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categories_by_aristotle [2018/04/21 03:28] (current)
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 +====== Categories ======
 +by [[ancients:​aristotle|Aristotle]]
 +translated by E. M. Edghill
 +Things are said to be named '​equivocally'​ when, though they have a
 +common name, the definition corresponding with the name differs for
 +each. Thus, a real man and a figure in a picture can both lay claim to
 +the name '​animal';​ yet these are equivocally so named, for, though
 +they have a common name, the definition corresponding with the name
 +differs for each. For should any one define in what sense each is an
 +animal, his definition in the one case will be appropriate to that
 +case only.
 +On the other hand, things are said to be named '​univocally'​ which
 +have both the name and the definition answering to the name in common.
 +A man and an ox are both '​animal',​ and these are univocally so
 +named, inasmuch as not only the name, but also the definition, is
 +the same in both cases: for if a man should state in what sense each
 +is an animal, the statement in the one case would be identical with
 +that in the other.
 +Things are said to be named '​derivatively',​ which derive their
 +name from some other name, but differ from it in termination. Thus the
 +grammarian derives his name from the word '​grammar',​ and the
 +courageous man from the word '​courage'​.
 +Forms of speech are either simple or composite. Examples of the
 +latter are such expressions as 'the man runs', 'the man wins'; of the
 +former '​man',​ '​ox',​ '​runs',​ '​wins'​.
 +Of things themselves some are predicable of a subject, and are never
 +present in a subject. Thus '​man'​ is predicable of the individual
 +man, and is never present in a subject.
 +By being '​present in a subject'​ I do not mean present as parts are
 +present in a whole, but being incapable of existence apart from the
 +said subject.
 +Some things, again, are present in a subject, but are never
 +predicable of a subject. For instance, a certain point of
 +grammatical knowledge is present in the mind, but is not predicable of
 +any subject; or again, a certain whiteness may be present in the
 +body (for colour requires a material basis), yet it is never
 +predicable of anything.
 +Other things, again, are both predicable of a subject and present in
 +a subject. Thus while knowledge is present in the human mind, it is
 +predicable of grammar.
 +There is, lastly, a class of things which are neither present in a
 +subject nor predicable of a subject, such as the individual man or the
 +individual horse. But, to speak more generally, that which is
 +individual and has the character of a unit is never predicable of a
 +subject. Yet in some cases there is nothing to prevent such being
 +present in a subject. Thus a certain point of grammatical knowledge is
 +present in a subject.
 +When one thing is predicated of another, all that which is
 +predicable of the predicate will be predicable also of the subject.
 +Thus, '​man'​ is predicated of the individual man; but '​animal'​ is
 +predicated of '​man';​ it will, therefore, be predicable of the
 +individual man also: for the individual man is both '​man'​ and
 +If genera are different and co-ordinate,​ their differentiae are
 +themselves different in kind. Take as an instance the genus '​animal'​
 +and the genus '​knowledge'​. 'With feet', '​two-footed',​ '​winged',​
 +'​aquatic',​ are differentiae of '​animal';​ the species of knowledge
 +are not distinguished by the same differentiae. One species of
 +knowledge does not differ from another in being '​two-footed'​.
 +But where one genus is subordinate to another, there is nothing to
 +prevent their having the same differentiae:​ for the greater class is
 +predicated of the lesser, so that all the differentiae of the
 +predicate will be differentiae also of the subject.
 +Expressions which are in no way composite signify substance,
 +quantity, quality, relation, place, time, position, state, action,
 +or affection. To sketch my meaning roughly, examples of substance
 +are '​man'​ or 'the horse',​ of quantity, such terms as 'two cubits long'
 +or 'three cubits long', of quality, such attributes as '​white',​
 +'​grammatical'​. '​Double',​ '​half',​ '​greater',​ fall under the category of
 +relation; 'in a the market place',​ 'in the Lyceum',​ under that of
 +place; '​yesterday',​ 'last year', under that of time. '​Lying',​
 +'​sitting',​ are terms indicating position, '​shod',​ '​armed',​ state;
 +'to lance',​ 'to cauterize',​ action; 'to be lanced',​ 'to be
 +cauterized',​ affection.
 +No one of these terms, in and by itself, involves an affirmation;​ it
 +is by the combination of such terms that positive or negative
 +statements arise. For every assertion must, as is admitted, be
 +either true or false, whereas expressions which are not in any way
 +composite such as '​man',​ '​white',​ '​runs',​ '​wins',​ cannot be either
 +true or false.
 +Substance, in the truest and primary and most definite sense of
 +the word, is that which is neither predicable of a subject nor present
 +in a subject; for instance, the individual man or horse. But in a
 +secondary sense those things are called substances within which, as
 +species, the primary substances are included; also those which, as
 +genera, include the species. For instance, the individual man is
 +included in the species '​man',​ and the genus to which the species
 +belongs is '​animal';​ these, therefore-that is to say, the species
 +'​man'​ and the genus '​animal,​-are termed secondary substances.
 +It is plain from what has been said that both the name and the
 +definition of the predicate must be predicable of the subject. For
 +instance, '​man'​ is predicted of the individual man. Now in this case
 +the name of the species man' is applied to the individual, for we
 +use the term '​man'​ in describing the individual; and the definition of
 +'​man'​ will also be predicated of the individual man, for the
 +individual man is both man and animal. Thus, both the name and the
 +definition of the species are predicable of the individual.
 +With regard, on the other hand, to those things which are present in
 +a subject, it is generally the case that neither their name nor
 +their definition is predicable of that in which they are present.
 +Though, however, the definition is never predicable, there is
 +nothing in certain cases to prevent the name being used. For instance,
 +'​white'​ being present in a body is predicated of that in which it is
 +present, for a body is called white: the definition, however, of the
 +colour white' is never predicable of the body.
 +Everything except primary substances is either predicable of a
 +primary substance or present in a primary substance. This becomes
 +evident by reference to particular instances which occur. '​Animal'​
 +is predicated of the species '​man',​ therefore of the individual man,
 +for if there were no individual man of whom it could be predicated, it
 +could not be predicated of the species '​man'​ at all. Again, colour
 +is present in body, therefore in individual bodies, for if there
 +were no individual body in which it was present, it could not be
 +present in body at all. Thus everything except primary substances is
 +either predicated of primary substances, or is present in them, and if
 +these last did not exist, it would be impossible for anything else
 +to exist.
 +Of secondary substances, the species is more truly substance than
 +the genus, being more nearly related to primary substance. For if
 +any one should render an account of what a primary substance is, he
 +would render a more instructive account, and one more proper to the
 +subject, by stating the species than by stating the genus. Thus, he
 +would give a more instructive account of an individual man by
 +stating that he was man than by stating that he was animal, for the
 +former description is peculiar to the individual in a greater
 +degree, while the latter is too general. Again, the man who gives an
 +account of the nature of an individual tree will give a more
 +instructive account by mentioning the species '​tree'​ than by
 +mentioning the genus '​plant'​.
 +Moreover, primary substances are most properly called substances
 +in virtue of the fact that they are the entities which underlie every.
 +else, and that everything else is either predicated of them or present
 +in them. Now the same relation which subsists between primary
 +substance and everything else subsists also between the species and
 +the genus: for the species is to the genus as subject is to predicate,
 +since the genus is predicated of the species, whereas the species
 +cannot be predicated of the genus. Thus we have a second ground for
 +asserting that the species is more truly substance than the genus.
 +Of species themselves, except in the case of such as are genera,
 +no one is more truly substance than another. We should not give a more
 +appropriate account of the individual man by stating the species to
 +which he belonged, than we should of an individual horse by adopting
 +the same method of definition. In the same way, of primary substances,
 +no one is more truly substance than another; an individual man is
 +not more truly substance than an individual ox.
 +It is, then, with good reason that of all that remains, when we
 +exclude primary substances, we concede to species and genera alone the
 +name '​secondary substance',​ for these alone of all the predicates
 +convey a knowledge of primary substance. For it is by stating the
 +species or the genus that we appropriately define any individual
 +man; and we shall make our definition more exact by stating the former
 +than by stating the latter. All other things that we state, such as
 +that he is white, that he runs, and so on, are irrelevant to the
 +definition. Thus it is just that these alone, apart from primary
 +substances, should be called substances.
 +Further, primary substances are most properly so called, because
 +they underlie and are the subjects of everything else. Now the same
 +relation that subsists between primary substance and everything else
 +subsists also between the species and the genus to which the primary
 +substance belongs, on the one hand, and every attribute which is not
 +included within these, on the other. For these are the subjects of all
 +such. If we call an individual man '​skilled in grammar',​ the predicate
 +is applicable also to the species and to the genus to which he
 +belongs. This law holds good in all cases.
