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 +====== Internal Workings of the Soviet System ======
  
 +[[Library of Congress Soviet Archives Exhibition|Library of Congress Soviet Archives Exhibition]]
 +
 +Having come to power in October 1917 by means of a coup d'​état,​ Vladimir Lenin and the Bolsheviks spent the next few years struggling to maintain their rule against widespread popular opposition. They had overthrown the provisional democratic government and were inherently hostile to any form of popular participation in politics. In the name of the revolutionary cause, they employed ruthless methods to suppress real or perceived political enemies. The small, elite group of Bolshevik revolutionaries which formed the core of the newly established Communist Party dictatorship ruled by decree, enforced with terror.
 +
 +This tradition of tight centralization,​ with decision-making concentrated at the highest party levels, reached new dimensions under Joseph Stalin. As many of these archival documents show, there was little input from below. The party elite determined the goals of the state and the means of achieving them in almost complete isolation from the people. They believed that the interests of the individual were to be sacrificed to those of the state, which was advancing a sacred social task. Stalin'​s "​revolution from above" sought to build socialism by means of forced collectivization and industrialization,​ programs that entailed tremendous human suffering and loss of life.
 +
 +Although this tragic episode in Soviet history at least had some economic purpose, the police terror inflicted upon the party and the population in the 1930s, in which millions of innocent people perished, had no rationale beyond assuring Stalin'​s absolute dominance. By the time the Great Terror ended, Stalin had subjected all aspects of Soviet society to strict party-state control, not tolerating even the slightest expression of local initiative, let alone political unorthodoxy. The Stalinist leadership felt especially threatened by the intelligentsia,​ whose creative efforts were thwarted through the strictest censorship; by religious groups, who were persecuted and driven underground;​ and by non-Russian nationalities,​ many of whom were deported en masse to Siberia during World War II because Stalin questioned their loyalty.
 +
 +Although Stalin'​s successors also persecuted writers and dissidents, they used police terror more sparingly to coerce the population, and they sought to gain some popular support by relaxing political controls and introducing economic incentives. Nonetheless,​ strict centralization continued and eventually led to the economic decline, inefficiency,​ and apathy that characterized the 1970s and 1980s, and contributed to the Chernobyl'​ nuclear disaster. Mikhail Gorbachev'​s program of perestroika was a reaction to this situation, but its success was limited by his reluctance to abolish the bastions of Soviet power--the party, the police, and the centralized economic system--until he was forced to do so after the attempted coup in August 1991. By that time, however, it was too late to hold either the Communist leadership or the Soviet Union together. After seventy-four years of existence, the Soviet system crumbled.
 +
 +===== Repression and Terror =====
 +
 +==== Stalin in Control ====
 +
 +During the second half of the 1920s, Joseph Stalin set the stage for gaining absolute power by employing police repression against opposition elements within the Communist Party. The machinery of coercion had previously been used only against opponents of Bolshevism, not against party members themselves. The first victims were Politburo members Leon Trotskii, Grigorii Zinov'​ev,​ and Lev Kamenev, who were defeated and expelled from the party in late 1927. Stalin then turned against Nikolai Bukharin, who was denounced as a "right opposition,"​ for opposing his policy of forced collectivization and rapid industrialization at the expense of the peasantry.
 +
 +Stalin had eliminated all likely potential opposition to his leadership by late 1934 and was the unchallenged leader of both party and state. Nevertheless,​ he proceeded to purge the party rank and file and to terrorize the entire country with widespread arrests and executions. During the ensuing Great Terror, which included the notorious show trials of Stalin'​s former Bolshevik opponents in 1936-1938 and reached its peak in 1937 and 1938, millions of innocent Soviet citizens were sent off to labor camps or killed in prison.
 +
 +By the time the terror subsided in 1939, Stalin had managed to bring both the party and the public to a state of complete submission to his rule. Soviet society was so atomized and the people so fearful of reprisals that mass arrests were no longer necessary. Stalin ruled as absolute dictator of the Soviet Union throughout World War II and until his death in March 1953.
 +
 +=== Letter from Rykov ===
 +
 +To the Presidium of the Supreme Soviet of the USSR
 +
 +On March 13 [of this year] the Military Tribunal of the Supreme Court condemned me to death by shooting. I ask for clemency.
 +
 +My guilt before the party and the country is great, but I have a passionate desire and, I think, enough strength to expiate it.
 +
 +I ask you to believe that I am not a completely corrupt person. In my life there were many years of noble, honest work for the revolution. I can still prove that even after having committed so many crimes, it is possible to become an honest person and to die with honor.
 +
 +I ask that you spare my life.
 +
 +March 13, 1938
 +
 +[signed] A.I. Rykov
 +
 +==== Kirov Murder and Purges ====
 +
 +The murder of Sergei Kirov on December 1, 1934, set off a chain of events that culminated in the Great Terror of the 1930s. Kirov was a full member of the ruling Politburo, leader of the Leningrad party apparatus, and an influential member of the ruling elite. His concern for the welfare of the workers in Leningrad and his skill as an orator had earned him considerable popularity. Some party members had even approached him secretly with the proposal that he take over as general secretary.
 +
 +It is doubtful that Kirov represented an immediate threat to Stalin'​s predominance,​ but he did disagree with some of Stalin'​s policies, and Stalin had begun to doubt the loyalty of members of the Leningrad apparatus. In need of a pretext for launching a broad purge, Stalin evidently decided that murdering Kirov would be expedient. The murder was carried out by a young assassin named Leonid Nikolaev. Recent evidence has indicated that Stalin and the NKVD planned the crime.
 +
 +Stalin then used the murder as an excuse for introducing draconian laws against political crime and for conducting a witch-hunt for alleged conspirators against Kirov. Over the next four-and-a-half years, millions of innocent party members and others were arrested -- many of them for complicity in the vast plot that supposedly lay behind the killing of Kirov. From the Soviet point of view, his murder was probably the crime of the century because it paved the way for the Great Terror. Stalin never visited Leningrad again and directed one of his most vicious post-War purges against the city -- Russia'​s historic window to the West.
 +
 +=== Speech of Bukharin ===
 +
 +{{ :​b2abukhr.gif?​direct&​200|}}
 +
 +Translated Transcript
 +
 +GRIGOR'​EVA-KHATUNTSEV,​ Nikitina [stenographer]
 +
 +[...]
 +
 +BUKHARIN.
 +
 +Let me relate to you how I explained this matter. Comrade Mikoian says the following: On the most basic question, he, Bukharin, has differences of opinion with the party: In essence, he stuck to his old positions. This is untrue. In no way have I stuck to my previous positions -- not on industrialization,​ not on collectivization,​ [and] not on village restructuring in general. But with regards to stimuli in agriculture,​ this question was not clear to me until the matter came round to the legislation on Soviet trade. I consider the entire problem, as a whole, was resolved after the introduction of laws on Soviet trade. Prior to this, this problem, very important but not all-embracing,​ was not clear to me. When this matter became pertinent to product turnover in [illegible] and Soviet....
 +
 +[intervening pages of transcript missing]
 +
 +KHATUNTSEV-VASIL'​EVA,​ F-va [stenographer]
 +
 +I would like to make one more remark. Apparently Mikoian has said: How, then, are you not responsible,​ as you say, for [illegible] this whole "​school"​ sits? I do bear responsibility for this. But the question involves the degree of responsibility;​ it is a matter of the quality of this responsibility. During the process of confrontation [and cross-examination],​ I told Kaganovich that I am responsible for the death of Tomskii because, in 1928-29, had I not headed up groups of rightists, it is possible that Tomskii'​s fate might also have been different. I bear responsibility for this fact. However, it is necessary to establish the degree and nature of this responsibility. Responsibility for what transpired with these youth over an indefinite number of years qualitatively and quantitatively differs from, let's say, the responsibility of a person who orders another person to do something and that person carries out the order. I am not shifting responsibility from myself; more than anyone else, I accept the gravity of this responsibility. However, I would like to say that the measure of responsibility,​ the characterization of this responsibility,​ is absolutely specific in nature, and it should be expressed as I have expressed it here.
 +
 +[intervening pages of transcript missing]
 +
 +[...] two people? This is an obvious lie. How could Kulikov offer two versions in answer to this absolutely and exceptionally terrible question? How could Sokol'​nikov advance two ideas at the same time?
 +
 +VOICE:
 +
 +( Rozit, Slepkov, and others mention this).
 +
 +BUKHARIN:
 +
 +In what regard about this? If one speaks "​generally"​ in this way, nothing at all is said: It is the same as when a student is asked where Moscow is on the map, and he immediately covers the whole map with the palm of his hand.
 +
 +Regarding the Riutinskii platform. It was presented by Ezhov as one of the top-priority issues requiring deliberation. This is very understandable from the point of view of constructing an indictment. The Riutinskii platform (if you could prove that I have any connection to it) would be a real treasure, because of its concern with the most crucial moments in the struggle with Soviet power, its concern with terror, and [illegible],​ etc., etc. I studied the vast number of pages of [material?] especially from the angle of the Riutinskii platform. Nonetheless,​ I feel that it is necessary here to look closely at this matter which, after all, is in testimony. Astrov testifies that the authors were Rykov [...]
 +
 +[intervening pages of transcript missing]
 +
 +[...] Errio did not see; it is even there, they say, that I maintained contact with Skrypnik (for a right-wing deviation, I would have to be linked to the positions of Skrypnik); it has been established,​ they say, that I stand for a democratic republic and, at the same time, it is known that I spoke about it, let's say, at an assembly, and a whole series of other things. I cannot answer all these questions separately, since it would require too much time, so I'll take only the fundamental ones.
 +
 +I'd like to say a few words about terror. Comrades, the question of membership in the party seems to me simply to be naive: if a person takes the terrorist point of view against the leadership of the party, then the question as to whether he may be a party member is a naive question. I have absolutely no relationship with terror, not by a single word or thought. When I hear these things, it seems to me that the conversation concerns other people; perhaps I am sitting here and hearing about another person. I do not understand how I can be charged with such an accusation; to me this is absolutely incomprehensible [and] I look on this as "a sheep looking at new gates" [i.e., I feel totally lost in foreign territory].
 +
 +POZERN:
 +
 +These are not "new gates"​--that'​s the problem.
 +
 +BUKHARIN:
 +
 +To your way of thinking, perhaps they are not new gates, but then I'm not a sheep either.
 +
 +[intervening pages of transcript missing]
 +
 +ALTAEVA-PRIGORNAIA,​ Petrakova. [stenographer]
 +
 +STALIN:
 +
 +You should not and do not have the right to slander yourself. This is a most criminal thing.
 +
 +MOLOTOV:
 +
 +That which you have stated concerning the famine is simply an anti-Soviet thing.
 +
 +VOICES FROM THE ROOM:
 +
 +A counterrevolutionary thing!
 +
 +STALIN:
 +
 +You must come around to our position. Trotskii with his disciples, Zinov'​ev and Kamenev, at one time worked with Lenin, and now these people have negotiated an agreement with Hitler. After this, can we label such things as shocking? Absolutely not. After everything that has happened to these gentlemen, former comrades, who have negotiated an agreement with Hitler, a sellout of the USSR, there is nothing surprising in human affairs.
 +
 +Everything has to be proven and not [just] replied to using exclamation points and question marks.
 +
 +MOLOTOV:
 +
 +And anti-Soviet matters should not be engaged in.
 +
 +MOLOTOV:
 +
 +Let us call a recess, comrades.
 +
 +=== Study of Kirov'​s murder ===
 +
 +Transport Department
 +
 +Transport Department of the Central Committee of the All-Union Communist Party (of Bolsheviks) to Comrade Evgen'​ev
 +
 +On the Analytical Study of the Confidential Letter of the Central Committee of the All-Union Communist Party (of Bolsheviks) about Lessons Learned from the Events Surrounding the Heinous Murder of Comrade Kirov (1)
 +
 +....
 +
 +Study of the letter of the Central Committee began with an instructional conference with the chiefs of political sections supervising workers in the administration of the Political Section for Land Transport and the party organizers of the Moscow [transportation] hub. The conference was held January 20 by the supervisor of the Political Section for Land Transport.
 +
 +On January 22 study of the letter began at hub conferences of party organizers and the active party membership of branch political sections; these meetings were held by the chief of the Political Section for Land Transport and the deputy and members of the Party Collegium for Land Transport.
 +
 +On January 25 study of the letter began in party committees with active party members and subsequently at closed party meetings.
 +
 +For study of the letter at the closed party meetings, the Political Section for Land Transport appointed party workers as leaders in 46 party organizations.
 +
 +The party organizations for transport received a great deal of help from territorial party organizations,​ especially in Moscow and in Tula and Gorkii as well; those organizations helped in the guidance of workers in the political sections and sent their workers to meetings of railway party organizations for study of the Central Committee letter.
 +
 +In a vast majority of the party transport organizations,​ study of the Central Committee letter proceeded at the highest ideological-political level, showing the political strength and uncompromising nature of party organizations in the struggle for the overall party line, as well as their solidarity around the Stalin Central Committee and the party leader, Comrade Stalin.
 +
 +The letter was heard with particular attention and exceptional interest at all the meetings.
 +
 +The reading of the letter was accompanied by commentary and an emphasis on its exceptional clarity, precision and Stalinist style.
 +
 +In the majority of organizations,​ the closed meetings were well prepared and distinguished by very large attendance and exceptional political activity.
 +
 +At the Voitovich Plant, for example, of 280 persons who could have attended 272 were present and 93 spoke. At the Krasnyi Put' Plant, 60 of 73 persons attended and 18 spoke. .... In the 22nd Railway Region (Ranenburg),​ 19 of 24 communists attended and 11 spoke. In the First Section, 98 to 100 percent took part in the party meetings.
 +
 +Among communists who were not present at the closed party meetings because of illness or assignment, supplementary meetings were held to study the letter.
 +
 +Party organizers visited intermediate outposts for study of the letter with individual communists.
 +
 +Individual party organizations conducted poor preparations and therefore study of the letter proceeded at a low political level. For example, at Steam Engine Station Moskva-1, study of the Central Committee letter at a meeting of the party committee and active membership missed the principal political meaning of the letter and debate was limited to minor faults in composition. The same thing occurred at the party meeting of the 18th Railway Region. At the Kashir Repair Shop, the double-dealing of former Trotskyites was not exposed to its full depth. Therefore, a second study of the letter was conducted in these organizations.
 +
 +At this meeting it was also indicated that the work being conducted was only the beginning of accomplishing the basic tasks stemming from the Central Committee letter.
 +
 +This especially concerns party organizations and individual communists at small field stations where study of the Central Committee letter was less vigorous, where existing scandals have still [not] been exposed and where revolutionary vigilance, preparedness for struggle and the ideological political work of communists is not yet at the necessary level.
 +
 +The meeting discussed in particular detail and provided concrete instruction on the question of improving propaganda work.
