided again into
+subspecies. Those species, then, also will be 'simultaneous' point
+of nature, which, belonging to the same genus, are distinguished
+each from each by one and the same method of differentiation.
+But genera are prior to species, for the sequence of their being
+cannot be reversed. If there is the species 'water-animal', there will
+be the genus 'animal', but granted the being of the genus 'animal', it
+does not follow necessarily that there will be the species
+'water-animal'.
+Those things, therefore, are said to be 'simultaneous' in nature,
+the being of each of which involves that of the other, while at the
+same time neither is in any way the cause of the other's being;
+those species, also, which are distinguished each from each and
+opposed within the same genus. Those things, moreover, are
+'simultaneous' in the unqualified sense of the word which come into
+being at the same time.
+There are six sorts of movement: generation, destruction,
+increase, diminution, alteration, and change of place.
+It is evident in all but one case that all these sorts of movement
+are distinct each from each. Generation is distinct from
+destruction, increase and change of place from diminution, and so
+on. But in the case of alteration it may be argued that the process
+necessarily implies one or other of the other five sorts of motion.
+This is not true, for we may say that all affections, or nearly all,
+produce in us an alteration which is distinct from all other sorts
+of motion, for that which is affected need not suffer either
+increase or diminution or any of the other sorts of motion. Thus
+alteration is a distinct sort of motion; for, if it were not, the
+thing altered would not only be altered, but would forthwith
+necessarily suffer increase or diminution or some one of the other
+sorts of motion in addition; which as a matter of fact is not the
+case. Similarly that which was undergoing the process of increase or
+was subject to some other sort of motion would, if alteration were not
+a distinct form of motion, necessarily be subject to alteration
+also. But there are some things which undergo increase but yet not
+alteration. The square, for instance, if a gnomon is applied to it,
+undergoes increase but not alteration, and so it is with all other
+figures of this sort. Alteration and increase, therefore, are
+distinct.
+Speaking generally, rest is the contrary of motion. But the
+different forms of motion have their own contraries in other forms;
+thus destruction is the contrary of generation, diminution of
+increase, rest in a place, of change of place. As for this last,
+change in the reverse direction would seem to be most truly its
+contrary; thus motion upwards is the contrary of motion downwards
+and vice versa.
+In the case of that sort of motion which yet remains, of those
+that have been enumerated, it is not easy to state what is its
+contrary. It appears to have no contrary, unless one should define the
+contrary here also either as 'rest in its quality' or as 'change in
+the direction of the contrary quality', just as we defined the
+contrary of change of place either as rest in a place or as change
+in the reverse direction. For a thing is altered when change of
+quality takes place; therefore either rest in its quality or change in
+the direction of the contrary may be called the contrary of this
+qualitative form of motion. In this way becoming white is the contrary
+of becoming black; there is alteration in the contrary direction,
+since a change of a qualitative nature takes place.
+The term 'to have' is used in various senses. In the first place
+it is used with reference to habit or disposition or any other
+quality, for we are said to 'have' a piece of knowledge or a virtue.
+Then, again, it has reference to quantity, as, for instance, in the
+case of a man's height; for he is said to 'have' a height of three
+or four cubits. It is used, moreover, with regard to apparel, a man
+being said to 'have' a coat or tunic; or in respect of something which
+we have on a part of ourselves, as a ring on the hand: or in respect
+of something which is a part of us, as hand or foot. The term refers
+also to content, as in the case of a vessel and wheat, or of a jar and
+wine; a jar is said to 'have' wine, and a corn-measure wheat. The
+expression in such cases has reference to content. Or it refers to
+that which has been acquired; we are said to 'have' a house or a
+field. A man is also said to 'have' a wife, and a wife a husband,
+and this appears to be the most remote meaning of the term, for by the
+use of it we mean simply that the husband lives with the wife.
+Other senses of the word might perhaps be found, but the most
+ordinary ones have all been enumerated.
+-THE END-

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