 +It is a common characteristic of all sub. stance that it is never
 +present in a subject. For primary substance is neither present in a
 +subject nor predicated of a subject; while, with regard to secondary
 +substances, it is clear from the following arguments (apart from
 +others) that they are not present in a subject. For '​man'​ is
 +predicated of the individual man, but is not present in any subject:
 +for manhood is not present in the individual man. In the same way,
 +'​animal'​ is also predicated of the individual man, but is not
 +present in him. Again, when a thing is present in a subject, though
 +the name may quite well be applied to that in which it is present, the
 +definition cannot be applied. Yet of secondary substances, not only
 +the name, but also the definition, applies to the subject: we should
 +use both the definition of the species and that of the genus with
 +reference to the individual man. Thus substance cannot be present in a
 +Yet this is not peculiar to substance, for it is also the case
 +that differentiae cannot be present in subjects. The characteristics
 +'​terrestrial'​ and '​two-footed'​ are predicated of the species '​man',​
 +but not present in it. For they are not in man. Moreover, the
 +definition of the differentia may be predicated of that of which the
 +differentia itself is predicated. For instance, if the
 +characteristic '​terrestrial'​ is predicated of the species '​man',​ the
 +definition also of that characteristic may be used to form the
 +predicate of the species '​man':​ for '​man'​ is terrestrial.
 +The fact that the parts of substances appear to be present in the
 +whole, as in a subject, should not make us apprehensive lest we should
 +have to admit that such parts are not substances: for in explaining
 +the phrase 'being present in a subject',​ we stated'​ that we meant
 +'​otherwise than as parts in a whole'​.
 +It is the mark of substances and of differentiae that, in all
 +propositions of which they form the predicate, they are predicated
 +univocally. For all such propositions have for their subject either
 +the individual or the species. It is true that, inasmuch as primary
 +substance is not predicable of anything, it can never form the
 +predicate of any proposition. But of secondary substances, the species
 +is predicated of the individual, the genus both of the species and
 +of the individual. Similarly the differentiae are predicated of the
 +species and of the individuals. Moreover, the definition of the
 +species and that of the genus are applicable to the primary substance,
 +and that of the genus to the species. For all that is predicated of
 +the predicate will be predicated also of the subject. Similarly, the
 +definition of the differentiae will be applicable to the species and
 +to the individuals. But it was stated above that the word '​univocal'​
 +was applied to those things which had both name and definition in
 +common. It is, therefore, established that in every proposition,​ of
 +which either substance or a differentia forms the predicate, these are
 +predicated univocally.
 +All substance appears to signify that which is individual. In the
 +case of primary substance this is indisputably true, for the thing
 +is a unit. In the case of secondary substances, when we speak, for
 +instance, of '​man'​ or '​animal',​ our form of speech gives the
 +impression that we are here also indicating that which is
 +individual, but the impression is not strictly true; for a secondary
 +substance is not an individual, but a class with a certain
 +qualification;​ for it is not one and single as a primary substance is;
 +the words '​man',​ '​animal',​ are predicable of more than one subject.
 +Yet species and genus do not merely indicate quality, like the
 +term '​white';​ '​white'​ indicates quality and nothing further, but
 +species and genus determine the quality with reference to a substance:
 +they signify substance qualitatively differentiated. The determinate
 +qualification covers a larger field in the case of the genus that in
 +that of the species: he who uses the word '​animal'​ is herein using a
 +word of wider extension than he who uses the word '​man'​.
 +Another mark of substance is that it has no contrary. What could
 +be the contrary of any primary substance, such as the individual man
 +or animal? It has none. Nor can the species or the genus have a
 +contrary. Yet this characteristic is not peculiar to substance, but is
 +true of many other things, such as quantity. There is nothing that
 +forms the contrary of 'two cubits long' or of 'three cubits long',
 +or of '​ten',​ or of any such term. A man may contend that '​much'​ is the
 +contrary of '​little',​ or '​great'​ of '​small',​ but of definite
 +quantitative terms no contrary exists.
 +Substance, again, does not appear to admit of variation of degree. I
 +do not mean by this that one substance cannot be more or less truly
 +substance than another, for it has already been stated'​ that this is
 +the case; but that no single substance admits of varying degrees
 +within itself. For instance, one particular substance, '​man',​ cannot
 +be more or less man either than himself at some other time or than
 +some other man. One man cannot be more man than another, as that which
 +is white may be more or less white than some other white object, or as
 +that which is beautiful may be more or less beautiful than some
 +other beautiful object. The same quality, moreover, is said to subsist
 +in a thing in varying degrees at different times. A body, being white,
 +is said to be whiter at one time than it was before, or, being warm,
 +is said to be warmer or less warm than at some other time. But
 +substance is not said to be more or less that which it is: a man is
 +not more truly a man at one time than he was before, nor is
 +anything, if it is substance, more or less what it is. Substance,
 +then, does not admit of variation of degree.
 +The most distinctive mark of substance appears to be that, while
 +remaining numerically one and the same, it is capable of admitting
 +contrary qualities. From among things other than substance, we
 +should find ourselves unable to bring forward any which possessed this
 +mark. Thus, one and the same colour cannot be white and black. Nor can
 +the same one action be good and bad: this law holds good with
 +everything that is not substance. But one and the selfsame
 +substance, while retaining its identity, is yet capable of admitting
 +contrary qualities. The same individual person is at one time white,
 +at another black, at one time warm, at another cold, at one time good,
 +at another bad. This capacity is found nowhere else, though it might
 +be maintained that a statement or opinion was an exception to the
 +rule. The same statement, it is agreed, can be both true and false.
 +For if the statement 'he is sitting'​ is true, yet, when the person
 +in question has risen, the same statement will be false. The same
 +applies to opinions. For if any one thinks truly that a person is
 +sitting, yet, when that person has risen, this same opinion, if
 +still held, will be false. Yet although this exception may be allowed,
 +there is, nevertheless,​ a difference in the manner in which the
 +thing takes place. It is by themselves changing that substances
 +admit contrary qualities. It is thus that that which was hot becomes
 +cold, for it has entered into a different state. Similarly that
 +which was white becomes black, and that which was bad good, by a
 +process of change; and in the same way in all other cases it is by
 +changing that substances are capable of admitting contrary
 +qualities. But statements and opinions themselves remain unaltered
 +in all respects: it is by the alteration in the facts of the case that
 +the contrary quality comes to be theirs. The statement 'he is sitting'​
 +remains unaltered, but it is at one time true, at another false,
 +according to circumstances. What has been said of statements applies
 +also to opinions. Thus, in respect of the manner in which the thing
 +takes place, it is the peculiar mark of substance that it should be
 +capable of admitting contrary qualities; for it is by itself
 +changing that it does so.
 +If, then, a man should make this exception and contend that
 +statements and opinions are capable of admitting contrary qualities,
 +his contention is unsound. For statements and opinions are said to
 +have this capacity, not because they themselves undergo
 +modification,​ but because this modification occurs in the case of
 +something else. The truth or falsity of a statement depends on
 +facts, and not on any power on the part of the statement itself of
 +admitting contrary qualities. In short, there is nothing which can
 +alter the nature of statements and opinions. As, then, no change takes
 +place in themselves, these cannot be said to be capable of admitting
 +contrary qualities.
 +But it is by reason of the modification which takes place within the
 +substance itself that a substance is said to be capable of admitting
 +contrary qualities; for a substance admits within itself either
 +disease or health, whiteness or blackness. It is in this sense that it
 +is said to be capable of admitting contrary qualities.
 +To sum up, it is a distinctive mark of substance, that, while
 +remaining numerically one and the same, it is capable of admitting
 +contrary qualities, the modification taking place through a change
 +in the substance itself.
 +Let these remarks suffice on the subject of substance.
 +Quantity is either discrete or continuous. Moreover, some quantities
 +are such that each part of the whole has a relative position to the
 +other parts: others have within them no such relation of part to part.
 +Instances of discrete quantities are number and speech; of
 +continuous, lines, surfaces, solids, and, besides these, time and
 +In the case of the parts of a number, there is no common boundary at
 +which they join. For example: two fives make ten, but the two fives
 +have no common boundary, but are separate; the parts three and seven
 +also do not join at any boundary. Nor, to generalize, would it ever be
 +possible in the case of number that there should be a common
 +boundary among the parts; they are always separate. Number, therefore,
 +is a discrete quantity.
 +The same is true of speech. That speech is a quantity is evident:
 +for it is measured in long and short syllables. I mean here that
 +speech which is vocal. Moreover, it is a discrete quantity for its
 +parts have no common boundary. There is no common boundary at which
 +the syllables join, but each is separate and distinct from the rest.
 +A line, on the other hand, is a continuous quantity, for it is
 +possible to find a common boundary at which its parts join. In the
 +case of the line, this common boundary is the point; in the case of
 +the plane, it is the line: for the parts of the plane have also a
 +common boundary. Similarly you can find a common boundary in the
 +case of the parts of a solid, namely either a line or a plane.