 +
 +At present, study of the Central Committee letter has begun in komsomol (2) organizations,​ in relation to which the political section discloses certain facts concerning party organizers not providing required leadership for this study and sometimes not even attending komsomol meetings for study of the letter. The political sections of [labor] branches and party organizers were notified of the impermissability of such happenings, and a proposal was made to the political section chiefs that they personally accompany the active members of komsomol organizations in study of the Central Committee letter and single out proven communists and responsible workers for study of the letter in all komsomol organizations to ensure an ideologically high political level for komsomol meetings in the study of the Central Committee letter.
 +
 +Chief of the Political Section for Land Transportation
 +
 +[signature indistinct]
 +
 +(Kostanian)
 +
 +Translator'​s notes:
 +
 +(1) Kirov, a prominent party leader, was murdered December 1, 1934; this event marked the beginning of the Great Terror.
 +
 +(2) "​komsomol"​ [kommunisticheskii soiuz molodezhi] is the acronym for the Communist Youth League.
 +
 +===== Secret Police =====
 +
 +From the beginning of their regime, the Bolsheviks relied on a strong secret, or political, police to buttress their rule. The first secret police, called the Cheka, was established in December 1917 as a temporary institution to be abolished once Vladimir Lenin and the Bolsheviks had consolidated their power. The original Cheka, headed by Feliks Dzerzhinskii,​ was empowered only to investigate "​counterrevolutionary"​ crimes. But it soon acquired powers of summary justice and began a campaign of terror against the propertied classes and enemies of Bolshevism. Although many Bolsheviks viewed the Cheka with repugnance and spoke out against its excesses, its continued existence was seen as crucial to the survival of the new regime.
 +
 +Once the Civil War (1918-21) ended and the threat of domestic and foreign opposition had receded, the Cheka was disbanded. Its functions were transferred in 1922 to the State Political Directorate,​ or GPU, which was initially less powerful than its predecessor. Repression against the population lessened. But under party leader Joseph Stalin, the secret police again acquired vast punitive powers and in 1934 was renamed the People'​s Comissariat for Internal Affairs, or NKVD. No longer subject to party control or restricted by law, the NKVD became a direct instrument of Stalin for use against the party and the country during the Great Terror of the 1930s.
 +
 +The secret police remained the most powerful and feared Soviet institution throughout the Stalinist period. Although the post-Stalin secret police, the KGB, no longer inflicted such large-scale purges, terror, and forced depopulation on the peoples of the Soviet Union, it continued to be used by theKremlin leadership to suppress political and religious dissent. The head of the KGB was a key figure in resisting the democratization of the late 1980s and in organizing the attempted putsch of August 1991.
 +
 +==== United Press ====
 +
 +{{ :​c3unprss.gif?​direct&​200|}}
 +
 +TO THE POLITBURO
 +
 +To Comrade Stalin.
 +
 +Copies to all members of the Politburo.
 +
 +For some time now, particularly during the period of the Genoa Conference, the Moscow representative of the American Telegraph Agency "​United Press" citizen Gullinger has started sending abroad telegrams tendentiously reflecting events in Russia. This has been particularly so in his telegrams on the removal of church properties and in telegrams that have anticipated the "​united front" of Germany and Russia at the Genoa Conference. We have repeatedly brought to his attention the distortion of the facts permitted by him in his telegrams; we have not let pass several of his telegrams, while in others we have expunged the particularly tendentious passages that might serve as the basis for propagating false rumors about Russia abroad. In response to this, citizen Gullinger has begun to slip into his telegrams phrases about the tightening of censorship in Moscow. On April 26, he brought for transmission a telegram, a copy of which is enclosed with this letter. This telegram was not let through; nevertheless,​ Gullinger sent it, apparently through some mission, as we learned from the response he received to his suggestion.
 +
 +I feel that it is intolerable to permit such crooks to live in Moscow and to continue to do such dirty tricks. I suggest that he be deported immediately.
 +
 +....
 +
 +Since it is necessary to deport him immediately,​ I would request that the question be resolved by Thursday by an arrangement over the telephone. (A copy of this letter has been circulated to all members of the Politburo).
 +
 +With Communist Greetings
 +
 +Stamp (bottom right): Secret Archive of the Central Committee of the All-Union Communist Party (of Bolsheviks) Inventory No 290; Convocation;​ F-GR; Archive No.--
 +
 +===== The GULAG =====
 +
 +The Soviet system of forced labor camps was first established in 1919 under the Cheka, but it was not until the early 1930s that the camp population reached significant numbers. By 1934 the GULAG, or Main Directorate for Corrective Labor Camps, then under the Cheka'​s successor organization the NKVD, had several million inmates. Prisoners included murderers, thieves, and other common criminals--along with political and religious dissenters. The GULAG, whose camps were located mainly in remote regions of Siberia and the Far North, made significant contributions to the Soviet economy in the period of Joseph Stalin. GULAG prisoners constructed the White Sea-Baltic Canal, the Moscow-Volga Canal, the Baikal-Amur main railroad line, numerous hydroelectric stations, and strategic roads and industrial enterprises in remote regions. GULAG manpower was also used for much of the country'​s lumbering and for the mining of coal, copper, and gold.
 +
 +Stalin constantly increased the number of projects assigned to the NKVD, which led to an increasing reliance on its labor. The GULAG also served as a source of workers for economic projects independent of the NKVD, which contracted its prisoners out to various economic enterprises.
 +
 +Conditions in the camps were extremely harsh. Prisoners received inadequate food rations and insufficient clothing, which made it difficult to endure the severe weatherand the long working hours; sometimes the inmates were physically abused by camp guards. As a result, the death rate from exhaustion and disease in the camps was high. After Stalin died in 1953, the GULAG population was reduced significantly,​ and conditions for inmates somewhat improved. Forced labor camps continued to exist, although on a small scale, into the Gorbachev period, and the government even opened some camps to scrutiny by journalists and human rights activists. With the advance of democratization,​ political prisoners and prisoners of conscience all but disappeared from the camps.
 +
 +==== Collectivization of Livestock: Letter to Bolshevik ====
 +
 +{{ :​d3presid.gif?​direct&​200|}}
 +
 +To the Presidium of the Central Executive Committee of the All-Union Communist Party (Bolshevik)
 +We appeal to you, asking you to pay a minimum of attention to our request.
 +
 +We are prisoners who are returning from the Solovetsky concentration camp because of our poor health. We went there full of energy and good health, and now we are returning as invalids, broken and crippled emotionally and physically. We are asking you to draw your attention to the arbitrary use of power and the violence that reign at the Solovetsky concentration camp in Kemi and in all sections of the concentration camp. It is difficult for a human being even to imagine such terror, tyranny, violence, and lawlessness. When we went there, we could not conceive of such a horror, and now we, crippled ourselves, together with several thousands who are still there, appeal to the ruling center of the Soviet state to curb the terror that reigns there. As though it weren'​t enough that the Unified State Political Directorate [OGPU] without oversight and due process sends workers and peasants there who are by and large innocent (we are not talking about criminals who deserve to be punished), the former tsarist penal servitude system in comparison to Solovky had 99% more humanity, fairness, and legality. [...]
 +
 +People die like flies, i.e., they die a slow and painful death; we repeat that all this torment and suffering is placed only on the shoulders of the proletariat without money, i.e., on workers who, we repeat, were unfortunate to find themselves in the period of hunger and destruction accompanying the events of the October Revolution, and who committed crimes only to save themselves and their families from death by starvation; they have already borne the punishment for these crimes, and the vast majority of them subsequently chose the path of honest labor. Now because of their past, for whose crime they have already paid, they are fired from their jobs. Yet, the main thing is that the entire weight of this scandalous abuse of power, brute violence, and lawlessness that reign at Solovky and other sections of the OGPU concentration camp is placed on the shoulders of workers and peasants; others, such as counterrevolutionaries,​ profiteers and so on, have full wallets and have set themselves up and live in clover in the Soviet State, while next to them, in the literal meaning of the word, the penniless proletariat dies from hunger, cold, and back- breaking 14-16 hour days under the tyranny and lawlessness of inmates who are the agents and collaborators of the State Political Directorate [GPU].
 +
 +If you complain or write anything ("​Heaven forbid"​),​ they will frame you for an attempted escape or for something else, and they will shoot you like a dog. They line us up naked and barefoot at 22 degrees below zero and keep us outside for up to an hour. It is difficult to describe all the chaos and terror that is going on in Kemi, Solovky, and the other sections of the concentrations camp. All annual inspections uncover a lot of abuses. But what they discover in comparison to what actually exists is only a part of the horror and abuse of power, which the inspection accidently uncovers. (One example is the following fact, one of a thousand, which is registered in GPU and for which the guilty have been punished: THEY FORCED THE INMATES TO EAT THEIR OWN FECES. "​Comrades,"​ if we dare to use this phrase, verify that this is a fact from reality, about which, we repeat, OGPU has the official evidence, and judge for yourself the full extent of effrontery and humiliation in the supervision by those who want to make a career for themselves. [...]
 +
 +We are sure and we hope that in the All-Union Communist Party there are people, as we have been told, who are humane and sympathetic;​ it is possible, that you might think that it is our imagination,​ but we swear to you all, by everything that is sacred to us, that this is only one small part of the nightmarish truth, because it makes no sense to make this up. We repeat, and will repeat 100 times, that yes, indeed there are some guilty people, but the majority suffer innocently, as is described above. The word law, according to the law of the GPU concentration camps, does not exist; what does exist is only the autocratic power of petty tyrants, i.e., collaborators,​ serving time, who have power over life and death. Everything described above is the truth and we, ourselves, who are close to the grave after 3 years in Solovky and Kemi and other sections, are asking you to improve the pathetic, tortured existence of those who are there who languish under the yoke of the OGPU's tyranny, violence, and complete lawlessness....
 +
 +To this we subscribe: G. Zheleznov, Vinogradov, F. Belinskii.
 +
 +Dec. 14, 1926
 +
 +True copy
 +
 +TRANSLATOR'​S COMMENTS: The letter is written in very poor Russian. For the sake of clarity, the translator corrected the grammar and substituted a few words.
 +
 +===== Collectivization and Industrialization =====
 +
 +In November 1927, Joseph Stalin launched his "​revolution from above" by setting two extraordinary goals for Soviet domestic policy: rapid industrialization and collectivization of agriculture. His aims were to erase all traces of the capitalism that had entered under the New Economic Policy and to transform the Soviet Union as quickly as possible, without regard to cost, into an industrialized and completely socialist state.
 +
 +Stalin'​s First Five-Year Plan, adopted by the party in 1928, called for rapid industrialization of the economy, with an emphasis on heavy industry. It set goals that were unrealistic-- a 250 percent increase in overall industrial development and a 330 percent expansion in heavy industry alone. All industry and services were nationalized,​ managers were given predetermined output quotas by central planners, and trade unions were converted into mechanisms for increasing worker productivity. Many new industrial centers were developed, particularly in the Ural Mountains, and thousands of new plants were built throughout the country. But because Stalin insisted on unrealistic production targets, serious problems soon arose. With the greatest share of investment put into heavy industry, widespread shortages of consumer goods occurred.
 +
 +The First Five-Year Plan also called for transforming Soviet agriculture from predominantly individual farms into a system of large state collective farms. The Communist regime believed that collectivization would improve agricultural productivity and would produce grain reserves sufficiently large to feed the growing urban labor force. The anticipated surplus was to pay for industrialization. Collectivization was further expected to free many peasants for industrial work in the cities and to enable the party to extend its political dominance over the remaining peasantry.
 +
 +{{ :​e3livest.gif?​direct&​200|}}
 +
 +Stalin focused particular hostility on the wealthier peasants, or kulaks. About one million kulak households (some five million people) were deported and never heard from again. Forced collectivization of the remaining peasants, which was often fiercely resisted, resulted in a disastrous disruption of agricultural productivity and a catastrophic famine in 1932-33. Although the First Five-Year Plan called for the collectivization of only twenty percent of peasant households, by 1940 approximately ninety-sevenpercent of all peasant households had been collectivized and private ownership of property almost entirely eliminated. Forced collectivization helped achieve Stalin'​s goal of rapid industrialization,​ but the human costs were incalculable.
 +
 +Stalin focused particular hostility on the wealthier peasants, or kulaks. About one million kulak households (some five million people) were deported and never heard from again. Forced collectivization of the remaining peasants, which was often fiercely resisted, resulted in a disastrous disruption of agricultural productivity and a catastrophic famine in 1932-33. Although the First Five-Year Plan called for the collectivization of only twenty percent of peasant households, by 1940 approximately ninety-sevenpercent of all peasant households had been collectivized and private ownership of property almost entirely eliminated. Forced collectivization helped achieve Stalin'​s goal of rapid industrialization,​ but the human costs were incalculable.
 +
 +==== Collectivization of Livestock ====
 +
 +Addendum to point 20, Politburo minutes no. 94 of April 20, 1931
 +
 +ON FORCED COLLECTIVIZATION OF LIVESTOCK
 +
 +[Handwritten line:] Resolution of the Central Committee [TsK] of the All-Union Communist Party (Bolsheviks) [VKP(b)], Mar 26, 1932
 +
 +In many regions of our country we can observe the collectivization of cattle and smaller livestock by forcible means. This practice is a flagrant violation of repeatedly issued directives by the party'​s TsK, as well as of the provisions contained in the statute of the agricultural artel.
 +
 +The TsK VKP(b) stresses that only enemies of the kolkhozes would permit forced collectivization of livestock from individual kolkhozniks. The TsK emphasizes that forced requisition of kolkhozniks'​ cattle and smaller livestock is contrary to the party'​s political program. The goal of the party is that every member of the kolkhoz have a cow, some smaller livestock and poultry.....
 +
 +The TsK of the VKP(b) proposes to all party, Soviet and kolkhoz organizations:​
 +
 +  - Cease all attempts of forced collectivization of cattle and small livestock belonging to the kolkhozniks and expel from the party those guilty of violating TsK directives;
 +  - Organize aid for the members of the kolkhozes who have no cattle nor small livestock to purchase and raise young animals for their own personal needs.
 +
 +Signed: TsK VKP(b)
 +
 +The next 1932 letter documents in great detail the devastating effects of collectivization in the Novosibirsk area of Siberia. An accompanying physician'​s report describes the deleterious medical conditions the famine has produced. This document is among the first detailed descriptions of the collectivization and its results in Siberia.
 +
 +==== Letter from Feigin ====
 +
 +Letter of April 9, 1932, from Feigin to Ordzhonikidze (a close friend of Stalin'​s),​ about conditions on the kolkhozes (collective farms), and...
 +
 +{{ :​aa3feig1.gif?​direct&​200|}}
 +
 +Dear Sergo [Ordzhonikidze],​
 +
 +I'm writing you from Novosibirsk. I have driven around several collective farms [kolkhozes] and consider it necessary to inform you about a few items. I was in various kolkhozes--not productive and relatively unproductive ones, but everywhere there was only one sight--that of a huge shortage of seed, famine, and extreme emaciation of livestock.
 +
 +In the kolkhozes which I observed I attempted to learn how much the livestock had diminished in comparison with the years 1927-28. It turns out that kolkhoz Ziuzia has 507 milch cows at present while there were 2000 in '28; kolkhoz Ust'​-Tandovskii collectively and individually has 203 head, earlier they had more than 600; kolkhoz Kruglo-Ozernyi at present has 418 head of beef cattle and 50 held by kolkhozniks,​ in 1928 there were 1800 head; kolkhoz Goldoba collectively and individually has 275 head, in 1929 there were 1000 plus head, this kolkhoz now has 350 sheep, in 1929 there were 1500. Approximately the same correlations were found also in the kolkhozes Ol'​gino and Novo-Spasski.
 +
 +The raion which I visited (Barabinskii) is known for its butter export, but even in the other raions of Western Siberia the decline of livestock farming during this period is not much smaller.
 +
 +These are facts that I myself checked, and on this basis I think that the data in the general census recently carried out by Gosplan significantly embellish the real picture.
 +
 +The situation of the kolkhoz livestock farms is a bad one, primarily because of lack of feed. Milk production has reached extremely low levels of 1, 2 or 3 liters per day instead of the 5-7 liters normal for this region in a high-yield year [crossed out: "as noted by kolkhozniks and individual farmers"​]. The poor condition of the livestock cannot be blamed on poor care or poor labor organization since in most of the kolkhozes I visited, the situation in terms of care and labor organization,​ relatively speaking, is not bad (although it could be much better), but in any case it is im- measurably better than in the butter-producing state farms [sovkhozes] of the raion, which I also visited.
 +
 +And so, undoubtedly,​ if the collectivized livestock is sufficiently fed every year, we can increase greatly the yield of commodity production, but this still does not remedy the situation, in that the sovkhozes and kolkhozes will not be able to meet the needs of the country for meat and butter in the next 2-3 years, and I think it is now necessary, when the socialistic sector of the villages has been strengthened,​ to speed up the growth of livestock farming in the private households of the kolkhozniks and individual farmers. The resolution of the Central Committee forbidding collectivization of the last cow is somewhat of a plus in this regard, but this is not the main issue. The main issue is the fact that almost all of the kolkhoznik'​s livestock is contracted and removed. This livestock consists of the last cows and last sheep. In addition, when this livestock is contracted, the kolkhoznik and individual farmer slaughter off the rest. As a result, in the villages where I have observed this situation, not more than 20-30% of the kolkhozniks have one cow each and a few sheep, but as a rule, the kolkhoznik and individual farmer not only do not raise livestock, but they try to get rid of or slaughter those they do own.
 +
 +If this situation continues, then in my opinion, next year the shortage of meat, leather, and fats will be greater than this year.
 +
 +The regional [Party] workers firmly believe that the sovkhozes and the com-modity farms of the kolkhozes will be able to supply the nation already this year with the necessary production and express the idea that private ownership of livestock by the kolkhozniks should cease.
 +
 +I think we should undertake all measures to increase private ownership of livestock by the kolkhoznik or else there is no way out of the present periodic shortage of products.
 +
 +The second item concerns the sowing campaign. The situation is such that there is not enough seed in the kolkhozes. There is no way that we will be able to fulfill the plan for grain production, and the shortfall in the krai will probably be 15-20 percent. Besides this, horses are quite emaciated, a significant number of them have already died, and in addition, the people do not have provisions. And so the spring planting will occur in exceptionally tight circumstances,​ but I figure that with the right or-ganization of seed distribution within the krai and among the kolkhozes we can achieve such a level that the gross yield in 1932 will rise above not only the gross yield of last year, but even that of the high-yield year of 1930.
 +
 +How can we accomplish this? Here is the situation: all kolkhozes have been given a plan for sowing. [crossed out: Some areas were given state subsidies in order to carry out this plan. As a result] some kolkhozes have enough or nearly enough seed (including the state subsidy), but other kolkhozes have barely any seed. Since the planting will be carried out according to plan, one group of kolkhozes will sow all fields, but another group with less seed will be faced with a large underfulfillment of the sowing plan. How does this relate to crop capacity? The point is that in these circumstances fields which may yield an extremely insignificant harvest will be sown in the first group of kolkhozes; that is, not only the fallow and autumn fields will be sown, but if the plan is followed blindly even the salt-marshes,​ on which absolutely nothing grows, will be sown (as was done last year); whereas fallow and autumn fields in the second group of kolkhozes which that readied last year and have proven to be productive will remain unsown.
 +
 +In order to prevent this situation it is necessary to change the existing plan, but no one wants to do this, even though they understand perfectly well that it is imperative to review the plan. The situation I discovered in the kolkhozes that I observed last year was that at least 30% of all the sown fields were sown by the kolkhozes at too late a date, merely to carry out the sowing plan (this is one of the reasons for the crop failure); on the other hand, fields known to produce a less than decent harvest were sown, also merely to carry out the plan. This year the same episode will be repeated if instructions on behalf of the Central Committee are not be issued accordingly--in a time of acute seed deficiency a significant amount of seed will be wasted on worthless land, the sowing will occur at a time when the land is already drying out, that is, when it is too late to sow, but the fallow and autumn fields of the second group of kolkhozes will remain underutilized. These conditions guarantee a meager harvest, and in some places complete crop failure, only because a plan was given based on a forecast of spring planting, consisting of as many favorable qualifying indicators as possible, not considering that the fall harvest will result in extremely unfavorable qualitative results.
 +
 +And so I come to my second conclusion--that the Central Committee give the order to all regional organizations (as soon as possible, there is little time left before the spring planting) depending on the conditions of each raion and kolkhoz, that the plan be changed in such a way as to produce the best qualitative results. For this it is imperative to conduct a review from the standpoint of 1) sowing all prepared fields (fallow and autumn fields) without exception; 2) redistribution of seed among the kolkhozes in the time remaining before the planting date so that the planting be completed within 15 days, and under no circumstances more than 17 days; 3) and finally, that the improvement of fallow land be stipulated for 1933.
 +
 +In fulfilling these conditions, given average or especially favorable climatic conditions, the gross yield, and consequently,​ even the commodity output of bread may yield not less but even more than in 1930, even if the sown area declines. But in addition, I believe that in reality the sown area will not decline because last year and the year before all agricultural agencies and Party organizations pushed madly for quantitative indicators, the planting season was extremely lengthy, they sowed worthless land and, as a rule, only lands that were suitable and were sown at the correct time were productive. If in following this course (to conceal the actual nature of things with quantitative indicators) we immediately start and propose to review the plan from the standpoint of achieving the best qualitative indicators [crossed out: results] (taking into account the seed shortage), then we can reach the necessary results.
 +
 +Third issue--the peasant'​s attitude. Their attitude is utterly bad in light of the famine and the fact that they are losing their last cows through contracting--as a result the kolkhoznik has neither bread nor milk. I saw all this with my own eyes and am not exaggerating. People are starving, living on food substitutes,​ they grow weaker, and naturally, under such circumstances,​ their mood is hostile. I have not seen such an attitude as is now found in the villages, due to famine and the loss of the last cows and sheep through contrac-ting,​ in a long time. I will inform you of the facts that substantiate this when we meet. Upon arriving in Moscow, I will try to see Stalin and inform him, or if he cannot spare the time, I will write him a letter.
 +
 +It seems that you told me in 1926-27 (in Morozovka), when the opposition was making quite furious attacks on the Central Committee that Stalin sees farther than the rest of you. This is undoubtedly so and was substantiated during the period from 1923 on and especially since the establishment of the five-year plan. But in order for him to see beyond everyone, one must, with absolute objectivity,​ relate to him those facts which are based on reality. I will attempt to do this upon my arrival in Moscow, and I will tell him what I have seen with my own eyes. Maybe I am drawing incorrect conclusions,​ but I acquainted myself thoroughly with the factual situation and it seems to me that it is utterly imperative that Stalin take up this matter. This sounds like those arguments the German Social Democrats made in Marx's lifetime, saying, "I know the factual situation, but let "​papa"​ Marx draw the conclusion."​ I have nothing new to say besides what I have already related, and I will just repeat what the German Social Democrats used to say: "Let '​papa'​ Stalin draw the conclusions,​ and I will describe the factual situation as it is."
 +
 +Take care. Feigin
 +
 +19/9 April 32
 +
 +At the same time I am sending you the doctor'​s statement on the famine in peasant families and in turn I corroborate that I observed a similar situation.
 +==== Kiselev'​s memorandum ====
 +
 +Dr. Kiselev'​s memorandum of March 25, 1932, about those conditions.
 +
 +{{ :​aa3feig2.gif?​direct&​200|}}
 +
 +Top Secret
 +
 +TO THE HEAD OF THE WESTERN SIBERIA REGIONAL BOARD OF HEALTH Comrade TRAKMAN.
 +
 +Copy to POKROV REGIONAL COMMITTEE OF THE ALL-UNION COMMUNIST PARTY (Bosheviks),​ REGIONAL EXECUTIVE COMMITTEE and RUSSIAN COMMUNIST LEAGUE
 +
 +MEMORANDUM
 +
 +On the instructions of the Regional Committee of the All- Union Communist Party (Bolsheviks) issued to Kiselev on 24 March 1932 on the subject of finding hunger-caused illness, several families of the Kartsovskii village soviet were observed and the following was found: as stated by soviet chairman Comrade Sukhanov and secretary of the First Party Organization Comrade Medvedev, a series of written and oral statements from the kolkhozniks of this village, that they and their families suffer from starvation, were received.
 +
 +The statements were made by the following people: Gorokhova Mariia, Pautova Malan'​ia,​ Rogozina Irina, Logacheva Ustin'​ia,​ and others. The soviet chairman, the secretary of the First Party Organization and other communists substantiate the fact that the kolkhozniks use animals that have died as food.
 +
 +Together with the soviet chairman and other citizens I visited the quarters of the above-mentioned kolkhozniks and also as per my wish I observed a series of homes besides the aforementioned in order to be convinced that the worst family cases were not chosen as an example.
 +
 +From my observation of 20 homes in first and second Karpov, I found only in one home, that of a Red Army veteran, a relative condition of nourishment,​ some flour and bread, but the rest subsist on food substitutes. Almost in every home either children or mothers were ill, undoubtably due to starvation, since their faces and entire bodies were swollen.
 +
 +An especially horrible picture of the following families:
 +
 +1) The family of Konstantin Sidel'​nikov who had gone to trade his wife's remaining shirts, skirts, and scarves for bread. The wife lay ill, having given birth 5 days earlier, and 4 very small children as pale as wax with swollen cheeks sat at the filthy table like marmots, and with spoons ate, from a common cup, hot water into which had been added from a bottle a white liquid of questionable taste and sour smell, which turned out to be skim milk (the result of passing milk through a separator). Konstantin Sidel'​nikov and his wife are excellent kolkhozniks--prime workers, ex-perienced kolkhozniks.
 +2) IAkov Sidel'​nikov has 2 children and elderly parents, both 70, living in one room, but they eat separately; that is, the elderly obtain their own food substitutes with their savings; the son, IAkov Sidel'​nikov,​ with his own; they hide their food substitutes from each other outside (I have attached examples of these food substitutes to this memorandum). The elderly in tears ask: "​Doctor,​ give us death!"​
 +3) Filipp Borodin has earned 650 work-days, has a wife and 5 children ranging from one-and-a-half to nine years of age. The wife lies ill on the oven, 3 children sit on the oven, they are as pale as wax with swollen faces, the one-and-a-half year old sits pale by the window, swollen, the 9 year old lies ill on the earthen floor covered with rags, and Filipp Borodin himself sits on a bench and continuously smokes cigarettes made of repulsively pungent tobacco, cries like a babe, asks death for his children. In tears he asks Comrade Sukhanov: "Give us at least 1 kilo of potatoes, give us at least 1 liter of milk, after all, I worked all summer and even now I work unceasingly (now he takes care of the bulls and in the summer he tends the grazing cows).
 +According the the statement by Comrade Sukhanov and the brigadier of the kolkhoz "Red Partisan,"​ Borodin was a non- complaining worker. Borodin does not even have food substitutes for nourishment,​ two days ago he and his family ate two sickly piglets thrown out of the common farmyard. In the Borodin home there is unbelievable filth, dampness, and stench, mixed with the smell of tobacco. Borodin swears at the children: "The devils don't die, I wish I didn't have to look at you!" Having objectively investigated the condition of Borodin himself I ascertain that he (Borodin) is starting to slip into psychosis due to starvation, which can lead to his eating his own children.
 +
 +My inspection of the series of families took place at the dinner hour, where they use those same food substitutes which they eat with hot water, but in several homes (2) on the table there were gnawed bones from a sickly horse. According to the explanations of the kolkhozniks,​ they themselves prepare food in the following manner: they grind sunflower stems, flax and hemp seeds, chaff, dreg, colza, goosefoot, and dried potato peelings, and they bake flat cakes. Of the food substitutes listed above, the oily seeds are nutritious, which are healthy in combined foods since they contain vitamins, by themselves the vegetable oils do not contain vitamins and by not com-bining them with other food products of more equal nourishment and caloric value they are found to be toxic and will harm the body. Based on: General Course on Hygiene by Prof. G. V. Khotopin, p. 301-4--_.
 +
 +The homes are filthy, the area around the homes is polluted by human waste, by diarrhea caused by these substitutes. People walk around like shadows, silent, vacant; empty homes with boarded-up windows (about 500 homeowners have left their homes in Karpov village for destinations unknown); one rarely sees an animal on the street (apparently the last ones have been eaten).
 +
 +In the entire village of 1000 yards I found only 2 chickens and a rooster. Occasionally one meets an emaciated dog.
 +
 +The impression is that Karpov village seems to be hit by anbiosis (hibernation,​ a freeze, falling asleep).
 +
 +The livestock is free to feed on thatched roofs of homes and barns.
 +
 +In reporting the above-related to the Pokrov Regional Committee of the All-Union Communist Party (Bolsheviks),​ Regional Executive Committee, Russian Com-munist League, and to you, as the regional health inspector and doctor of the Pokrov region, I beg of you to undertake immediate measures to help the starving and to notify me of the practical measures taken.
 +
 +March 25, 1932 Regional health inspector--doctor--KISELEV
 +
 +True copy:
 +
 +==== Hanging Order ====
 +
 +{{ :​ad3kula1.gif?​direct&​200|}}
 +
 +The Hanging Order from Lenin is available as two images. Click on the icons to view full-size images.
 +
 +The next document is an order from Lenin to communists in Penza, August 11, 1918, demanding that they publicly hang at least 100 kulaks and confiscate their grain, to set an example.
 +
 +The Hanging Order from Lenin is available as two images. Click on the icons to view full-size images.
 +
 +11-8-18
 +
 +Send to Penza To Comrades Kuraev, Bosh, Minkin and other Penza communists
 +
 +Comrades! The revolt by the five kulak volost'​s must be suppressed without mercy. The interest of the entire revolution demands this, because we have now before us our final decisive battle "with the kulaks."​ We need to set an example.
 +
 +  - You need to hang (hang without fail, so that the public sees) at least 100 notorious kulaks, the rich, and the bloodsuckers.