 +Space and time also belong to this class of quantities. Time,
 +past, present, and future, forms a continuous whole. Space,
 +likewise, is a continuous quantity; for the parts of a solid occupy
 +a certain space, and these have a common boundary; it follows that the
 +parts of space also, which are occupied by the parts of the solid,
 +have the same common boundary as the parts of the solid. Thus, not
 +only time, but space also, is a continuous quantity, for its parts
 +have a common boundary.
 +Quantities consist either of parts which bear a relative position
 +each to each, or of parts which do not. The parts of a line bear a
 +relative position to each other, for each lies somewhere, and it would
 +be possible to distinguish each, and to state the position of each
 +on the plane and to explain to what sort of part among the rest each
 +was contiguous. Similarly the parts of a plane have position, for it
 +could similarly be stated what was the position of each and what
 +sort of parts were contiguous. The same is true with regard to the
 +solid and to space. But it would be impossible to show that the arts
 +of a number had a relative position each to each, or a particular
 +position, or to state what parts were contiguous. Nor could this be
 +done in the case of time, for none of the parts of time has an abiding
 +existence, and that which does not abide can hardly have position.
 +It would be better to say that such parts had a relative order, in
 +virtue of one being prior to another. Similarly with number: in
 +counting, '​one'​ is prior to '​two',​ and '​two'​ to '​three',​ and thus
 +the parts of number may be said to possess a relative order, though it
 +would be impossible to discover any distinct position for each. This
 +holds good also in the case of speech. None of its parts has an
 +abiding existence: when once a syllable is pronounced, it is not
 +possible to retain it, so that, naturally, as the parts do not
 +abide, they cannot have position. Thus, some quantities consist of
 +parts which have position, and some of those which have not.
 +Strictly speaking, only the things which I have mentioned belong
 +to the category of quantity: everything else that is called
 +quantitative is a quantity in a secondary sense. It is because we have
 +in mind some one of these quantities, properly so called, that we
 +apply quantitative terms to other things. We speak of what is white as
 +large, because the surface over which the white extends is large; we
 +speak of an action or a process as lengthy, because the time covered
 +is long; these things cannot in their own right claim the quantitative
 +epithet. For instance, should any one explain how long an action
 +was, his statement would be made in terms of the time taken, to the
 +effect that it lasted a year, or something of that sort. In the same
 +way, he would explain the size of a white object in terms of
 +surface, for he would state the area which it covered. Thus the things
 +already mentioned, and these alone, are in their intrinsic nature
 +quantities; nothing else can claim the name in its own right, but,
 +if at all, only in a secondary sense.
 +Quantities have no contraries. In the case of definite quantities
 +this is obvious; thus, there is nothing that is the contrary of 'two
 +cubits long' or of 'three cubits long', or of a surface, or of any
 +such quantities. A man might, indeed, argue that '​much'​ was the
 +contrary of '​little',​ and '​great'​ of '​small'​. But these are not
 +quantitative,​ but relative; things are not great or small
 +absolutely, they are so called rather as the result of an act of
 +comparison. For instance, a mountain is called small, a grain large,
 +in virtue of the fact that the latter is greater than others of its
 +kind, the former less. Thus there is a reference here to an external
 +standard, for if the terms '​great'​ and '​small'​ were used absolutely, a
 +mountain would never be called small or a grain large. Again, we say
 +that there are many people in a village, and few in Athens, although
 +those in the city are many times as numerous as those in the
 +village: or we say that a house has many in it, and a theatre few,
 +though those in the theatre far outnumber those in the house. The
 +terms 'two cubits long, "three cubits long,' and so on indicate
 +quantity, the terms '​great'​ and '​small'​ indicate relation, for they
 +have reference to an external standard. It is, therefore, plain that
 +these are to be classed as relative.
 +Again, whether we define them as quantitative or not, they have no
 +contraries: for how can there be a contrary of an attribute which is
 +not to be apprehended in or by itself, but only by reference to
 +something external? Again, if '​great'​ and '​small'​ are contraries, it
 +will come about that the same subject can admit contrary qualities
 +at one and the same time, and that things will themselves be
 +contrary to themselves. For it happens at times that the same thing is
 +both small and great. For the same thing may be small in comparison
 +with one thing, and great in comparison with another, so that the same
 +thing comes to be both small and great at one and the same time, and
 +is of such a nature as to admit contrary qualities at one and the same
 +moment. Yet it was agreed, when substance was being discussed, that
 +nothing admits contrary qualities at one and the same moment. For
 +though substance is capable of admitting contrary qualities, yet no
 +one is at the same time both sick and healthy, nothing is at the
 +same time both white and black. Nor is there anything which is
 +qualified in contrary ways at one and the same time.
 +Moreover, if these were contraries, they would themselves be
 +contrary to themselves. For if '​great'​ is the contrary of '​small',​ and
 +the same thing is both great and small at the same time, then
 +'​small'​ or '​great'​ is the contrary of itself. But this is
 +impossible. The term '​great',​ therefore, is not the contrary of the
 +term '​small',​ nor '​much'​ of '​little'​. And even though a man should
 +call these terms not relative but quantitative,​ they would not have
 +It is in the case of space that quantity most plausibly appears to
 +admit of a contrary. For men define the term '​above'​ as the contrary
 +of '​below',​ when it is the region at the centre they mean by
 +'​below';​ and this is so, because nothing is farther from the
 +extremities of the universe than the region at the centre. Indeed,
 +it seems that in defining contraries of every kind men have recourse
 +to a spatial metaphor, for they say that those things are contraries
 +which, within the same class, are separated by the greatest possible
 +Quantity does not, it appears, admit of variation of degree. One
 +thing cannot be two cubits long in a greater degree than another.
 +Similarly with regard to number: what is '​three'​ is not more truly
 +three than what is '​five'​ is five; nor is one set of three more
 +truly three than another set. Again, one period of time is not said to
 +be more truly time than another. Nor is there any other kind of
 +quantity, of all that have been mentioned, with regard to which
 +variation of degree can be predicated. The category of quantity,
 +therefore, does not admit of variation of degree.
 +The most distinctive mark of quantity is that equality and
 +inequality are predicated of it. Each of the aforesaid quantities is
 +said to be equal or unequal. For instance, one solid is said to be
 +equal or unequal to another; number, too, and time can have these
 +terms applied to them, indeed can all those kinds of quantity that
 +have been mentioned.
 +That which is not a quantity can by no means, it would seem, be
 +termed equal or unequal to anything else. One particular disposition
 +or one particular quality, such as whiteness, is by no means
 +compared with another in terms of equality and inequality but rather
 +in terms of similarity. Thus it is the distinctive mark of quantity
 +that it can be called equal and unequal.
 +Those things are called relative, which, being either said to be
 +of something else or related to something else, are explained by
 +reference to that other thing. For instance, the word '​superior'​ is
 +explained by reference to something else, for it is superiority over
 +something else that is meant. Similarly, the expression '​double'​ has
 +this external reference, for it is the double of something else that
 +is meant. So it is with everything else of this kind. There are,
 +moreover, other relatives, e.g. habit, disposition,​ perception,
 +knowledge, and attitude. The significance of all these is explained by
 +a reference to something else and in no other way. Thus, a habit is
 +a habit of something, knowledge is knowledge of something, attitude is
 +the attitude of something. So it is with all other relatives that have
 +been mentioned. Those terms, then, are called relative, the nature
 +of which is explained by reference to something else, the
 +preposition '​of'​ or some other preposition being used to indicate
 +the relation. Thus, one mountain is called great in comparison with
 +son with another; for the mountain claims this attribute by comparison
 +with something. Again, that which is called similar must be similar to
 +something else, and all other such attributes have this external
 +reference. It is to be noted that lying and standing and sitting are
 +particular attitudes, but attitude is itself a relative term. To
 +lie, to stand, to be seated, are not themselves attitudes, but take
 +their name from the aforesaid attitudes.
 +It is possible for relatives to have contraries. Thus virtue has a
 +contrary, vice, these both being relatives; knowledge, too, has a
 +contrary, ignorance. But this is not the mark of all relatives;
 +'​double'​ and '​triple'​ have no contrary, nor indeed has any such term.
 +It also appears that relatives can admit of variation of degree. For
 +'​like'​ and '​unlike',​ '​equal'​ and '​unequal',​ have the modifications
 +'​more'​ and '​less'​ applied to them, and each of these is relative in
 +character: for the terms '​like'​ and '​unequal'​ bear '​unequal'​ bear a
 +reference to something external. Yet, again, it is not every
 +relative term that admits of variation of degree. No term such as
 +'​double'​ admits of this modification. All relatives have correlatives:​
 +by the term '​slave'​ we mean the slave of a master, by the term
 +'​master',​ the master of a slave; by '​double',​ the double of its
 +hall; by '​half',​ the half of its double; by '​greater',​ greater than
 +that which is less; by '​less,'​ less than that which is greater.