 +  - Publish their names.
 +  - Take away all of their grain.
 +  - Execute the hostages - in accordance with yesterday'​s telegram.
 +
 +{{ :​ad3kula2.gif?​direct&​200|}}
 +
 +This needs to be accomplished in such a way, that people for hundreds of miles around will see, tremble, know and scream out: let's choke and strangle those blood-sucking kulaks.
 +
 +Telegraph us acknowledging receipt and execution of this.
 +
 +Yours, Lenin
 +
 +P.S. Use your toughest people for this.
 +
 +TRANSLATOR'​S COMMENTS: Lenin uses the derogative term kulach'​e in reference to the class of prosperous peasants. A volost'​ was a territorial/​administrative unit consisting of a few villages and surrounding land.
 +
 +[not numbered]
 +
 +===== Anti-Religious Campaigns =====
 +
 +The Soviet Union was the first state to have as an ideological objective the elimination of religion. Toward that end, the Communist regime confiscated church property, ridiculed religion, harassed believers, and propagated atheism in the schools. Actions toward particular religions, however, were determined by State interests, and most organized religions were never outlawed.
 +
 +The main target of the anti-religious campaign in the 1920s and 1930s was the Russian Orthodox Church, which had the largest number of faithful. Nearly all of its clergy, and many of its believers, were shot or sent to labor camps. Theological schools were closed, and church publications were prohibited. By 1939 only about 500 of over 50,000 churches remained open.
 +
 +After Nazi Germany'​s attack on the Soviet Union in 1941, Joseph Stalin revived the Russian Orthodox Church to intensify patriotic support for the war effort. By 1957 about 22,000 Russian Orthodox churches had become active. But in 1959 Nikita Khrushchev initiated his own campaign against the Russian Orthodox Church and forced the closure of about 12,000 churches. By 1985 fewer than 7,000 churches remained active. Members of the church hierarchy were jailed or forced out, their places taken by docile clergy, many of whom had ties with the KGB.
 +
 +Campaigns against other religions were closely associated with particular nationalities,​ especially if they recognized a foreign religious authority such as the Pope. By 1926, the Roman Catholic Church had no bishops left in the Soviet Union, andby 1941 only two of the almost 1,200 churches that had existed in 1917, mostly in Lithuania, were still active. The Ukrainian Catholic Church (Uniate), linked with Ukrainian nationalism,​ was forcibly subordinated in 1946 to the Russian Orthodox Church, and the Autocephalous Orthodox Churches of Belorussia and Ukraine were suppressed twice, in the late 1920s and again in 1944.
 +
 +Attacks on Judaism were endemic throughout the Soviet period, and the organized practice of Judaism became almost impossible. Protestant denominations and other sects were also persecuted. The All-Union Council of Evangelical Christian Baptists, established by the government in 1944, typically was forced to confine its activities to the narrow act of worship and denied most opportunities for religious teaching and publication. Fearful of a pan-Islamic movement, the Soviet regime systematically suppressed Islam by force, until 1941. The Nazi invasion of the Soviet Union that year led the government to adopt a policy of official toleration of Islam while actively encouraging atheism among Muslims.
 +
 +==== Letter from Gorky to Stalin ====
 +
 +{{ :​f3gorky.gif?​direct&​200|}}
 +
 +Dear Iosif Vissarionovich:​
 +
 +....
 +
 +The emigre and bourgeois press bases its perception of Soviet reality almost entirely on the negative information which is published by our own press for self-criticism with the aim of education and agitation. The products of the these "​individual journalists"​ of the bourgeois press are not as numerous and harmful as they are made out to be, in contrast to our own release of self-revealing facts and conclusions.
 +
 +By strongly emphasizing facts of a negative nature, we open ourselves up to our enemies, providing them an enormous amount of material, which they in turn very aptly use against us, compromising our party and our leadership in the eyes of Europe'​s proletariat,​ compromising the very principle of the dictatorship of the working class, because the proletariat of Europe and America feeds on the bourgeois newspapers for the most part--and for this reason it cannot grasp our country'​s cultural- revolutionary progress, our successes and achievements in industrialization,​ the enthusiasm of our working masses, and of their influence on the impoverished peasantry.
 +
 +It stands to reason, I do not think we can positively influence the attitude which the bourgeoisie has already formed towards the Union of Soviets, and I do know that European conditions are zealously raising the revolutionary consciousness of the European proletariat.
 +
 +I also know that the one-sidedness of our treatment of reality--created by us--exerts an extremely unhealthy influence on our young people.
 +
 +In their letters, and in their conversations with me, it seems that today'​s youth displays an extremely pessimistic mood. This mood is very natural. Direct knowledge of reality of our youth from the central areas, especially our provinces is limited, insignificant. To acquaint themselves with what is going on they turn to the newspapers.
 +
 +[...]
 +
 +It is furthermore imperative to put the propaganda of atheism on solid ground. You won't achieve much with the weapons of Marx and materialism,​ as we have seen. Materialism and religion are two different planes and they don't coincide. If a fool speaks from the heavens and the sage from a factory--they won't understand one another. The sage needs to hit the fool with his stick, with his weapon.
 +
 +For this reason, there should be courses set up at the Communist Academy which would not only treat the history of religion, and mainly the history of the Christian church, i.e., the study of church history as politics.
 +
 +We need to know the "​fathers of the church,"​ the apologists of Christianity,​ especially indispensable to the study of the history of Catholicism,​ the most powerful and intellectual church organization whose political significance is quite clear. We need to know the history of church schisms, heresies, the Inquisition,​ the "​religious"​ wars, etc. Every quotation by a believer is easily countered with dozens of theological quotations which contradict it.
 +
 +We cannot do without an edition of the "​Bible"​ with critical commentaries from the Tubingen school and books on criticism of biblical texts, which could bring a very useful "​confusion into the minds" of believers.
 +
 +There is a fine role to be played here by a popular book on the Taborites and the Husite movements. It would be useful to introduce here "The history of the peasant wars in Germany,"​ the old book by Zimmerman. Carefully edited, it would be very useful for the minds.
 +
 +It is necessary to produce a book on the church'​s struggle against science.
 +
 +Our youth is very poorly informed on questions of this nature. The "​tendency"​ toward a religious disposition is very noticeable--a natural result of developing individualism. At this time, as always, the young are in a hurry to find "the definitive answer."​
 +
 +[...]
 +
 +Next is a letter of March 19, 1922, from Lenin via Molotov to members of the Politburo, outlining a brutal plan of action against the "Black Hundreds"​ clergy and their followers, who were defying the government decree to remove church valuables (purported by the government to be used to fund famine relief). Lenin proposed the arrest and quick trial of the insurrectionists in Shuia, followed by a ruthless campaign to shoot a large number of the reactionary clergy and bourgeoisie and urged that removal of valuables from the richest churches and monasteries be finished quickly.
 +
 +==== Letter from Lenin ====
 +
 +{{:​ae3bkhu1.gif?​direct&​200|}}
 +{{:​ae3bkhu2.gif?​direct&​200|}}
 +{{:​ae3bkhu3.gif?​direct&​200|}}
 +{{:​ae3bkhu4_2_.gif?​direct&​200|}}
 +
 +
 +The letter from Lenin to members of the Politbuto is available as four images.
 +
 +Copy To Comrade Molotov
 +
 +Top Secret For members of the Politburo.
 +
 +Please make no copies for any reason. Each member of the Politburo (incl. Comrade Kalinin) should comment directly on the document. Lenin.
 +
 +In regard to the occurrence at Shuia, which is already slated for discussion by the Polituro, it is necessary right now to make a firm decision about a general plan of action in the present course. Because I doubt that I will be able to attend the Politburo meeting on March 20th in person, I will set down my thoughts in writing.
 +
 +The event at Shuia should be connected with the announcement that the Russian News Agency [ROST] recently sent to the newspapers but that was not for publication,​ namely, the announcement that the Black Hundreds in Petrograd [Piter] were preparing to defy the decree on the removal of property of value from the churches. If this fact is compared with what the papers report about the attitude of the clergy to the decree on the removal of church property in addition to what we know about the illegal proclamation of Patriarch Tikhon, then it becomes perfectly clear that the Black Hundreds clergy, headed by its leader, with full deliberation is carrying out a plan at this very moment to destroy us decisively.
 +
 +It is obvious that the most influential group of the Black Hundreds clergy conceived this plan in secret meetings and that it was accepted with sufficient resolution. The events in Shuia is only one manifestation and actualization of this general plan.
 +
 +I think that here our opponent is making a huge strategic error by attempting to draw us into a decisive struggle now when it is especially hopeless and especially disadvantageous to him. For us, on the other hand, precisely at the present moment we are presented with an exceptionally favorable, even unique, opportunity when we can in 99 out of 100 chances utterly defeat our enemy with complete success and guarantee for ourselves the position we require for decades. Now and only now, when people are being eaten in famine-stricken areas, and hundreds, if not thousands, of corpses lie on the roads, we can (and therefore must) pursue the removal of church property with the most frenzied and ruthless energy and not hesitate to put down the least opposition. Now and only now, the vast majority of peasants will either be on our side, or at least will not be in a position to support to any decisive degree this handful of Black Hundreds clergy and reactionary urban petty bourgeoisie,​ who are willing and able to attempt to oppose this Soviet decree with a policy of force.
 +
 +We must pursue the removal of church property by any means necessary in order to secure for ourselves a fund of several hundred million gold rubles (do not forget the immense wealth of some monasteries and lauras). Without this fund any government work in general, any economic build-up in particular, and any upholding of soviet principles in Genoa especially is completely unthinkable. In order to get our hands on this fund of several hundred million gold rubles (and perhaps even several hundred billion), we must do whatever is necessary. But to do this successfully is possible only now. All considerations indicate that later on we will fail to do this, for no other time, besides that of desperate famine, will give us such a mood among the general mass of peasants that would ensure us the sympathy of this group, or, at least, would ensure us the neutralization of this group in the sense that victory in the struggle for the removal of church property unquestionably and completely will be on our side.
 +
 +One clever writer on statecraft correctly said that if it is necessary for the realization of a well-known political goal to perform a series of brutal actions then it is necessary to do them in the most energetic manner and in the shortest time, because masses of people will not tolerate the protracted use of brutality. This observation in particular is further strengthened because harsh measures against a reactionary clergy will be politically impractical,​ possibly even extremely dangerous as a result of the international situation in which we in Russia, in all probability,​ will find ourselves, or may find ourselves, after Genoa. Now victory over the reactionary clergy is assured us completely. In addition, it will be more difficult for the major part of our foreign adversaries among the Russian emigres abroad, i.e., the Socialist- Revolutionaries and the Milyukovites [Left Wing Cadet Party], to fight against us if we, precisely at this time, precisely in connection with the famine, suppress the reactionary clergy with utmost haste and ruthlessness.
 +
 +Therefore, I come to the indisputable conclusion that we must precisely now smash the Black Hundreds clergy most decisively and ruthlessly and put down all resistance with such brutality that they will not forget it for several decades.
 +
 +The campaign itself for carrying out this plan I envision in the following manner:
 +
 +Only Comrade Kalinin should appear officially in regard to any measures taken--never and under no circumstance must Comrade Trotsky write anything for the press or in any other way appear before the public.
 +
 +The telegram already issued in the name of the Politburo about the temporary suspension of removals must not be rescinded. It is useful for us because it gives our adversary the impression that we are vacillating,​ that he has succeeded in confusing us (our adversary, of course, will quickly find out about this secret telegram precisely because it is secret).
 +
 +Send to Shuia one of the most energetic, clear-headed,​ and capable members of the All-Russian Central Executive Committee [VTsIK] or some other representative of the central government (one is better than several), giving him verbal instructions through one of the members of the Politburo. The instructions must come down to this, that in Shuia he must arrest more if possible but not less than several dozen representatives of the local clergy, the local petty bourgeoisie,​ and the local bourgeoisie on suspicion of direct or indirect participation in the forcible resistance to the decree of the VTsIK on the removal of property of value from churches. Immediately upon completion of this task, he must return to Moscow and personally deliver a report to the full session of the Politburo or to two specially authorized members of the Politburo. On the basis of this report, the Politburo will give a detailed directive to the judicial authorities,​ also verbal, that the trial of the insurrectionists from Shuia, for opposing aid to the starving, should be carried out in utmost haste and should end not other than with the shooting of the very largest number of the most influential and dangerous of the Black Hundreds in Shuia, and, if possible, not only in this city but even in Moscow and several other ecclesiastical centers.
 +
 +I think that it is advisable for us not to touch Patriarch Tikhon himself, even though he undoubtedly headed this whole revolt of slave-holders. Concerning him, the State Political Administration [GPU] must be given a secret directive that precisely at this time all communications of this personage must be monitored and their contents disclosed in all possible accuracy and detail. Require Dzerzhinsky and Unshlikht personally to report to the Politburo about this weekly.
 +
 +At the party congress arrange a secret meeting of all or almost all delegates to discuss this matter jointly with the chief workers of the GPU, the People'​s Commissariat of Justice [NKIu], and the Revolutionary Tribunal. At this meeting pass a secret resolution of the congress that the removal of property of value, especially from the very richest lauras, monasteries,​ and churches, must be carried out with ruthless resolution, leaving nothing in doubt, and in the very shortest time. The greater the number of representatives of the reactionary clergy and the reactionary bourgeoisie that we succeed in shooting on this occasion, the better because this "​audience"​ must precisely now be taught a lesson in such a way that they will not dare to think about any resistance whatsoever for several decades.
 +
 +To attend to the quickest and most successful carrying out of these measures, there at the congress, i.e., at the secret meeting, appoint a special commission, the participation of Comrade Trotsky and Comrade Kalinin being required, without giving any publicity to this commission, with the purpose that the subordination to it of all operations would be provided for and carried out not in the name of the commission but as an all-soviet and all-party order. Appoint those who are especially responsible from among the best workers to carry out these measures in the wealthiest lauras, monasteries,​ and churches.
 +
 +Lenin.
 +
 +March 19, 1922.
 +
 +I request that Comrade Molotov attempt to circulate this letter to the members of the Politburo by evening today (not making copies) and ask them to return it to the secretary immediately after reading it, with a succinct note regarding whether each member of the Politburo agrees in principle or if the letter arouses any differences of opinion.
 +
 +Lenin.
 +
 +A note in the hand of Comrade Molotov:
 +
 +"​Agreed. However, I propose to extend the campaign not to all gubernias and cities, but to those where indeed there are considerable possessions of value, accordingly concentrating the forces and attention of the party.
 +
 +March 19. Molotov."​
 +
 +True copy: [illegible]
 +
 +The original has been transferred to the Lenin Institute.