 +So it is with every other relative term; but the case we use to
 +express the correlation differs in some instances. Thus, by
 +knowledge we mean knowledge the knowable; by the knowable, that
 +which is to be apprehended by knowledge; by perception, perception
 +of the perceptible;​ by the perceptible,​ that which is apprehended by
 +Sometimes, however, reciprocity of correlation does not appear to
 +exist. This comes about when a blunder is made, and that to which
 +the relative is related is not accurately stated. If a man states that
 +a wing is necessarily relative to a bird, the connexion between
 +these two will not be reciprocal, for it will not be possible to say
 +that a bird is a bird by reason of its wings. The reason is that the
 +original statement was inaccurate, for the wing is not said to be
 +relative to the bird qua bird, since many creatures besides birds have
 +wings, but qua winged creature. If, then, the statement is made
 +accurate, the connexion will be reciprocal, for we can speak of a
 +wing, having reference necessarily to a winged creature, and of a
 +winged creature as being such because of its wings.
 +Occasionally,​ perhaps, it is necessary to coin words, if no word
 +exists by which a correlation can adequately be explained. If we
 +define a rudder as necessarily having reference to a boat, our
 +definition will not be appropriate,​ for the rudder does not have
 +this reference to a boat qua boat, as there are boats which have no
 +rudders. Thus we cannot use the terms reciprocally,​ for the word
 +'​boat'​ cannot be said to find its explanation in the word '​rudder'​. As
 +there is no existing word, our definition would perhaps be more
 +accurate if we coined some word like '​ruddered'​ as the correlative
 +of '​rudder'​. If we express ourselves thus accurately, at any rate
 +the terms are reciprocally connected, for the '​ruddered'​ thing is
 +'​ruddered'​ in virtue of its rudder. So it is in all other cases. A
 +head will be more accurately defined as the correlative of that
 +which is '​headed',​ than as that of an animal, for the animal does
 +not have a head qua animal, since many animals have no head.
 +Thus we may perhaps most easily comprehend that to which a thing
 +is related, when a name does not exist, if, from that which has a
 +name, we derive a new name, and apply it to that with which the
 +first is reciprocally connected, as in the aforesaid instances, when
 +we derived the word '​winged'​ from '​wing'​ and from '​rudder'​.
 +All relatives, then, if properly defined, have a correlative. I
 +add this condition because, if that to which they are related is
 +stated as haphazard and not accurately, the two are not found to be
 +interdependent. Let me state what I mean more clearly. Even in the
 +case of acknowledged correlatives,​ and where names exist for each,
 +there will be no interdependence if one of the two is denoted, not
 +by that name which expresses the correlative notion, but by one of
 +irrelevant significance. The term '​slave,'​ if defined as related,
 +not to a master, but to a man, or a biped, or anything of that sort,
 +is not reciprocally connected with that in relation to which it is
 +defined, for the statement is not exact. Further, if one thing is said
 +to be correlative with another, and the terminology used is correct,
 +then, though all irrelevant attributes should be removed, and only
 +that one attribute left in virtue of which it was correctly stated
 +to be correlative with that other, the stated correlation will still
 +exist. If the correlative of 'the slave' is said to be 'the master',​
 +then, though all irrelevant attributes of the said '​master',​ such as
 +'​biped',​ '​receptive of knowledge',​ '​human',​ should be removed, and the
 +attribute '​master'​ alone left, the stated correlation existing between
 +him and the slave will remain the same, for it is of a master that a
 +slave is said to be the slave. On the other hand, if, of two
 +correlatives,​ one is not correctly termed, then, when all other
 +attributes are removed and that alone is left in virtue of which it
 +was stated to be correlative,​ the stated correlation will be found
 +to have disappeared.
 +For suppose the correlative of 'the slave' should be said to be 'the
 +man', or the correlative of 'the wing"​the bird'; if the attribute
 +'​master'​ be withdrawn from' the man', the correlation between 'the
 +man' and 'the slave' will cease to exist, for if the man is not a
 +master, the slave is not a slave. Similarly, if the attribute '​winged'​
 +be withdrawn from 'the bird', 'the wing' will no longer be relative;
 +for if the so-called correlative is not winged, it follows that 'the
 +wing' has no correlative.
 +Thus it is essential that the correlated terms should be exactly
 +designated; if there is a name existing, the statement will be easy;
 +if not, it is doubtless our duty to construct names. When the
 +terminology is thus correct, it is evident that all correlatives are
 +Correlatives are thought to come into existence simultaneously. This
 +is for the most part true, as in the case of the double and the
 +half. The existence of the half necessitates the existence of that
 +of which it is a half. Similarly the existence of a master
 +necessitates the existence of a slave, and that of a slave implies
 +that of a master; these are merely instances of a general rule.
 +Moreover, they cancel one another; for if there is no double it
 +follows that there is no half, and vice versa; this rule also
 +applies to all such correlatives. Yet it does not appear to be true in
 +all cases that correlatives come into existence simultaneously. The
 +object of knowledge would appear to exist before knowledge itself, for
 +it is usually the case that we acquire knowledge of objects already
 +existing; it would be difficult, if not impossible, to find a branch
 +of knowledge the beginning of the existence of which was
 +contemporaneous with that of its object.
 +Again, while the object of knowledge, if it ceases to exist, cancels
 +at the same time the knowledge which was its correlative,​ the converse
 +of this is not true. It is true that if the object of knowledge does
 +not exist there can be no knowledge: for there will no longer be
 +anything to know. Yet it is equally true that, if knowledge of a
 +certain object does not exist, the object may nevertheless quite
 +well exist. Thus, in the case of the squaring of the circle, if indeed
 +that process is an object of knowledge, though it itself exists as
 +an object of knowledge, yet the knowledge of it has not yet come
 +into existence. Again, if all animals ceased to exist, there would
 +be no knowledge, but there might yet be many objects of knowledge.
 +This is likewise the case with regard to perception: for the
 +object of perception is, it appears, prior to the act of perception.
 +If the perceptible is annihilated,​ perception also will cease to
 +exist; but the annihilation of perception does not cancel the
 +existence of the perceptible. For perception implies a body
 +perceived and a body in which perception takes place. Now if that
 +which is perceptible is annihilated,​ it follows that the body is
 +annihilated,​ for the body is a perceptible thing; and if the body does
 +not exist, it follows that perception also ceases to exist. Thus the
 +annihilation of the perceptible involves that of perception.
 +But the annihilation of perception does not involve that of the
 +perceptible. For if the animal is annihilated,​ it follows that
 +perception also is annihilated,​ but perceptibles such as body, heat,
 +sweetness, bitterness, and so on, will remain.
 +Again, perception is generated at the same time as the perceiving
 +subject, for it comes into existence at the same time as the animal.
 +But the perceptible surely exists before perception; for fire and
 +water and such elements, out of which the animal is itself composed,
 +exist before the animal is an animal at all, and before perception.
 +Thus it would seem that the perceptible exists before perception.
 +It may be questioned whether it is true that no substance is
 +relative, as seems to be the case, or whether exception is to be
 +made in the case of certain secondary substances. With regard to
 +primary substances, it is quite true that there is no such
 +possibility,​ for neither wholes nor parts of primary substances are
 +relative. The individual man or ox is not defined with reference to
 +something external. Similarly with the parts: a particular hand or
 +head is not defined as a particular hand or head of a particular
 +person, but as the hand or head of a particular person. It is true
 +also, for the most part at least, in the case of secondary substances;
 +the species '​man'​ and the species '​ox'​ are not defined with
 +reference to anything outside themselves. Wood, again, is only
 +relative in so far as it is some one's property, not in so far as it
 +is wood. It is plain, then, that in the cases mentioned substance is
 +not relative. But with regard to some secondary substances there is
 +a difference of opinion; thus, such terms as '​head'​ and '​hand'​ are
 +defined with reference to that of which the things indicated are a
 +part, and so it comes about that these appear to have a relative
 +character. Indeed, if our definition of that which is relative was
 +complete, it is very difficult, if not impossible, to prove that no
 +substance is relative. If, however, our definition was not complete,
 +if those things only are properly called relative in the case of which
 +relation to an external object is a necessary condition of
 +existence, perhaps some explanation of the dilemma may be found.
 +The former definition does indeed apply to all relatives, but the
 +fact that a thing is explained with reference to something else does
 +not make it essentially relative.