 +
 +===== Attacks on Intelligentsia =====
 +
 +==== Early Attacks ====
 +
 +In the years immediately following their accession to power in 1917, the Bolsheviks took measures to prevent challenges to their new regime, beginning with eliminating political opposition. When the freely-elected Constituent Assembly did not acknowledge the primacy of the Bolshevik government, Vladimir Lenin dissolved it in January 1918. The Left Socialist Revolutionary Party, which protested the action, withdrew from the Bolshevik coalition in March, and its members were automatically branded enemies of the people. Numerous opposition groups posed military threats from various parts of the country, placing the survival of the revolution in jeopardy. Between 1918 and 1921, a state of civil war existed.
 +
 +Bolshevik policy toward its detractors, and particularly toward articulate, intellectual criticism, hardened considerably. Suppression of newspapers, initially described as a temporary measure, became a permanent policy. Lenin considered the Constitutional Democrats (Kadets) the center of a conspiracy against Bolshevik rule. In 1919, he began mass arrests of professors and scientists who had been Kadets, and deported Kadets, Socialist Revolutionaries,​ Mensheviks, and Nationalists. The Bolshevik leadership sought rapidly to purge Russia of past leaders in order to build the future on a clean slate.
 +
 +These harsh measures alienated a large number of the intellectuals who had supported the overthrow of the tsarist order. The suppression of democratic institutions evoked strong protests from academics and artists,who felt betrayed in their idealistic belief that revolution would bring a free society. Writers who had emigrated shortly after the revolution published stinging attacks on the new government from abroad. As a result, further exit permits for artists were generally denied.
 +
 +The disenchantment of the majority of intellectuals did not surprise Lenin, who saw the old Russian intelligentsia as a kind of rival to his "party of a new type," which alone could bring revolutionary consciousness to the working class. In his view, artists generally served bourgeois interests, a notion that fueled the persecution of intellectuals throughout the Soviet period.
 +
 +==== Letter from Lenin to Gorky ====
 +
 +{{ :​g3aleks.gif?​direct&​200|}}
 +
 +Secret
 +
 +Sept. 15, 1919
 +
 +Dear Aleksei Maksimovich [Gorky]!
 +
 +I saw Tankov, and even before his visit and your letter, we had decided in the Central Committee [TSeka] to appoint Kamenev and Bukharin to review and confirm the arrests of the bourgeois intellectuals of the quasi-Constitutional Democrat [Kadet] stripe and to free everyone possible. For it is clear to us that here indeed mistakes were made.
 +
 +It is also clear that, in general, the arrest of the Kadets and quasi-Kadets was the necessary and correct measure to take.
 +
 +When I read your frank opinion on this subject, I recall a phrase you used during our conversations in London, Capri, and elsewhere that made a deep impression on me:
 +
 +"We artists are irresponsible people."​
 +
 +Just so! What gives you cause to say these improbably angry words? This cause, that dozens or even hundreds of these Kadet and quasi-Kadet little gentlemen will spend several days in prison in order to prevent conspiracies similar to the surrendering of the Krasnaia Gorka Fort, conspiracies that threaten the lives of thousands of workers and peasants!
 +
 +What a tragedy, you're thinking! What an injustice! Intellectuals in prison for several days or even weeks just to prevent the massacre of tens of thousands of workers and peasants!
 +
 +"​Artists are irresponsible people."​
 +
 +...Recently I read his [Korolenko'​s] War, Motherland, and Mankind, a pamphlet written in August 1917. Korolenko, you know, is the best of the "​quasi-Kadets,"​ almost a Menshevik. But what a vile, despicable, rotten defense of the imperialist war, dressed up with sugar-coated phrases! A pitiful petty bourgeois captivated by bourgeois prejudices! For such gentlemen, 10,000,000 men killed during an imperialist war is a matter deserving support (by deeds, while mouthing sugar-coated phrases "​against"​ the war), but the death of hundreds of thousands in a just civil war against landlords and capitalists evokes only aahs, oohs, sighs, and hysteria.
 +
 +No. It isn't a sin to jail such "men of talent"​ for short periods if that's what it takes to prevent plots (such as the one at Krasnaia Gorka) and the deaths of tens of thousands. We uncovered the conspiracies of the Kadets and quasi-Kadets. And we know that quasi-Kadet professors are giving assistance heart and soul to the conspirators. That is a fact.
 +
 +The intellectual forces of the workers and peasants are growing and getting stronger in their fight to overthrow the bourgeoisie and their accomplices,​ the educated classes, the lackeys of capital, who consider themselves the brains of the nation. In fact they are not its brains but its shit.
 +
 +We pay above-average salaries to those "​intellectual forces"​ who want to bring learning to the people (rather than toadying to capital). That is a fact. We cherish them. That is a fact. Tens of thousands of officers are serving in the Red Army and are winning in spite of hundreds of traitors. That is a fact.
 +
 +Regarding your frame of mind, I know how to "​understand"​ it (once you asked whether I would understand you). Several times, on Capri and elsewhere, I told you, "You let yourself be surrounded by the worst elements of the bourgeois intelligentsia , and you give in to their whining. You hear and listen to the wail of hundreds of intellectuals about their "​terrible"​ incarceration lasting several weeks, but you do not hear or listen to the voices of the masses, of millions -- workers and peasants -- who are threatened by Denikin, Kolchak, Lianozov, Rodzianko, the Krasnaia Gorka (and other Kadet) conspirators. I quite, quite understand that this is how you can end your letter with the statement that these "Reds are just as much enemies of the people as the Whites"​ (fighters for the overthrow of capitalists and landlords are just as much enemies of the people as are the capitalists and the landlords), or even end up believing in a tin divinity or in "our father the tsar." I quite understand.
 +
 +Really and truly you will die* if you don't break away from this situation with the bourgeois intelligentsia. With all my heart I wish that you would break away as soon as possible.
 +
 +Best regards
 +
 +[signed] Yours, Lenin.
 +
 +*But you're not writing! To waste yourself on the whining of decaying intellectuals and not to write -- is that not death for an artist, is that not a shame?
 +
 +==== Renewed Attacks ====
 +
 +The pattern of suppressing intellectual activity, with intermittent periods of relaxation, helped the party leadership reinforce its authority. After 1923, when threats to the revolution'​s survival had disappeared,​ intellectuals enjoyed relative creative freedom while the regime concentrated on improving the country'​s economic plight by allowing limited free enterprise under the Lenin'​s New Economic Policy.
 +
 +But in 1928, the Central Committee established the right of the party to exercise guidance over literature; and in 1932 literary and artistic organizations were restructured to promote a specified style called socialist realism. Works that did not contribute to the building of socialism were banned. Lenin had seen the need for increasing revolutionary consciousness in workers. Stalin now asserted that art should not merely serve society, but do so in a way determined by the party and its megalomaniacal plans for transforming society. As a result, artists and intellectuals as well as political figures became victims of the Great Terror of the 1930s.
 +
 +During the war against Nazi Germany, artists were permitted to infuse their works with patriotism and to direct them against the enemy. The victory in 1945, however, brought a return to repression against deviation from party policy. Andrei Zhdanov, who had been Stalin'​s spokesman on cultural affairs since 1934, led the attack. He viciously denounced such writers as Anna Akhmatova, Boris Pasternak, and Mikhail Zoshchenko, who were labeled "​anti-Soviet,​ underminers of socialist realism, and unduly pessimistic."​ Individuals were expelled from the Union of Writers, and offending periodicals were either abolished or brought under direct party control.Zhdanov died in 1948, but the cultural purge known as the Zhdanovshchina continued for several more years. The noted filmmaker Sergei Eisenstein and great composers such as Sergei Prokofiev and Dmitrii Shostakovich were denounced for "​neglect of ideology and subservience to Western influence."​ The attacks extended to scientists and philosophers and continued until after Stalin'​s death in 1953.
 +
 +==== Marietta Shaginian'​s Novel ====
 +
 +{{ :​h3novel.gif?​direct&​200|}}
 +
 +Regarding Marietta Shaginian'​s novel, Ticket to history, part one, the Ul'​ianov family
 +
 +...the Central Committee has determined that as a biographical-documentary novel about the life of the Ul'​ianov family, and also about the childhood and youth of Lenin, it appears to be a politically harmful, ideologically hostile work. One should consider it a gross political error on the part of the book's editor, Comrade Ermilov, and those in charge who permitted Shaginian'​s novel to be printed.
 +
 +One condemns the behavior of Comrade Krupskaia, who having received a draft copy of Shaginian'​s novel not only did not prevent the novel'​s publication,​ but instead, encouraged Shaginian in every way possible, reviewed the draft positively and advised Shaginian on the facts of the Ul'​ianov family'​s life. One should also consider Comrade Krupskaia completely responsible for this book.
 +
 +One should consider the behavior of Comrade Krupskaia all the more intolerable and tactless, since Comrade Krupskaia was in charge of Shaginian'​s task of writing a novel about Lenin without the knowledge and approval of the Central Committee, behind the back of the Central Committee, turning the very same all-party matter of composing a literary work about Lenin into a private and family affair, appearing in the role of sole exploiter of the circumstances of the social and personal life and works of Lenin and his family, for which the Central Committee never granted anyone exclusive rights.
 +
 +The Central Committee resolves
 +
 +  - to remove Comrade Ermilov from the position of editor of "​Krasnaia Nov'"​
 +  - to announce the reprimand of the director of GIKhL [State Publishing House of Belle Lettres] Comrade...
 +  - to apprise Krupskaia of her error
 +  - to prohibit anyone from submitting a literary work about Lenin without the knowledge and permission of the Central Committee
 +  - to question Shaginian'​s party membership in the KPK (Control Commission of the Communist Party).
 +
 +==== Censorship ====
 +
 +Creative writers enjoyed great prestige in both the Russian Empire and the Soviet Union because of literature'​s unique role as a sounding board for deeper political and social issues. Vladimir Lenin believed that literature and art could be exploited for ideological and political as well as educational purposes. As a result, the party rapidly established control over print and electronic media, book publishing and distribution,​ bookstores and libraries, and it created or abolished newspapers and periodicals at will.
 +
 +Communist Party ideology influenced the creative process from the moment of artistic inspiration. The party, in effect, served as the artist'​s Muse. In 1932 the party established socialist realism as the only acceptable aesthetic -- measuring merit by the degree to which a work contributed to building socialism among the masses. The Union of Writers was created the same year to harness writers to the Marxist-Leninist cause. Goskomizdat (State Committee for Publishing Houses, Printing Plants, and the Book Trade), in conjunction with the Union'​s secretariat,​ made all publishing decisions; the very allocation of paper became a hidden censorship mechanism. Glavlit (Main Administration for Literary and Publishing Affairs), created in 1922, was responsible for censorship, which came later in the creative process. The party'​s guidance had already affected the process long before the manuscript reached the censor'​s pen. The Soviet censorship system was thus more pervasive than that of the tsars or of most other recent dictatorships.
 +
 +Mikhail Gorbachev needed to enlist the support of writers and journalists to promote his reforms. He did so by launching his policy of glasnost'​ in 1986, challenging the foundations of censorship by undermining the authority of the Union of Writers to determine which works were appropriate forpublication. Officials from the Union were required to place works directly in the open market and to allow these works to be judged according to reader preferences,​ thereby removing the barrier between writer and reader and marking the beginning of the end of Communist party censorship.
 +
 +==== List of Persons ====
 +
 +{{ :​i3list.gif?​direct&​200|}}
 +
 +Secret
 +
 +LIST
 +
 +of persons, all of whose works are designated for removal by the orders of the Plenipotentiary Council of People'​s Commissars of the USSR and the Plenipotentiary Council of Ministers of the USSR for preservation of military and state secrets in the press for the period 1938-1948.
 +
 +" A "
 +
 +ABRAMOV, Arkadii Mikhailovich - 681 (party subjects)
 +
 +AVERBAKH, Leopol'​d Leonidovich - 266 (literary criticism)
 +
 +AVILOV, Nikolai Pavlovich (Glebov-Avilov,​ N.) (trade union movement)
 +
 +AVINOVITSKII,​ Iakov Lazarevich - 266 (military-chemical)
 +
 +AGIENKO, Aleksandr Fedorovich - 683 (anti-religious)
 +
 +...
 +
 +AZARKH, Raisa Moiseevna - 73 (fiction)
 +
 +AITAKOV, Nadyrbai - 957 (party subjects)
 +
 +AIKHENVAL'​D,​ Aleksandr Iul'​evich - 241 (economics)
 +
 +ALAZAN, Vagram Martynovich - 266 (artistic subjects)
 +
 +ALEKSANDROVICH,​ Andrei Ivanovich - 372 (poetry)
 +
 +ALKSNIS, Iakov Ivanovich (Alksnis-Astrov) - 171 (military)
 +
 +. . .
 +
 +TRANSLATOR'​S COMMENTS: The list contains more than 1,000 names. The numbers following the names bear no obvious correlation to the writer'​s specialization.
 +
 +==== Statistical Report ====
 +
 +{{:​af3bdli1.gif?​direct&​200|}}{{:​af3bdli2.gif?​direct&​200|}}{{:​af3bdli3.gif?​direct&​200|}}
 +
 +Statistical report of March 21, 1988, from V. Chebrikov, chairman of the KGB, detailing 1987 investigations of the distribution of anonymous publications hostile to the Soviet government and the Communist Party.
 +
 +The statistical report is available as three images. Click on the icons to view full-size images.
 +
 +Top Secret
 +
 +Special Folder
 +
 +Committee of State Security of the USSR
 +
 +March 21, 1988 No. 458-Ch Moscow
 +
 +TO THE CENTRAL COMMITTEE of the CPSU
 +
 +Results of the work of the KGB in investigating authors of anonymous materials of a hostile nature.
 +
 +In 1987 the measures implemented in the country for economic perestroika and the broadening of democratization and glasnost resulted in a 29.5% reduction in the distribution of anonymous materials of an anti-Soviet,​ nationalistic,​ and politically injurious content as compared with the previous year. However, the number of persons who took part in their preparation and distribution (1663) increased by 9.4% because of some growth of cliquish, negative occurrences among the youth of the Kazakh SRR and Latvia.
 +
 +The number of instances of distributed materials criticizing the international assistance to Afghanistan by the USSR declined by 77%, and the number of pro-fascist slogans and symbols fell by 24%.
 +
 +During the year 44 instances of distribution of anonymous materials containing terrorist statements against leaders of the CPSU and the Soviet government, 108 threats of physical violence against representatives of the local party, soviet activists, and functionaries,​ 308 nationalistic,​ basically anti-Russian fabrications,​ and 46 instances of disagreement with the measures for perestroika in Soviet society were recorded.
 +
 +A significant number of anonymous incidents occurred in Ukraine, Kazakhstan, Latvia, Lithuania, Moscow, and Leningrad.
 +
 +In 1987, 1,312 authors of pamphlets, letters, and graffiti were identified. Of this number, 33 persons admitted to statements of a terrorist nature about the leaders of the party and the government; and 67, to threats of physical violence against local party and soviet activists and functionaries.
 +
 +Of the total number of authors investigated,​ 37.2% are university students and students in vocational and trade schools, 18.6% are workers, 16.8% are office workers, 9.5% are retiredpersons,​ 17.9% are other categories of citizens, including persons serving time in correctional-labor facilities.
 +
 +Among the authors who were identified are 59 members and candidate members in the Communist Party and 361 in the Young Communist League.
 +
 +Reasons for preparing and distributing anonymous materials are: nationalist sentiments (248 persons); dissatisfaction with measures taken to strengthen discipline and fight drunkenness and alcoholism (187 persons); inadequacies in the food supply to the population and also high prices for certain commercial products (43 persons); difficulties with housing and household needs (41 persons); hooliganism (238 persons); mercenary motives (86 persons); mental illness (86 persons); illegal actions by some local managers manifested in coarse treatment of subordinates,​ officious treatment of citizens'​ petitions, violations of ethical behavior, etc. (23 persons).
 +
 +The reasons for the preparation and distribution of anonymous materials by the remaining 276 authors are now being investigated.
 +
 +After appropriate review, the majority of the authors under investigation (55.6%) were dealt with through measures of a preventive nature, 66 persons were tried pursuant to articles of the general Criminal Code of the RSFSR and the criminal codes of other union republics.
 +
 +The KGB is implementing measures to prevent and suppress in a timely fashion negative incidents connected with the distribution of anonymous materials of hostile content and to increase the effectiveness of the effort to identify the authors and distributors of these materials.
 +
 +For your information.
 +
 +Committee Chairman /s/ V. Chebrikov.
 +
 +==== Suppressing Dissidents ====
 +
 +The Communist regime considered dissent in the Soviet Union a repudiation of the proletarian struggle and a violation of Marxism-Leninism,​ and thus a threat to its authority. The proletariat was seen as selflessly striving for progress in the building of socialism, whereas the bourgeoisie was seen as selfishly fighting to maintain the status quo. According to Marxist ideology, class struggle was the engine of change in all social development. Vladimir Lenin'​s ideological contribution was to make the party itself the exclusive "​vanguard of the proletariat"​ and thus the final arbiter of what was proletarian or bourgeois. The secret police was enlisted to enforce the party'​s ideology and to suppress dissent.
 +
 +Because the party'​s legitimacy rested on the basic correctness of its ideology, failures in practical policy were never attributed to ideology itself. To maintain the party'​s ideological authority, religion had to be condemned outright, and history periodically revised to match the current party line. Books and magazines viewed as no longer politically correct were removed from libraries. Scientists, artists, poets, and others, including many who did not think of themselves as dissidents but whose work appeared critical of Soviet life, were systematically persecuted and even prosecuted.Often they were declared either enemies of the state and imprisoned, or insane and committed to punitive mental hospitals.
 +
 +To speak for human rights or to support freedom of expression was to question the very basis of Marxism-Leninism and the legitimacy of the party'​s rule. Among those harassed and persecuted were world-renowned artists and scientists, including Nobel Prize winners Boris Pasternak, who was forced to refuse his prize; Aleksandr Solzhenitsyn,​ who was forcibly removed from the USSR; and Andrei Sakharov, who was expelled from the Academy of Sciences and internally exiled to a closed city.
 +
 +A prime mover of change was Mikhail Gorbachev, whose policy of glasnost'​ allowed freedom of expression and resulted in the abandonment of Marxist-Leninist ideology and a loss of legitimacy for the party.
 +
 +==== Letter from Polokarpov ====
 +
 +Secret
 +
 +CC CPSU 16APR 1959
 +
 +To be returned to the General Dept., CC CPSU
 +
 +Not for publication
 +
 +CC CPSU
 +
 +B. Pasternak turned to me for advice on what he should do in connection with the proposal of the Norwegian publishers to receive money for the book "​Doctor Zhivago."​
 +
 +...Pasternak would like to receive this money, a portion of which he intends to give to the Literary Fund "for the needs of elderly writers."​
 +
 +I think that Pasternak should refuse receipt of money from the Norwegian bank.
 +
 +I am asking for permission to express this point of view.
 +
 +(signed)
 +
 +D. Polikarpov April 16 1959
 +
 +[HANDWRITTEN] Archive Boris Pasternak refused to receive the money from the Norwegian publishers. See the copy of his letter to the Copyright Directorate (attached).
 +
 +August 17, 1959
 +
 +In a telegram from 1971, noted Soviet physicist Andrei Sakharov supports the protests of two dissidents, V. Fainberg and V. Borisov, who have been hospitalized in a Leningrad psychiatric institution for "​asocial behavior."​ An accompanying memorandum from the USSR Minister of Health affirms the legitimacy and advisability of hospitalizing the two dissidents in the institution,​ run by the Ministry of Internal Affairs, and denies the use of mind-altering medications in their treatment.
 +
 +==== Telegram from Sakharov ====
 +
 +{{:​ac3sakh1.gif?​direct&​200|}}
 +{{:​ac3sakh1.gif?​direct&​200|}}
 +{{:​ac3sakh1.gif?​direct&​200|}}
 +{{:​ac3sakh1.gif?​direct&​200|}}
 +{{:​ac3sakh1.gif?​direct&​200|}}
 +
 +The Telegram from Sakharov is available as five images. Click on the icons to view full-size images. ​
 +
 +Sakharov'​s telegram to the Minister of Health, March 5, 1971, concerning the treatment of political prisoners Fainberg and Borisov, who were being held in a Leningrad psychiatric hospital, and reports on the matter by various officials.
 +
 +MINISTRY OF HEALTH
 +
 +Secret OF THE USSR
 +
 +Copy no. 1 March 16, 1971
 +
 +No.704c
 +
 +Moscow
 +
 +CENTRAL COMMITTEE OF THE COMMUNIST PARTY OF THE SOVIET UNION
 +
 +Not for publication
 +
 +I am sending for your familiarization the text of a telegram from Academician Sakharov that was received in the Ministry of Health of the USSR.
 +
 +Enclosure: The aforementioned text.
 +
 +MINISTRY OF HEALTH OF THE USSR
 +
 +B. Petrovskii
 +
 +
 +
 +
 +COPY
 +
 +MINISTRY OF COMMUNICATION OF THE USSR
 +
 +
 +TELEGRAM MOSCOW 3502 71 15 1151
 +
 +NOTIFICATION BY TELEGRAM
 +
 +MOSCOW I-51 RAKHMANOV LANE 3 MINISTRY OF HEALTH OF THE USSR
 +
 +TO THE MINISTER, ACADEMICIAN B.V. PETROVSKII
 +
 +DEAR BORIS VASIL'​EVICH:​ FAINBERG AND BORISOV, POLITICAL PRISONERS IN THE LENINGRAD PSYCHIATRIC PRISON, HAVE ANNOUNCED A HUNGER STRIKE AGAINST COMPULSORY THERAPEUTIC TREATMENT WITH MEDICATIONS INJURIOUS TO MENTAL ACTIVITY. I AM ENDORSING THEIR DEMANDS. I ASK YOU URGENTLY TO INTERVENE TO PRESERVE THE HEALTH [AND] DIGNITY OF PRISONERS IN THE PSYCHIATRIC PRISON. PROMOTE THE REMOVAL OF EVEN THE POSSIBILITY OF VIOLATIONS OF HUMAN RIGHTS AND MEDICAL ETHICS IN THE RUNNING OF PSYCHIATRIC INSTITUTIONS AND THE CORRECTION OF OVERLOOKED VIOLATIONS- ACADEMICIAN SAKHAROV-
 +
 +True copy: [signed] Krutova [?]
 +
 +
 +
 +MINISTRY OF HEALTH OF THE USSR
 +
 +March 25, 1971 No. 828 c Moscow
 +
 +TO THE HEAD OF THE DEPARTMENT OF SCIENCE AND EDUCATIONAL INSTITUTIONS CENTRAL COMMITTEE OF THE COMMUNIST PARTY OF THE SOVIET UNION
 +
 +Comrade S.P. Trapeznikov
 +
 +In connection with the telegram to me from Academician Sakharov, in which he requests the adoption of measures against the alleged "​compulsory therapeutic treatment with medications injurious to mental activity"​ of "​political prisoners"​ Fainberg and Borisov in the "​Leningrad Psychiatric Prison,"​ the chief specialist for neuropsychiatry of the Ministry of Health of the USSR, candidate of medical science Z.N. Serebriakova,​ and the Deputy Director of the Scientific Department of the Institute for Psychiatry of the Academy of Medical Sciences of the USSR, Prof. R.A. Nadzharov, were sent to Leningrad.
 +
 +An investigation has established that the patients F.I. Fainberg and V. E. Borisov were sent for compulsory therapeutic treatment to the special psychiatric hospital of the Ministry of Internal Affairs of the USSR by court order in compliance with existing legislation after they were found by forensic-psychiatric experts to be suffering from mental illness and mentally incompetent.
 +
 +In the patient V.I. Fainberg, are noted personality changes and persistent quasi-psychopathic disorders (paranoid development of the social reforming type), carried over from a schizophrenic condition in his youth, for which he has repeatedly been hospitalized in psychiatric clinics in Kharkov, Moscow, and Leningrad.
 +
 +In the patient V.E. Borisov, are also noted persistent, quasi- psychopathic personality changes (infantilism,​ paranoia) against a background of residual, organic neurological symptoms. He has repeatedly undergone compulsory therapeutic treatment in the special psychiatric hospital in Leningrad in connection with anti- social behavior.
 +
 +An earlier transfer of the patient for treatment at a standard psychiatric hospital led to negative results.
 +
 +The patient was returned to the special psychiatric hospital after an attempt to kidnap him by persons unknown who attacked the [hospital] personnel.
 +
 +[ ... ]
 +
 +Taking into account the origin of the situationally conditioned psychogenic reaction of the patients with refusal to eat and the limited possibilities for medical treatment, a change in the conditions of their custody in the given hospital was declared advisable, having in mind more active psychotherapeutic and readapting measures, but also the exclusion of undesirable influences from the outside that would lead to the reinforcement of their paranoid precepts.
 +
 +[ ... ]
 +
 +MINISTER OF HEALTH OF THE USSR [signed] B. PETROVSKII
 +
 +
 +
 +CENTRAL COMMITTEE OF THE COMMUNIST PARTY OF THE SOVIET UNION
 +
 +To No. 12065
 +
 +In a telegram addressed to the Minister of Health of the USSR, Comrade Petrovskii, Academician Sakharov reports that "​political prisoners Fainberg and Borisov of the Leningrad Psychiatric Prison have announced a hunger strike against compulsory treatment with medications injurious to mental activity"​ and asks that measures be taken to correct overlooked violations.
 +
 +The facts indicated in the telegram were investigated by the Ministry of Health of the USSR. It has been determined that the patients V.I. Fainberg and V.E. Borisov were sent for compulsory therapeutic treatment to the special psychiatric hospital of the Ministry of Internal Affairs of the USSR [MIA SSSR] in compliance with existing legislation after forensic-psychiatric experts declared them incompetent by reason of mental illness.
 +
 +[ ... ]
 +
 +Both patients have had their symptoms treated in a way that has no effect on mental activity.
 +
 +[ ... ]
 +
 +During the investigation,​ it was noticed that the internal regime of the special psychiatric hospitals of the MIA SSSR do not meet modern requirements for the rehabilitative treatment of the mentally ill in inpatient hospitals.
 +
 +The MIA USSR has now outlined a series of measures to improve medical service for the mentally ill in said hospitals.
 +
 +Comrade Sakharov has been informed of the results.
 +
 +Deputy Director of the Department of Science and Educational Institutions of the Central [signed] V. Baltiiskii
 +
 +Committee of the Communist Party of the Soviet Union
 +
 +June 10, 1971
 +
 +320-A/7
 +
 +===== Ukrainian Famine =====
 +
 +The dreadful famine that engulfed Ukraine, the northern Caucasus, and the lower Volga River area in 1932-1933 was the result of Joseph Stalin'​s policy of forced collectivization. The heaviest losses occurred in Ukraine, which had been the most productive agricultural area of the Soviet Union. Stalin was determined to crush all vestiges of Ukrainian nationalism. Thus, the famine was accompanied by a devastating purge of the Ukrainian intelligentsia and the Ukrainian Communist party itself. The famine broke the peasants'​ will to resist collectivization and left Ukraine politically,​ socially, and psychologically traumatized.
 +
 +The policy of all-out collectivization instituted by Stalin in 1929 to finance industrialization had a disastrous effect on agricultural productivity. Nevertheless,​ in 1932 Stalin raised Ukraine'​s grain procurement quotas by forty-four percent. This meant that there would not be enough grain to feed the peasants, since Soviet law required that no grain from a collective farm could be given to the members of the farm until the government'​s quota was met. Stalin'​s decision and the methods used to implement it condemned millions of peasants to death by starvation. Party officials, with the aid of regular troops and secret police units, waged a merciless war of attrition against peasants who refused to give up their grain. Even indispensible seed grain was forcibly confiscated from peasant households. Any man, woman, or child caught taking even a handful of grain from a collective farm could be, and often was, executed or deported. Thosewho did not appear to be starving were often suspected of hoarding grain. Peasants were prevented from leaving their villages by the NKVD and a system of internal passports.
 +
 +The death toll from the 1932-33 famine in Ukraine has been estimated between six million and seven million. According to a Soviet author, "​Before they died, people often lost their senses and ceased to be human beings."​ Yet one of Stalin'​s lieutenants in Ukraine stated in 1933 that the famine was a great success. It showed the peasants "who is the master here. It cost millions of lives, but the collective farm system is here to stay."
 +
 +==== Grain Problem ====
 +
 +{{ :​k3grain.gif?​direct&​200|}}
 +
 +Addendum to the minutes of Politburo [meeting] No. 93.
 +
 +RESOLUTION OF THE COUNCIL OF PEOPLE'​S COMMISSARS OF THE UKRAINIAN SOVIET SOCIALIST REPUBLIC AND OF THE CENTRAL COMMITTEE OF THE COMMUNIST PARTY (BOLSHEVIK) OF UKRAINE ON BLACKLISTING VILLAGES THAT MALICIOUSLY SABOTAGE THE COLLECTION OF GRAIN.
 +
 +In view of the shameful collapse of grain collection in the more remote regions of Ukraine, the Council of People'​s Commissars and the Central Committee call upon the oblast executive committees and the oblast [party] committees as well as the raion executive committees and the raion [party] committees: to break up the sabotage of grain collection, which has been organized by kulak and counterrevolutionary elements; to liquidate the resistance of some of the rural communists, who in fact have become the leaders of the sabotage; to eliminate the passivity and complacency toward the saboteurs, incompatible with being a party member; and to ensure, with maximum speed, full and absolute compliance with the plan for grain collection.
 +
 +The Council of People'​s Commissars and the Central Committee resolve:
 +
 +To place the following villages on the black list for overt disruption of the grain collection plan and for malicious sabotage, organized by kulak and counterrevolutionary elements:
 +
 +1. village of Verbka in Pavlograd raion, Dnepropetrovsk oblast.
 +
 +...
 +
 +5. village of Sviatotroitskoe in Troitsk raion, Odessa oblast. 6. village of Peski in Bashtan raion, Odessa oblast.