 +From this it is plain that, if a man definitely apprehends a
 +relative thing, he will also definitely apprehend that to which it
 +is relative. Indeed this is self-evident:​ for if a man knows that some
 +particular thing is relative, assuming that we call that a relative in
 +the case of which relation to something is a necessary condition of
 +existence, he knows that also to which it is related. For if he does
 +not know at all that to which it is related, he will not know
 +whether or not it is relative. This is clear, moreover, in
 +particular instances. If a man knows definitely that such and such a
 +thing is '​double',​ he will also forthwith know definitely that of
 +which it is the double. For if there is nothing definite of which he
 +knows it to be the double, he does not know at all that it is
 +double. Again, if he knows that a thing is more beautiful, it
 +follows necessarily that he will forthwith definitely know that also
 +than which it is more beautiful. He will not merely know
 +indefinitely that it is more beautiful than something which is less
 +beautiful, for this would be supposition,​ not knowledge. For if he
 +does not know definitely that than which it is more beautiful, he
 +can no longer claim to know definitely that it is more beautiful
 +than something else which is less beautiful: for it might be that
 +nothing was less beautiful. It is, therefore, evident that if a man
 +apprehends some relative thing definitely, he necessarily knows that
 +also definitely to which it is related.
 +Now the head, the hand, and such things are substances, and it is
 +possible to know their essential character definitely, but it does not
 +necessarily follow that we should know that to which they are related.
 +It is not possible to know forthwith whose head or hand is meant. Thus
 +these are not relatives, and, this being the case, it would be true to
 +say that no substance is relative in character. It is perhaps a
 +difficult matter, in such cases, to make a positive statement
 +without more exhaustive examination,​ but to have raised questions with
 +regard to details is not without advantage.
 +By '​quality'​ I mean that in virtue of which people are said to be
 +such and such.
 +Quality is a term that is used in many senses. One sort of quality
 +let us call '​habit'​ or '​disposition'​. Habit differs from disposition
 +in being more lasting and more firmly established. The various kinds
 +of knowledge and of virtue are habits, for knowledge, even when
 +acquired only in a moderate degree, is, it is agreed, abiding in its
 +character and difficult to displace, unless some great mental upheaval
 +takes place, through disease or any such cause. The virtues, also,
 +such as justice, self-restraint,​ and so on, are not easily dislodged
 +or dismissed, so as to give place to vice.
 +By a disposition,​ on the other hand, we mean a condition that is
 +easily changed and quickly gives place to its opposite. Thus, heat,
 +cold, disease, health, and so on are dispositions. For a man is
 +disposed in one way or another with reference to these, but quickly
 +changes, becoming cold instead of warm, ill instead of well. So it
 +is with all other dispositions also, unless through lapse of time a
 +disposition has itself become inveterate and almost impossible to
 +dislodge: in which case we should perhaps go so far as to call it a
 +It is evident that men incline to call those conditions habits which
 +are of a more or less permanent type and difficult to displace; for
 +those who are not retentive of knowledge, but volatile, are not said
 +to have such and such a '​habit'​ as regards knowledge, yet they are
 +disposed, we may say, either better or worse, towards knowledge.
 +Thus habit differs from disposition in this, that while the latter
 +in ephemeral, the former is permanent and difficult to alter.
 +Habits are at the same time dispositions,​ but dispositions are not
 +necessarily habits. For those who have some specific habit may be said
 +also, in virtue of that habit, to be thus or thus disposed; but
 +those who are disposed in some specific way have not in all cases
 +the corresponding habit.
 +Another sort of quality is that in virtue of which, for example,
 +we call men good boxers or runners, or healthy or sickly: in fact it
 +includes all those terms which refer to inborn capacity or incapacity.
 +Such things are not predicated of a person in virtue of his
 +disposition,​ but in virtue of his inborn capacity or incapacity to
 +do something with ease or to avoid defeat of any kind. Persons are
 +called good boxers or good runners, not in virtue of such and such a
 +disposition,​ but in virtue of an inborn capacity to accomplish
 +something with ease. Men are called healthy in virtue of the inborn
 +capacity of easy resistance to those unhealthy influences that may
 +ordinarily arise; unhealthy, in virtue of the lack of this capacity.
 +Similarly with regard to softness and hardness. Hardness is predicated
 +of a thing because it has that capacity of resistance which enables it
 +to withstand disintegration;​ softness, again, is predicated of a thing
 +by reason of the lack of that capacity.
 +A third class within this category is that of affective qualities
 +and affections. Sweetness, bitterness, sourness, are examples of
 +this sort of quality, together with all that is akin to these; heat,
 +moreover, and cold, whiteness, and blackness are affective
 +qualities. It is evident that these are qualities, for those things
 +that possess them are themselves said to be such and such by reason of
 +their presence. Honey is called sweet because it contains sweetness;
 +the body is called white because it contains whiteness; and so in
 +all other cases.
 +The term '​affective quality'​ is not used as indicating that those
 +things which admit these qualities are affected in any way. Honey is
 +not called sweet because it is affected in a specific way, nor is this
 +what is meant in any other instance. Similarly heat and cold are
 +called affective qualities, not because those things which admit
 +them are affected. What is meant is that these said qualities are
 +capable of producing an '​affection'​ in the way of perception. For
 +sweetness has the power of affecting the sense of taste; heat, that of
 +touch; and so it is with the rest of these qualities.
 +Whiteness and blackness, however, and the other colours, are not
 +said to be affective qualities in this sense, but -because they
 +themselves are the results of an affection. It is plain that many
 +changes of colour take place because of affections. When a man is
 +ashamed, he blushes; when he is afraid, he becomes pale, and so on. So
 +true is this, that when a man is by nature liable to such
 +affections, arising from some concomitance of elements in his
 +constitution,​ it is a probable inference that he has the corresponding
 +complexion of skin. For the same disposition of bodily elements, which
 +in the former instance was momentarily present in the case of an
 +access of shame, might be a result of a man's natural temperament,​
 +so as to produce the corresponding colouring also as a natural
 +characteristic. All conditions, therefore, of this kind, if caused
 +by certain permanent and lasting affections, are called affective
 +qualities. For pallor and duskiness of complexion are called
 +qualities, inasmuch as we are said to be such and such in virtue of
 +them, not only if they originate in natural constitution,​ but also
 +if they come about through long disease or sunburn, and are
 +difficult to remove, or indeed remain throughout life. For in the same
 +way we are said to be such and such because of these.
 +Those conditions, however, which arise from causes which may
 +easily be rendered ineffective or speedily removed, are called, not
 +qualities, but affections: for we are not said to be such virtue of
 +them. The man who blushes through shame is not said to be a
 +constitutional blusher, nor is the man who becomes pale through fear
 +said to be constitutionally pale. He is said rather to have been
 +Thus such conditions are called affections, not qualities.
 +In like manner there are affective qualities and affections of the
 +soul. That temper with which a man is born and which has its origin in
 +certain deep-seated affections is called a quality. I mean such
 +conditions as insanity, irascibility,​ and so on: for people are said
 +to be mad or irascible in virtue of these. Similarly those abnormal
 +psychic states which are not inborn, but arise from the concomitance
 +of certain other elements, and are difficult to remove, or
 +altogether permanent, are called qualities, for in virtue of them
 +men are said to be such and such.
 +Those, however, which arise from causes easily rendered
 +ineffective are called affections, not qualities. Suppose that a man
 +is irritable when vexed: he is not even spoken of as a bad-tempered
 +man, when in such circumstances he loses his temper somewhat, but
 +rather is said to be affected. Such conditions are therefore termed,
 +not qualities, but affections.
 +The fourth sort of quality is figure and the shape that belongs to a
 +thing; and besides this, straightness and curvedness and any other
 +qualities of this type; each of these defines a thing as being such
 +and such. Because it is triangular or quadrangular a thing is said
 +to have a specific character, or again because it is straight or
 +curved; in fact a thing'​s shape in every case gives rise to a
 +qualification of it.
 +Rarity and density, roughness and smoothness, seem to be terms
 +indicating quality: yet these, it would appear, really belong to a
 +class different from that of quality. For it is rather a certain
 +relative position of the parts composing the thing thus qualified
 +which, it appears, is indicated by each of these terms. A thing is
 +dense, owing to the fact that its parts are closely combined with
 +one another; rare, because there are interstices between the parts;
 +smooth, because its parts lie, so to speak, evenly; rough, because
 +some parts project beyond others.
 +There may be other sorts of quality, but those that are most
 +properly so called have, we may safely say, been enumerated.
 +These, then, are qualities, and the things that take their name from
 +them as derivatives,​ or are in some other way dependent on them, are
 +said to be qualified in some specific way. In most, indeed in almost
 +all cases, the name of that which is qualified is derived from that of
 +the quality. Thus the terms '​whiteness',​ '​grammar',​ '​justice',​ give us
 +the adjectives '​white',​ '​grammatical',​ '​just',​ and so on.