 +
 +The following measures should be undertaken with respect to these villages :
 +
 +1. Immediate cessation of delivery of goods, complete suspension of cooperative and state trade in the villages, and removal of all available goods from cooperative and state stores.
 +
 +2. Full prohibition of collective farm trade for both collective farms and collective farmers, and for private farmers.
 +
 +3. Cessation of any sort of credit and demand for early repayment of credit and other financial obligations.
 +
 +4. Investigation and purge of all sorts of foreign and hostile elements from cooperative and state institutions,​ to be carried out by organs of the Workers and Peasants Inspectorate.
 +
 +5. Investigation and purge of collective farms in these villages, with removal of counterrevolutionary elements and organizers of grain collection disruption.
 +
 +The Council of People'​s Commissars and the Central Committee call upon all collective and private farmers who are honest and dedicated to Soviet rule to organize all their efforts for a merciless struggle against kulaks and their accomplices in order to: defeat in their villages the kulak sabotage of grain collection; fulfill honestly and conscientiously their grain collection obligations to the Soviet authorities;​ and strengthen collective farms.
 +
 +CHAIRMAN OF THE COUNCIL OF PEOPLE'​S COMMISSARS OF THE UKRAINIAN SOVIET SOCIALIST REPUBLIC - V. CHUBAR'​.
 +
 +SECRETARY OF THE CENTRAL COMMITTEE OF THE COMMUNIST PARTY (BOLSHEVIK) OF UKRAINE - S. KOSIOR.
 +
 +6 December 1932.
 +
 +True copy
 +
 +===== Deportations =====
 +
 +Joseph Stalin'​s forcible resettlement of over 1.5 million people, mostly Muslims, during and after World War II is now viewed by many human rights experts in Russia as one of his most drastic genocidal acts. Volga Germans and seven nationalities of Crimea and the northern Caucasus were deported: the Crimean Tatars, Kalmyks, Chechens, Ingush, Balkars, Karachai, and Meskhetians. Other minorities evicted from the Black Sea coastal region included Bulgarians, Greeks, and Armenians.
 +
 +Resistance to Soviet rule, separatism, and widespread collaboration with the German occupation forces were among the official reasons for the deportation of these non-Russian peoples. The possibility of a German attack was used to justify the resettlement of the ethnically mixed population of Mtskheta, in southwestern Georgia. The Balkars were punished for allegedly having sent a white horse as a gift to Adolf Hitler.
 +
 +The deportees were rounded up and transported,​ usually in railroad cattle cars, to Uzbekistan, Kazakhstan, Kirgizia, and Siberia -- areas called "human dumping grounds"​ by historian Robert Conquest. Most estimates indicate that close to two-fifths of the affected populations perished. The plight of the Crimean Tatars was exceptionally harsh; nearly half died of hunger in the first eighteen months after being banished from their homeland.
 +
 +In February 1956, Nikita Khrushchev condemned the deportations as a violation of Leninist principles. In his "​secret speech"​ to the Twentieth Party Congress, hestated that the Ukrainians avoided such a fate "only because there were too many of them and there was no place to which to deport them." That year, the Soviet government issued decrees on the restoration of the Chechen-Ingush Autonomous Republic and the Kabardino-Balkar Autonomous Republic, the formation of the Kalmyk Autonomous Oblast',​ and the reorganization of the Cherkess Autonomous Oblast'​ into the Karachai-Cherkess Autonomous Oblast'​. The Crimean Tatars, Meskhetians,​ and Volga Germans, however, were only partially rehabilitated and were not, for the most part, permitted to return to their homelands until after the disintegration of the Soviet Union in 1991.
 +
 +==== On the Crimean Tatars ====
 +
 +{{ :​l3tartar.gif?​direct&​200|}}
 +
 +TOP SECRET
 +
 +STATE DEFENSE COMMITTEE
 +
 +State Defense Committee Decree No. 5859ss
 +
 +May 11, 1944 Moscow, the Kremlin
 +
 +On the Crimean Tatars
 +
 +During the Patriotic War [World War II], many Crimean Tatars betrayed the Motherland, deserting Red Army units that defended the Crimea and siding with the enemy, joining volunteer army units formed by the Germans to fight against the Red Army; as members of German punitive detachments,​ during the occupation of the Crimea by German fascist troops, the Crimean Tatars particularly were noted for their savage reprisals against Soviet partisans, and also helped the German invaders to organize the violent roundup of Soviet citizens for German enslavement and the mass extermination of the Soviet people.
 +
 +The Crimean Tatars actively collaborated with the German occupation authorities,​ participating in the so-called "Tatar national committees,"​ organized by the German intelligence organs, and were often used by the Germans to infiltrate the rear of the Red Army with spies and saboteurs. With the support of the Crimean Tatars, the "Tatar national committees,"​ in which the leading role was played by White Guard-Tatar emigrants, directed their activity at the persecution and oppression of the non-Tatar population of the Crimea and were engaged in preparatory efforts to separate the Crimea from the Soviet Union by force, with the help of the German armed forces.
 +
 +Taking into account the facts cited above, the State Defense Committee decrees that:
 +
 +All Tatars are to be banished from the territory of the Crimea and resettled permanently as special settlers in the regions of the Uzbek SSR. The resettlement will be assigned to the Soviet NKVD. The Soviet NKVD (comrade Beria) is to complete the resettlement by 1 June 1944.
 +The following procedure and conditions of resettlement are to be established:​
 +a) The special settlers will be allowed to take with them personal items, clothing, household objects, dishes and utensils, and up to 500 kilograms of food per family.
 +
 +Property, buildings, outbuildings,​ furniture, and farmstead lands left behind will be taken over by the local authorities;​ all beef and dairy cattle, as well as poultry, will be taken over by the People'​s Commissariat of the Meat and Dairy Industries, all agricultural production by the USSR People'​s Commissariat of Procurement,​ horses and other draft animals by the USSR People'​s Commissariat of Agriculture,​ and breeding cattle by the USSR People'​s Commissariat of State Grain and Animal Husbandry Farms.
 +
 +Exchange receipts will be issued in every populated place and every farm for the receipt of livestock, grain, vegetables, and for other types of agricultural production.
 +
 +By 1 July this year, the USSR NKVD, People'​s Commissariat of Agriculture,​ People'​s Commissariat of the Meat and Dairy Industries, People'​s Commissariat of State Grain and Animal Husbandry Farms, and People'​s Commissariat of Procurement are to submit to the USSR Council of People'​s Commissars a proposal on the procedure for repaying the special settlers, on the basis of exchange receipts, for livestock, poultry, and agricultural production received from them.
 +
 +b) ... To facilitate the receipt of livestock, grain, and agricultural production from the special settlers, the USSR People'​s Commissariat of Agriculture (comrade Benediktov),​ USSR People'​s Commissariat of Procurement (comrade Subbotin), USSR People'​s Commissariat of the Meat and Dairy Industries (comrade Smirnov), and USSR People'​s Commissariat of State Grain and Animal Husbandry Farms (comrade Lobanov) are to dispatch the required number of workers to the Crimea, in coordination with comrade Gritsenko.
 +
 +c) The People'​s Commissariat of Railroads (comrade Kaganovich) is to organize the transport of the special settlers from Crimea to the Uzbek SSR, using specially formed trains, according to a schedule devised jointly with the USSR NKVD. The number of trains, loading stations, and destination points are to be determined by the USSR NKVD.
 +
 +Payment for the transport will be based on the rate at which the prisoners are transported;​
 +
 +d) To each train of special settlers, the USSR People'​s Commissariat of Public Health (comrade Miterev) is to assign, within a time frame to be coordinated with the USSR NKVD, one physician and two nurses, as well as an appropriate supply of medicines, and to provide medical and first-aid care to special settlers in transit;
 +
 +e) The USSR People'​s Commissariat of Trade (comrade Liubimov) will provide all trains carrying special settlers with hot food and boiling water on a daily basis.
 +
 +To provide food for the special settlers in transit, the People'​s Commissariat of Trade is to allocate the quantity of food supplies indicated in Appendix No. 1.
 +
 +By 1 June of this year, the Secretary of the Central Committee of the Communist Party (Bolshevik) of Uzbekistan, comrade Iusupov, the Chairman of the Uzbek SSR Council of People'​s Commissars, comrade Abdurakhmanov,​ and the Uzbek SSR People'​s Commissar of Internal Affairs, comrade Kobulov, are to carry out the following steps in regard to the acceptance and settlement of the special settlers:
 +
 +a.) To accept and settle within the Uzbek SSR 140 to 160 thousand special settlers -- Tatars, sent by the USSR NKVD from the Crimean ASSR.
 +
 +The settlement of the special settlers will occur in state farm communities,​ existing collective farms, farms affiliated with enterprises,​ and in factory communities,​ for employment in agriculture and industry;
 +
 +b.) To establish commissions in oblasts where the special settlers are resettled, consisting of the chairman of the oblast executive committee, secretary of the oblast committee, and chief of the NKVD administration,​ charging them with the implementation of all measures in connection with the acceptance and distribution of the newly arrived special settlers;
 +
 +c.) To organize raion troikas, consisting of the chairman of the raion executive committee, secretary of the raion committee, and chief of the raion branch of the NKVD, charging them with preparation for the distribution and organization of the acceptance of the newly arrived special settlers;
 +
 +d.) To arrange the automotive transport of the special settlers, mobilizing the vehicles of any enterprises or institutions for this purpose;
 +
 +e.) To grant plots of farm land to the newly arrived special settlers and to help them build homes by providing construction materials;
 +
 +f.) To organize special NKVD commandant'​s headquarters,​ to be maintained by the USSR NKVD, in the raions of settlement;
 +
 +g.) By 20 May of this year, the Uzbek SSR Central Committee and Council of People'​s Commissars are to submit to the USSR NKVD (comrade Beria) a plan for the settlement of the special settlers in the oblasts and raions, indicating the destination points of the trains.
 +
 +Seven-year loans of up to 5,000 rubles per family, for the construction and setting up of homes, are to be extended by the Agricultural Bank (comrade Kravtsov) to special settlers sent to the Uzbek SSR, in their places of settlement.
 +
 +Every month during the June-August 1944 period, equal quantities of flour, groats, and vegetables will be allocated by the USSR People'​s Commissariat of Procurement (comrade Subbotin) to the Uzbek SSR Council of People'​s Commissars for distribution to the special settlers, in accordance with Appendix No. 2.
 +Flour, groats, and vegetables are to be distributed free of charge to the special settlers during the June-August period, as repayment for the agricultural production and livestock received from them in the areas from which they were evicted.
 +
 +To augment the automotive transport capacity of the NKVD troops, garrisoned in the raions of settlement in the Uzbek, Kazakh, and Kirgiz SSR's, the People'​s Commissariat of Defense (comrade Khrulev) is to provide 100 recently repaired "​Willys"​(3) motor vehicles and 250 trucks during the May-June 1944 period.
 +
 +By 20 May 1944, the Main Administration for the Transport and Supply of Petroleum and Petroleum Products (comrade Shirokov) is to allocate and supply 400 tons of gasoline to locations specified by the USSR NKVD, and 200 tons of gasoline are to be placed at the disposal of the Uzbek SSR Council of People'​s Commissars.
 +The supply of gasoline [for this purpose] is to be carried out in conjunction with a corresponding reduction of supplies to all other consumers.
 +
 +By 15 May of this year, the Main Supply Administration of the USSR Ministry of Forestry, USSR Council of People'​s Commissars (comrade Lopukhov), is to deliver 75,000 2.75-meter railroad car boards to the People'​s Commissariat of Railroads, using any means at its disposal.
 +In May of this year, the People'​s Commissariat of Finance (comrade Zverev) is to transfer 30 million rubles from the reserve fund of the USSR Council of People'​s Commissars to the USSR NKVD, for the implementation of special measures.
 +I. Stalin
 +Chairman, State Defense Committee
 +
 +cc : Comrades Molotov, Beria, Malenkov, Mikoian, Voznesenskii,​Andreev,​ Kosygin, Gritsenko, Iusupov, Abdurakhmanov,​ Kobulov (Uzbek SSR NKVD), Chadaev -- entire document; Shatalin, Gorkin, [illegible] Smirnov, Subbotin, Benediktov, Lobanov, Zverev,​Kaganovich,​ Miterev, Liubimov, Kravtsov, Khrulev, Zhukov, Shirokov, Lopukhov -- appropriate sections.
 +
 +TRANSLATOR'​S COMMENTS:
 +
 +Notation in upper left-hand corner: "To be returned to the State Defense Committee Secretariat (Part II)".
 +Typed along left edge of first page: "​Making copies or extracts of this decree is strictly prohibited"​.
 +Willys-Overland developed and mass-produced a jeep model that was given to the Soviet Union during World War II.
 +
 +===== Jewish Antifascist Committee =====
 +
 +The Jewish Antifascist Committee (JAC) was formed in Kuibyshev in April 1942. Two Polish Jewish socialists, Henryk Erlich and Viktor Alter (both of whom were later secretly executed), may have proposed the idea to Lavrenti Beria, the head of the NKVD. The organization was meant to serve the interests of Soviet foreign policy and the Soviet military through media propaganda -- as well as through personal contacts with Jews abroad, especially in Britain and the United States, designed to influence public opinion and enlist foreign support for the Soviet war effort.
 +
 +The chairman of the JAC was Solomon Mikhoels, a famous actor and director of the Moscow Yiddish State Theater. Shakne Epshtein, a Yiddish journalist, was the secretary and editor of the JAC's newspaper, Einikait (Unity). Other prominent JAC members were the poet Itsik Feffer, a former member of the Bund (a Jewish socialist movement that existed from 1897 to 1921 and supported the Mensheviks),​ the writer Il'ia Ehrenburg, General Aaron Katz of the Stalin Military Academy, and Boris Shimelovich,​ the chief surgeon of the Red Army, as well as some non-Jews from the arts, sciences, and the military.
 +
 +A year after its establishment,​ the JAC was moved to Moscow and became one of the most important centers of Jewish culture and Yiddish literature until the German invasion. The JAC broadcast pro-Soviet propaganda to foreign audiences several times a week, telling them of the absence of anti-Semitism and ofthe great anti-Nazi efforts being made by the Soviet military.
 +
 +In 1948, Mikhoels was assassinated by secret agents of Stalin, and, as part of a newly launched official anti-Semitic campaign, the JAC was disbanded in November and most of its members arrested.
 +
 +==== The Jewish Antifascist Committee ====
 +
 +{{ :​m3antfac.gif?​direct&​200|}}
 +
 +JEWISH ANTIFASCIST COMMITTEE IN THE USSR
 +
 +Moscow, ulitsa Kropotkina, 10, Telephone: G-6-71-00, G-6-47-07
 +
 +[letterhead also in Russian and Yiddish]
 +
 +21 June 1946
 +
 +TO COMRADE M. A. SUSLOV, DIRECTOR OF THE SECTION FOR FOREIGN POLICY OF THE CENTRAL COMMITTEE OF THE COMMUNIST PARTY
 +
 +Pursuant to the inquiry of Comrade Shumeiko, we are providing some information about the Jewish Antifascist Committee in the USSR and its activity.