 +There are some cases, however, in which, as the quality under
 +consideration has no name, it is impossible that those possessed of it
 +should have a name that is derivative. For instance, the name given to
 +the runner or boxer, who is so called in virtue of an inborn capacity,
 +is not derived from that of any quality; for lob those capacities have
 +no name assigned to them. In this, the inborn capacity is distinct
 +from the science, with reference to which men are called, e.g.
 +boxers or wrestlers. Such a science is classed as a disposition;​ it
 +has a name, and is called '​boxing'​ or '​wrestling'​ as the case may
 +be, and the name given to those disposed in this way is derived from
 +that of the science. Sometimes, even though a name exists for the
 +quality, that which takes its character from the quality has a name
 +that is not a derivative. For instance, the upright man takes his
 +character from the possession of the quality of integrity, but the
 +name given him is not derived from the word '​integrity'​. Yet this does
 +not occur often.
 +We may therefore state that those things are said to be possessed of
 +some specific quality which have a name derived from that of the
 +aforesaid quality, or which are in some other way dependent on it.
 +One quality may be the contrary of another; thus justice is the
 +contrary of injustice, whiteness of blackness, and so on. The
 +things, also, which are said to be such and such in virtue of these
 +qualities, may be contrary the one to the other; for that which is
 +unjust is contrary to that which is just, that which is white to
 +that which is black. This, however, is not always the case. Red,
 +yellow, and such colours, though qualities, have no contraries.
 +If one of two contraries is a quality, the other will also be a
 +quality. This will be evident from particular instances, if we apply
 +the names
 +used to denote the other categories; for instance, granted that
 +justice is the contrary of injustice and justice is a quality,
 +injustice will also be a quality: neither quantity, nor relation,
 +nor place, nor indeed any other category but that of quality, will
 +be applicable properly to injustice. So it is with all other
 +contraries falling under the category of quality.
 +Qualities admit of variation of degree. Whiteness is predicated of
 +one thing in a greater or less degree than of another. This is also
 +the case with reference to justice. Moreover, one and the same thing
 +may exhibit a quality in a greater degree than it did before: if a
 +thing is white, it may become whiter.
 +Though this is generally the case, there are exceptions. For if we
 +should say that justice admitted of variation of degree,
 +difficulties might ensue, and this is true with regard to all those
 +qualities which are dispositions. There are some, indeed, who
 +dispute the possibility of variation here. They maintain that
 +justice and health cannot very well admit of variation of degree
 +themselves, but that people vary in the degree in which they possess
 +these qualities, and that this is the case with grammatical learning
 +and all those qualities which are classed as dispositions. However
 +that may be, it is an incontrovertible fact that the things which in
 +virtue of these qualities are said to be what they are vary in the
 +degree in which they possess them; for one man is said to be better
 +versed in grammar, or more healthy or just, than another, and so on.
 +The qualities expressed by the terms '​triangular'​ and '​quadrangular'​
 +do not appear to admit of variation of degree, nor indeed do any
 +that have to do with figure. For those things to which the
 +definition of the triangle or circle is applicable are all equally
 +triangular or circular. Those, on the other hand, to which the same
 +definition is not applicable, cannot be said to differ from one
 +another in degree; the square is no more a circle than the
 +rectangle, for to neither is the definition of the circle appropriate.
 +In short, if the definition of the term proposed is not applicable
 +to both objects, they cannot be compared. Thus it is not all qualities
 +which admit of variation of degree.
 +Whereas none of the characteristics I have mentioned are peculiar to
 +quality, the fact that likeness and unlikeness can be predicated
 +with reference to quality only, gives to that category its distinctive
 +feature. One thing is like another only with reference to that in
 +virtue of which it is such and such; thus this forms the peculiar mark
 +of quality.
 +We must not be disturbed because it may be argued that, though
 +proposing to discuss the category of quality, we have included in it
 +many relative terms. We did say that habits and dispositions were
 +relative. In practically all such cases the genus is relative, the
 +individual not. Thus knowledge, as a genus, is explained by
 +reference to something else, for we mean a knowledge of something. But
 +particular branches of knowledge are not thus explained. The knowledge
 +of grammar is not relative to anything external, nor is the
 +knowledge of music, but these, if relative at all, are relative only
 +in virtue of their genera; thus grammar is said be the knowledge of
 +something, not the grammar of something; similarly music is the
 +knowledge of something, not the music of something.
 +Thus individual branches of knowledge are not relative. And it is
 +because we possess these individual branches of knowledge that we
 +are said to be such and such. It is these that we actually possess: we
 +are called experts because we possess knowledge in some particular
 +branch. Those particular branches, therefore, of knowledge, in
 +virtue of which we are sometimes said to be such and such, are
 +themselves qualities, and are not relative. Further, if anything
 +should happen to fall within both the category of quality and that
 +of relation, there would be nothing extraordinary in classing it under
 +both these heads.
 +Action and affection both admit of contraries and also of
 +variation of degree. Heating is the contrary of cooling, being
 +heated of being cooled, being glad of being vexed. Thus they admit
 +of contraries. They also admit of variation of degree: for it is
 +possible to heat in a greater or less degree; also to be heated in a
 +greater or less degree. Thus action and affection also admit of
 +variation of degree. So much, then, is stated with regard to these
 +We spoke, moreover, of the category of position when we were dealing
 +with that of relation, and stated that such terms derived their
 +names from those of the corresponding attitudes.
 +As for the rest, time, place, state, since they are easily
 +intelligible,​ I say no more about them than was said at the beginning,
 +that in the category of state are included such states as '​shod',​
 +'​armed',​ in that of place 'in the Lyceum'​ and so on, as was
 +explained before.
 +The proposed categories have, then, been adequately dealt with.
 +We must next explain the various senses in which the term '​opposite'​
 +is used. Things are said to be opposed in four senses: (i) as
 +correlatives to one another, (ii) as contraries to one another,
 +(iii) as privatives to positives, (iv) as affirmatives to negatives.
 +Let me sketch my meaning in outline. An instance of the use of the
 +word '​opposite'​ with reference to correlatives is afforded by the
 +expressions '​double'​ and '​half';​ with reference to contraries by '​bad'​
 +and '​good'​. Opposites in the sense of '​privatives'​ and '​positives'​
 +are' blindness'​ and '​sight';​ in the sense of affirmatives and
 +negatives, the propositions 'he sits', 'he does not sit'.
 +(i) Pairs of opposites which fall under the category of relation are
 +explained by a reference of the one to the other, the reference
 +being indicated by the preposition '​of'​ or by some other
 +preposition. Thus, double is a relative term, for that which is double
 +is explained as the double of something. Knowledge, again, is the
 +opposite of the thing known, in the same sense; and the thing known
 +also is explained by its relation to its opposite, knowledge. For
 +the thing known is explained as that which is known by something, that
 +is, by knowledge. Such things, then, as are opposite the one to the
 +other in the sense of being correlatives are explained by a
 +reference of the one to the other.
 +(ii) Pairs of opposites which are contraries are not in any way
 +interdependent,​ but are contrary the one to the other. The good is not
 +spoken of as the good of the had, but as the contrary of the bad,
 +nor is white spoken of as the white of the black, but as the
 +contrary of the black. These two types of opposition are therefore
 +distinct. Those contraries which are such that the subjects in which
 +they are naturally present, or of which they are predicated, must
 +necessarily contain either the one or the other of them, have no
 +intermediate,​ but those in the case of which no such necessity
 +obtains, always have an intermediate. Thus disease and health are
 +naturally present in the body of an animal, and it is necessary that
 +either the one or the other should be present in the body of an
 +animal. Odd and even, again, are predicated of number, and it is
 +necessary that the one or the other should be present in numbers.
 +Now there is no intermediate between the terms of either of these
 +two pairs. On the other hand, in those contraries with regard to which
 +no such necessity obtains, we find an intermediate. Blackness and
 +whiteness are naturally present in the body, but it is not necessary
 +that either the one or the other should be present in the body,
 +inasmuch as it is not true to say that everybody must be white or
 +black. Badness and goodness, again, are predicated of man, and of many
 +other things, but it is not necessary that either the one quality or
 +the other should be present in that of which they are predicated: it
 +is not true to say that everything that may be good or bad must be
 +either good or bad. These pairs of contraries have intermediates:​
 +the intermediates between white and black are grey, sallow, and all
 +the other colours that come between; the intermediate between good and
 +bad is that which is neither the one nor the other.
 +Some intermediate qualities have names, such as grey and sallow
 +and all the other colours that come between white and black; in
 +other cases, however, it is not easy to name the intermediate,​ but
 +we must define it as that which is not either extreme, as in the
 +case of that which is neither good nor bad, neither just nor unjust.
 +(iii) '​privatives'​ and '​Positives'​ have reference to the same
 +subject. Thus, sight and blindness have reference to the eye. It is
 +a universal rule that each of a pair of opposites of this type has
 +reference to that to which the particular '​positive'​ is natural. We
 +say that that is capable of some particular faculty or possession
 +has suffered privation when the faculty or possession in question is
 +in no way present in that in which, and at the time at which, it
 +should naturally be present. We do not call that toothless which has
 +not teeth, or that blind which has not sight, but rather that which
 +has not teeth or sight at the time when by nature it should. For there
 +are some creatures which from birth are without sight, or without
 +teeth, but these are not called toothless or blind.
 +To be without some faculty or to possess it is not the same as the
 +corresponding '​privative'​ or '​positive'​. '​Sight'​ is a '​positive',​
 +'​blindness'​ a '​privative',​ but 'to possess sight' is not equivalent to
 +'​sight',​ 'to be blind' is not equivalent to '​blindness'​. Blindness
 +is a '​privative',​ to be blind is to be in a state of privation, but is
 +not a '​privative'​. Moreover, if '​blindness'​ were equivalent to
 +'being blind',​ both would be predicated of the same subject; but
 +though a man is said to be blind, he is by no means said to be
 +To be in a state of '​possession'​ is, it appears, the opposite of
 +being in a state of '​privation',​ just as '​positives'​ and
 +'​privatives'​ themselves are opposite. There is the same type of
 +antithesis in both cases; for just as blindness is opposed to sight,
 +so is being blind opposed to having sight.
 +That which is affirmed or denied is not itself affirmation or
 +denial. By '​affirmation'​ we mean an affirmative proposition,​ by
 +'​denial'​ a negative. Now, those facts which form the matter of the
 +affirmation or denial are not propositions;​ yet these two are said
 +to be opposed in the same sense as the affirmation and denial, for
 +in this case also the type of antithesis is the same. For as the
 +affirmation is opposed to the denial, as in the two propositions 'he
 +sits', 'he does not sit', so also the fact which constitutes the
 +matter of the proposition in one case is opposed to that in the other,
 +his sitting, that is to say, to his not sitting.
 +It is evident that '​positives'​ and '​privatives'​ are not opposed each
 +to each in the same sense as relatives. The one is not explained by
 +reference to the other; sight is not sight of blindness, nor is any
 +other preposition used to indicate the relation. Similarly blindness
 +is not said to be blindness of sight, but rather, privation of
 +sight. Relatives, moreover, reciprocate;​ if blindness, therefore, were
 +a relative, there would be a reciprocity of relation between it and
 +that with which it was correlative. But this is not the case. Sight is
 +not called the sight of blindness.
 +That those terms which fall under the heads of '​positives'​ and
 +'​privatives'​ are not opposed each to each as contraries, either, is
 +plain from the following facts: Of a pair of contraries such that they
 +have no intermediate,​ one or the other must needs be present in the
 +subject in which they naturally subsist, or of which they are
 +predicated; for it is those, as we proved,'​ in the case of which
 +this necessity obtains, that have no intermediate. Moreover, we
 +cited health and disease, odd and even, as instances. But those
 +contraries which have an intermediate are not subject to any such
 +necessity. It is not necessary that every substance, receptive of such
 +qualities, should be either black or white, cold or hot, for something
 +intermediate between these contraries may very well be present in
 +the subject. We proved, moreover, that those contraries have an
 +intermediate in the case of which the said necessity does not
 +obtain. Yet when one of the two contraries is a constitutive
 +property of the subject, as it is a constitutive property of fire to
 +be hot, of snow to be white, it is necessary determinately that one of
 +the two contraries, not one or the other, should be present in the
 +subject; for fire cannot be cold, or snow black. Thus, it is not the
 +case here that one of the two must needs be present in every subject
 +receptive of these qualities, but only in that subject of which the
 +one forms a constitutive property. Moreover, in such cases it is one
 +member of the pair determinately,​ and not either the one or the other,
 +which must be present.
 +In the case of '​positives'​ and '​privatives',​ on the other hand,
 +neither of the aforesaid statements holds good. For it is not
 +necessary that a subject receptive of the qualities should always have
 +either the one or the other; that which has not yet advanced to the
 +state when sight is natural is not said either to be blind or to
 +see. Thus '​positives'​ and '​privatives'​ do not belong to that class
 +of contraries which consists of those which have no intermediate. On
 +the other hand, they do not belong either to that class which consists
 +of contraries which have an intermediate. For under certain conditions
 +it is necessary that either the one or the other should form part of
 +the constitution of every appropriate subject. For when a thing has
 +reached the stage when it is by nature capable of sight, it will be
 +said either to see or to be blind, and that in an indeterminate sense,
 +signifying that the capacity may be either present or absent; for it
 +is not necessary either that it should see or that it should be blind,
 +but that it should be either in the one state or in the other. Yet
 +in the case of those contraries which have an intermediate we found
 +that it was never necessary that either the one or the other should be
 +present in every appropriate subject, but only that in certain
 +subjects one of the pair should be present, and that in a
 +determinate sense. It is, therefore, plain that '​positives'​ and
 +'​privatives'​ are not opposed each to each in either of the senses in
 +which contraries are opposed.
 +Again, in the case of contraries, it is possible that there should
 +be changes from either into the other, while the subject retains its
 +identity, unless indeed one of the contraries is a constitutive
 +property of that subject, as heat is of fire. For it is possible
 +that that that which is healthy should become diseased, that which
 +is white, black, that which is cold, hot, that which is good, bad,
 +that which is bad, good. The bad man, if he is being brought into a
 +better way of life and thought, may make some advance, however slight,
 +and if he should once improve, even ever so little, it is plain that
 +he might change completely, or at any rate make very great progress;
 +for a man becomes more and more easily moved to virtue, however
 +small the improvement was at first. It is, therefore, natural to
 +suppose that he will make yet greater progress than he has made in the
 +past; and as this process goes on, it will change him completely and
 +establish him in the contrary state, provided he is not hindered by
 +lack of time. In the case of '​positives'​ and '​privatives',​ however,
 +change in both directions is impossible. There may be a change from
 +possession to privation, but not from privation to possession. The man
 +who has become blind does not regain his sight; the man who has become
 +bald does not regain his hair; the man who has lost his teeth does not
 +grow his grow a new set. (iv) Statements opposed as affirmation and
 +negation belong manifestly to a class which is distinct, for in this
 +case, and in this case only, it is necessary for the one opposite to
 +be true and the other false.
 +Neither in the case of contraries, nor in the case of
 +correlatives,​ nor in the case of '​positives'​ and '​privatives',​ is it
 +necessary for one to be true and the other false. Health and disease
 +are contraries: neither of them is true or false. '​Double'​ and
 +'​half'​ are opposed to each other as correlatives:​ neither of them is
 +true or false. The case is the same, of course, with regard to
 +'​positives'​ and '​privatives'​ such as '​sight'​ and '​blindness'​. In
 +short, where there is no sort of combination of words, truth and
 +falsity have no place, and all the opposites we have mentioned so
 +far consist of simple words.
 +At the same time, when the words which enter into opposed statements
 +are contraries, these, more than any other set of opposites, would
 +seem to claim this characteristic. '​Socrates is ill' is the contrary
 +of '​Socrates is well', but not even of such composite expressions is
 +it true to say that one of the pair must always be true and the
 +other false. For if Socrates exists, one will be true and the other
 +false, but if he does not exist, both will be false; for neither
 +'​Socrates is ill' nor '​Socrates is well' is true, if Socrates does not
 +exist at all.
 +In the case of '​positives'​ and '​privatives',​ if the subject does not
 +exist at all, neither proposition is true, but even if the subject
 +exists, it is not always the fact that one is true and the other
 +false. For '​Socrates has sight' is the opposite of '​Socrates is blind'
 +in the sense of the word '​opposite'​ which applies to possession and
 +privation. Now if Socrates exists, it is not necessary that one should
 +be true and the other false, for when he is not yet able to acquire
 +the power of vision, both are false, as also if Socrates is altogether
 +But in the case of affirmation and negation, whether the subject
 +exists or not, one is always false and the other true. For manifestly,
 +if Socrates exists, one of the two propositions '​Socrates is ill',
 +'​Socrates is not ill', is true, and the other false. This is
 +likewise the case if he does not exist; for if he does not exist, to
 +say that he is ill is false, to say that he is not ill is true. Thus
 +it is in the case of those opposites only, which are opposite in the
 +sense in which the term is used with reference to affirmation and
 +negation, that the rule holds good, that one of the pair must be
 +true and the other false.
 +That the contrary of a good is an evil is shown by induction: the
 +contrary of health is disease, of courage, cowardice, and so on. But
 +the contrary of an evil is sometimes a good, sometimes an evil. For
 +defect, which is an evil, has excess for its contrary, this also being
 +an evil, and the mean. which is a good, is equally the contrary of the
 +one and of the other. It is only in a few cases, however, that we
 +see instances of this: in most, the contrary of an evil is a good.
 +In the case of contraries, it is not always necessary that if one
 +exists the other should also exist: for if all become healthy there
 +will be health and no disease, and again, if everything turns white,
 +there will be white, but no black. Again, since the fact that Socrates
 +is ill is the contrary of the fact that Socrates is well, and two
 +contrary conditions cannot both obtain in one and the same
 +individual at the same time, both these contraries could not exist
 +at once: for if that Socrates was well was a fact, then that
 +Socrates was ill could not possibly be one.
 +It is plain that contrary attributes must needs be present in
 +subjects which belong to the same species or genus. Disease and health
 +require as their subject the body of an animal; white and black
 +require a body, without further qualification;​ justice and injustice
 +require as their subject the human soul.
 +Moreover, it is necessary that pairs of contraries should in all
 +cases either belong to the same genus or belong to contrary genera
 +or be themselves genera. White and black belong to the same genus,
 +colour; justice and injustice, to contrary genera, virtue and vice;
 +while good and evil do not belong to genera, but are themselves actual
 +genera, with terms under them.
 +There are four senses in which one thing can be said to be '​prior'​
 +to another. Primarily and most properly the term has reference to
 +time: in this sense the word is used to indicate that one thing is
 +older or more ancient than another, for the expressions '​older'​ and
 +'more ancient'​ imply greater length of time.
 +Secondly, one thing is said to be '​prior'​ to another when the
 +sequence of their being cannot be reversed. In this sense '​one'​ is
 +'​prior'​ to '​two'​. For if '​two'​ exists, it follows directly that
 +'​one'​ must exist, but if '​one'​ exists, it does not follow
 +necessarily that '​two'​ exists: thus the sequence subsisting cannot
 +be reversed. It is agreed, then, that when the sequence of two
 +things cannot be reversed, then that one on which the other depends is
 +called '​prior'​ to that other.
 +In the third place, the term '​prior'​ is used with reference to any
 +order, as in the case of science and of oratory. For in sciences which
 +use demonstration there is that which is prior and that which is
 +posterior in order; in geometry, the elements are prior to the
 +propositions;​ in reading and writing, the letters of the alphabet
 +are prior to the syllables. Similarly, in the case of speeches, the
 +exordium is prior in order to the narrative.
 +Besides these senses of the word, there is a fourth. That which is
 +better and more honourable is said to have a natural priority. In
 +common parlance men speak of those whom they honour and love as
 +'​coming first' with them. This sense of the word is perhaps the most
 +Such, then, are the different senses in which the term '​prior'​ is
 +Yet it would seem that besides those mentioned there is yet another.
 +For in those things, the being of each of which implies that of the
 +other, that which is in any way the cause may reasonably be said to be
 +by nature '​prior'​ to the effect. It is plain that there are
 +instances of this. The fact of the being of a man carries with it
 +the truth of the proposition that he is, and the implication is
 +reciprocal: for if a man is, the proposition wherein we allege that he
 +is true, and conversely, if the proposition wherein we allege that
 +he is true, then he is. The true proposition,​ however, is in no way
 +the cause of the being of the man, but the fact of the man's being
 +does seem somehow to be the cause of the truth of the proposition,​ for
 +the truth or falsity of the proposition depends on the fact of the
 +man's being or not being.
 +Thus the word '​prior'​ may be used in five senses.
 +The term '​simultaneous'​ is primarily and most appropriately
 +applied to those things the genesis of the one of which is
 +simultaneous with that of the other; for in such cases neither is
 +prior or posterior to the other. Such things are said to be
 +simultaneous in point of time. Those things, again, are '​simultaneous'​
 +in point of nature, the being of each of which involves that of the
 +other, while at the same time neither is the cause of the other'​s
 +being. This is the case with regard to the double and the half, for
 +these are reciprocally dependent, since, if there is a double, there
 +is also a half, and if there is a half, there is also a double,
 +while at the same time neither is the cause of the being of the other.
 +Again, those species which are distinguished one from another and
 +opposed one to another within the same genus are said to be
 +'​simultaneous'​ in nature. I mean those species which are
 +distinguished each from each by one and the same method of division.
 +Thus the '​winged'​ species is simultaneous with the '​terrestrial'​ and
 +the '​water'​ species. These are distinguished within the same genus,
 +and are opposed each to each, for the genus '​animal'​ has the '​winged',​
 +the '​terrestrial',​ and the '​water'​ species, and no one of these is
 +prior or posterior to another; on the contrary, all such things appear
 +to be '​simultaneous'​ in nature. Each of these also, the terrestrial,​
 +the winged, and the water species, can be divided again into
 +subspecies. Those species, then, also will be '​simultaneous'​ point
 +of nature, which, belonging to the same genus, are distinguished
 +each from each by one and the same method of differentiation.
 +But genera are prior to species, for the sequence of their being
 +cannot be reversed. If there is the species '​water-animal',​ there will
 +be the genus '​animal',​ but granted the being of the genus '​animal',​ it
 +does not follow necessarily that there will be the species
 +Those things, therefore, are said to be '​simultaneous'​ in nature,
 +the being of each of which involves that of the other, while at the
 +same time neither is in any way the cause of the other'​s being;
 +those species, also, which are distinguished each from each and
 +opposed within the same genus. Those things, moreover, are
 +'​simultaneous'​ in the unqualified sense of the word which come into
 +being at the same time.
 +There are six sorts of movement: generation, destruction,​
 +increase, diminution, alteration, and change of place.
 +It is evident in all but one case that all these sorts of movement
 +are distinct each from each. Generation is distinct from
 +destruction,​ increase and change of place from diminution, and so
 +on. But in the case of alteration it may be argued that the process
 +necessarily implies one or other of the other five sorts of motion.
 +This is not true, for we may say that all affections, or nearly all,
 +produce in us an alteration which is distinct from all other sorts
 +of motion, for that which is affected need not suffer either
 +increase or diminution or any of the other sorts of motion. Thus
 +alteration is a distinct sort of motion; for, if it were not, the
 +thing altered would not only be altered, but would forthwith
 +necessarily suffer increase or diminution or some one of the other
 +sorts of motion in addition; which as a matter of fact is not the
 +case. Similarly that which was undergoing the process of increase or
 +was subject to some other sort of motion would, if alteration were not
 +a distinct form of motion, necessarily be subject to alteration
 +also. But there are some things which undergo increase but yet not
 +alteration. The square, for instance, if a gnomon is applied to it,
 +undergoes increase but not alteration, and so it is with all other
 +figures of this sort. Alteration and increase, therefore, are
 +Speaking generally, rest is the contrary of motion. But the
 +different forms of motion have their own contraries in other forms;
 +thus destruction is the contrary of generation, diminution of
 +increase, rest in a place, of change of place. As for this last,
 +change in the reverse direction would seem to be most truly its
 +contrary; thus motion upwards is the contrary of motion downwards
 +and vice versa.
 +In the case of that sort of motion which yet remains, of those
 +that have been enumerated, it is not easy to state what is its
 +contrary. It appears to have no contrary, unless one should define the
 +contrary here also either as 'rest in its quality'​ or as '​change in
 +the direction of the contrary quality',​ just as we defined the
 +contrary of change of place either as rest in a place or as change
 +in the reverse direction. For a thing is altered when change of
 +quality takes place; therefore either rest in its quality or change in
 +the direction of the contrary may be called the contrary of this
 +qualitative form of motion. In this way becoming white is the contrary
 +of becoming black; there is alteration in the contrary direction,
 +since a change of a qualitative nature takes place.
 +The term 'to have' is used in various senses. In the first place
 +it is used with reference to habit or disposition or any other
 +quality, for we are said to '​have'​ a piece of knowledge or a virtue.
 +Then, again, it has reference to quantity, as, for instance, in the
 +case of a man's height; for he is said to '​have'​ a height of three
 +or four cubits. It is used, moreover, with regard to apparel, a man
 +being said to '​have'​ a coat or tunic; or in respect of something which
 +we have on a part of ourselves, as a ring on the hand: or in respect
 +of something which is a part of us, as hand or foot. The term refers
 +also to content, as in the case of a vessel and wheat, or of a jar and
 +wine; a jar is said to '​have'​ wine, and a corn-measure wheat. The
 +expression in such cases has reference to content. Or it refers to
 +that which has been acquired; we are said to '​have'​ a house or a
 +field. A man is also said to '​have'​ a wife, and a wife a husband,
 +and this appears to be the most remote meaning of the term, for by the
 +use of it we mean simply that the husband lives with the wife.
 +Other senses of the word might perhaps be found, but the most
 +ordinary ones have all been enumerated.
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