 +
 +...
 +
 +The Jewish Antifascist Committee in the USSR was formed soon after the first antifascist radio broadcast political rally of representatives of the Jewish people, which was held in Moscow in August 1941.
 +
 +The Committee consists of 70 members (a list of Committee members is attached), and its executive committee has 19 members (a list of executive committee members is attached).
 +
 +The working staff of the Committee consists of:
 +
 +Secretary of the Committee, whose duties (following the death of Comrade Shakhno Epshtein) are carried out by the writer I. Fefer, member of the All-Union Communist Party (Bolsheviks) [VKP(b)] since 1919.
 +Deputy Secretary of the Committee, Comrade S.M. Shpigel'​glias,​ VKP(b) member since 1919 and formerly a party worker.
 +
 +Senior editors: N. IA. Levin, VKP(b) member since 1944 and veteran of World War II; L. A. Gol'​dberg,​ not a party member, former director of the publishing house Der Emes; editor S.O. Berman, VKP(b) member since 1940, veteran of World War II; and three translators and several technical workers.
 +
 +In the course of the last two years, representatives of a series of foreign Jewish antifascist organizations have visited the Committee: Deputy Chairman of the Jewish Antifascist Committee of Bulgaria, Mr. Zhak Vradzhali; one of the leaders of the Union of Jews of Czechoslovakia,​ Mr. Rozenberg; representatives of Jewish organizations of France, Poland, et al.
 +
 +Recently Mr. Ben Zion Goldberg (Waife), the son-in-law of Sholem Aleichem, visited the Soviet Union. He is a prominent public figure in the United States, a member of the executive committee of the Soviet-American Friendship Society (headed by Lamont), chairman of the Committee of Jewish Scientists, Writers, and Artists of the United States (Albert Einstein is president of the Committee), vice-president of Ambidjan, the All-American Society for Aid to Birobidzhan (president of Ambidzhan-- Steffenson). Mr. Goldberg is also a major American journalist, a contributor to the newspapers Toronto Star, Saint Louis Dispatch, New York Post, and Today, and to the magazine New Republic. Mr. Goldberg stayed in the Soviet Union from January 11 to June 8, excluding one month when he traveled to Finland, Sweden, and Denmark.
 +
 +During his stay in the Soviet Union, Mr. Goldberg was received in Moscow by M. I. Kalinin and S. A. Lozovskii; he attended all meetings of the Supreme Soviet of the Soviet Union; and he had a series of meetings with Soviet writers (including a banquet at the Union of Writers), with representatives of the Soviet Jewish community (at the Jewish Antifascist Committee in the USSR headquarters),​ with leaders of the State Jewish Theater, with the chief rabbi of the Moscow Jewish congregation,​ Shliffer, and with leaders of the Red Cross, among others.
 +
 +Mr. Goldberg visited Riga, Tallin, Leningrad, Minsk, Vilnius, Kaunas, Kiev, Odessa, Lvov, Uzhgorod, Mukachevo, Brody, and Stalingrad. He was received by the leading workers and writers in the capitals of the union republics.
 +
 +During his stay in the Soviet Union, Mr. Goldberg dispatched via the Soviet Information Bureau 33 articles to the American, Canadian, English, Palestinian,​ Polish, and Yiddish press. The articles were extremely friendly toward the Soviet Union.
 +
 +Before his departure, Mr. Goldberg began to write a book in English entitled England, the Opponent of Peace, and a book in Yiddish entitled Jewish Culture in the Soviet Union.
 +
 +Recently the Committee has received a series of requests from prominent Jewish public figures from several countries seeking assistance in visiting the Soviet Union. Such requests were received from: N. Goldman, the chairman of the executive committee of the World Jewish Congress; Dr. Stephen Wise, chairman of the American Jewish Congress; Louis Levine, chairman of the Jewish Union for Soviet Aid under Russian War Relief; Mr. Raiskii, the editor-in-chief of the newspaper Presse Nouvelle in Paris; et al.
 +
 +The Jewish Antifascist Committee in the USSR has sent during its entire existence one delegation, composed of Comrades Mikhoels and Fefer, to the United States, England, Canada, and Mexico. This delegations'​s trip report has been published in the book The Jewish People against Fascism (attached; see pp. 91- 129).
 +
 +[signed]
 +
 +Chairman of the Jewish Anfifascist Committee in the USSR: S. Mikhoels
 +
 +Member of the Executive Committee of the Jewish Antifascist Committee in the USSR: I. Fefer
 +
 +TRANSLATOR'​S COMMENTS:
 +
 +[Stamps at upper right:] Removed from the register; to the dossier of [blank] sector; date: 9 Jan. 1947.
 +
 +[Secretariat OMI], Central Committee of the Communist Party No. 2074 1 July 1946
 +
 +[Handwritten marginalia at left margin of p. 1:] To the archive [illegible notations and signature] The book stays. [signed] G. Shumeiko 25/1948
 +
 +===== Chernobyl'​ =====
 +
 +n April 1986, Chernobyl'​ (Chornobyl'​ in Ukrainian) was an obscure city on the Pripiat'​ River in north-central Ukraine. Almost incidentally,​ its name was attached to the V.I. Lenin Nuclear Power Plant located about twenty-five kilometers upstream.
 +
 +On April 26, the city's anonymity vanished forever when, during a test at 1:21 A.M., the No. 4 reactor exploded and released thirty to forty times the radioactivity of the atomic bombs dropped on Hiroshima and Nagasaki. The world first learned of history'​s worst nuclear accident from Sweden, where abnormal radiation levels were registered at one of its nuclear facilities.
 +
 +Ranking as one of the greatest industrial accidents of all time, the Chernobyl'​ disaster and its impact on the course of Soviet events can scarcely be exaggerated. No one can predict what will finally be the exact number of human victims. Thirty- one lives were lost immediately. Hundreds of thousands of Ukrainians, Russians, and Belorussians had to abandon entire cities and settlements within the thirty-kilometer zone of extreme contamination. Estimates vary, but it is likely that some 3 million people, more than 2 million in Belarus'​ alone, are still living in contaminated areas. The city of Chernobyl'​ is still inhabited by almost 10,000 people. Billions of rubles have been spent, and billions more will be needed to relocate communities and decontaminate the rich farmland.
 +
 +Chernobyl'​ has become a metaphor not only for the horror of uncontrolled nuclear power but alsofor the collapsing Soviet system and its reflexive secrecy and deception, disregard for the safety and welfare of workers and their families, and inability to deliver basic services such as health care and transportation,​ especially in crisis situations. The Chernobyl'​ catastrophe derailed what had been an ambitious nuclear power program and formed a fledgling environmental movement into a potent political force in Russia as well as a rallying point for achieving Ukrainian and Belorussian independence in 1991. Although still in operation, the Chernobyl'​ plant is scheduled for total shutdown before the year 2000. The power station will be replaced by a thermal energy giant.
 +
 +==== Construction Flaws ====
 +
 +The Construction Flaws of Chernobyl are available as two images. Click on the icons to view full-size images.
 +
 +{{:​n3const1.gif?​direct&​200|}}{{:​n3const2.gif?​direct&​200|}}
 +
 +40
 +
 +Not for publication
 +
 +Secret
 +
 +21 Feb. 79 05363 Return to the General Section of the Central Committee of the CPSU
 +
 +Central Committee of the CPSU
 +
 +USSR COMMITTEE OF STATE SECURITY [KGB]
 +
 +February 21, 1979 No. 346-A Moscow
 +
 +Construction Flaws at the Chernobyl Nuclear Power Plant [AES]
 +
 +According to data in the possession of the KGB of the USSR, design deviations and violations of construction and assembly technology are occurring at various places in the construction of the second generating unit of the Chernobyl AES, and these could lead to mishaps and accidents.
 +
 +The structural pillars of the generator room were erected with a deviation of up to 100 mm from the reference axes, and horizontal connections between the pillars are absent in places. Wall panels have been installed with a deviation of up to 150 mm from the axes. The placement of roof plates does not conform to the designer'​s specifications. Crane tracks and stopways have vertical drops of up to 100 mm and in places a slope of up to 8 degree.
 +
 +Deputy head of the Construction Directorate,​ Comrade V. T. Gora, gave instructions for backfilling the foundation in many places where vertical waterproofing was damaged. Similar violations were permitted in other sections with the knowledge of Comrade V. T. Gora and the head of the construction group, Comrade IU. L. Matveev. Damage to the waterproofing can lead to ground water seepage into the station and radioactive contamination of the environment.
 +
 +The leadership of the Directorate is not devoting proper attention to the foundation, on which the quality of the construction largely depends. The cement plant operates erratically,​ and its output is of poor quality. Interruptions were permitted during the pouring of especially heavy concrete causing gaps and layering in the foundation. Access roads to the Chernobyl AES are in urgent need of repair.
 +
 +Construction of the third high-voltage transmission line is behind schedule, which could limit the capacity utilization of the second unit.
 +
 +As a result of inadequate monitoring of the condition of safety equipment, in the first three quarters of 1978, 170 individuals suffered work-related injuries, with the loss of work time totalling 3,366 worker-days.
 +
 +The KGB of Ukraine has informed the CPSU Central Committee of these violations. This is for your information.
 +
 +Chairman of the Committee [KGB] [signed] IU. Andropov
 +
 +42
 +
 +Secret
 +
 +Copy no. 1
 +
 +USSR MINISTRY OF POWER AND ELECTRIFICATION (MINENERGO USSR)
 +
 +Central Committee CPSU
 +
 +Kitaiskii pr. 7
 +
 +Moscow, K-74 103074
 +
 +Minenergo USSR
 +
 +Central Committee of the CPSU Moscow K-11 A.T. 112604
 +
 +MAR. 16, 79 07738 3-16-79 No. 1381-2c
 +
 +Return to General Section of the Central Committee
 +
 +Checking the structural condition of the first unit of the Chernobyl AES.
 +
 +At the instruction of the USSR Minister of Power and Electrification,​ a commission under the chairmanship of Deputy Minister Comrade F. V. Sapozhnikov was formed to check the quality of construction and assembly work on the first unit of the Chernobyl AES.
 +
 +The commission visited the site on March 5-6, 1979, and examined the state of the buildings and structures of the first unit of the Chernobyl AES and the notes on the quality of construction and assembly work.
 +
 +The Commission found that violations of construction technology and design deviations have been documented.
 +
 +In each specific instance, engineering solutions were adopted (in the construction,​ the operation, or by the designers) to eliminate deviations and make the structures conform to the specifications of the original design and normative documents.
 +
 +Some of the measures have been realized; the rest of the work is being completed according to a rigid timetable set by the commission.
 +
 +At the present time the power station is operating successfully,​ and there are no hindrances to its further operation.
 +
 +Taking into account the specifics of nuclear power stations, and attaching primary significance to the reliability and safety of their operations, the USSR Ministry of Power and Electrification has issued an order to enhance monitoring of technical standards observance and the quality of construction
 +
 +and assembly work at all AESs under construction. A letter of similar content was sent to the Central Committee of the Communist Party of Ukraine.
 +
 +Deputy Minister [signed] P. P. Falaleev
 +
 +Secret
 +
 +CENTRAL COMMITTEE OF THE CPSU
 +
 +Defects in the Construction of the Chernobyl AES
 +
 +Chairman of the KGB of the USSR, Comrade IU. V. Andropov, reports about the low quality of construction work on various sections of the second unit of the Chernobyl AES of the USSR Ministry of Power and Electrification.
 +
 +As instructed, Comrade Minister P. S. Neporozhnii has formed a special commission under the leadership of Deputy Minister Comrade Sapozhnikov to examine and carefully analyze the facts cited. The commission visited the site to conduct a thorough investigation of design deviations and to inspect the system of monitoring the quality of construction and assembly work.
 +
 +It was found that in erecting individual pillars, wall panels, and crane track stopways, there indeed were instances of deviation from the reference axes and substandard construction practices. Most of these deviations were exposed by the design inspectorate of the Gidroproekt Institute and a technical site inspection, and they were documented.
 +
 +The Chernobyl AES construction directorate along with the design organization and client have adopted coordinated engineering solutions ensuring design reliability and construction quality. Some of the deviations have been eliminated, and the rest of the measures are being carried out. A timetable under the control of the Ministry leadership has been established to eliminate the noted deficiencies.
 +
 +The specialists conclude that at present there are no obstacles to the subsequent operation of the Chernobyl AES, and the electric power station is operating reliably.
 +
 +To raise the quality of construction and assembly work and strengthen control over fire and radiation safety, the Ministry has published instructions stipulating strict verification of the quality of work at AES construction sites by Ministry commissions,​ enhancing quality inspection laws, training engineers and technicians,​ strengthening fire-fighting procedures, and monitoring observation of safety regulations.
 +
 +....
 +
 +The Central Committee of the Communist Party of the Ukraine has been informed of the measures taken by the ministry.
 +
 +Head of the Section of Machine Building of the Central Committee of the CPSU. [SIGNATURE] (V. Frolov)
 +
 +March "​23",​ 1979
 +
 +Nos. 05363,​07738,​ 60A/II.
 +
 +===== Perestroika =====
 +
 +From modest beginnings at the Twenty-Seventh Party Congress in 1986, perestroika,​ Mikhail Gorbachev'​s program of economic, political, and social restructuring,​ became the unintended catalyst for dismantling what had taken nearly three-quarters of a century to erect: the Marxist-Leninist-Stalinist totalitarian state.
 +
 +The world watched in disbelief but with growing admiration as Soviet forces withdrew from Afghanistan,​ democratic governments overturned Communist regimes in Eastern Europe, Germany was reunited, the Warsaw Pact withered away, and the Cold War came to an abrupt end.
 +
 +In the Soviet Union itself, however, reactions to the new policies were mixed. Reform policies rocked the foundation of entrenched traditional power bases in the party, economy, and society but did not replace them entirely. Newfound freedoms of assembly, speech, and religion, the right to strike, and multicandidate elections undermined not only the Soviet Union'​s authoritarian structures, but also the familiar sense of order and predictability. Long-suppressed,​ bitter inter-ethnic,​ economic, and social grievances led to clashes, strikes, and growing crime rates.
 +
 +Gorbachev introduced policies designed to begin establishing a market economy by encouraging limited private ownership and profitability in Soviet industry and agriculture. But the Communist control system and over-centralization of power and privilege were maintained and new policies produced no economic miracles. Instead, lines got longer for scarce goods in the stores, civic unrest mounted, and bloody crackdowns claimed lives, particularly in the restive nationalist populations of the outlying Caucasus and Baltic states.
 +
 +On August 19, 1991, conservative elements in Gorbachev'​s own administration launched an abortive coup d'tat to prevent the signing of a new union treaty the following day and to restore the party'​s power and authority. Boris Yeltsin, who had become Russia'​s first popularly elected president in June 1991, made the seat of government of his Russian republic, known as the White House, the rallying point for resistance to the organizers of the coup. Under his leadership, Russia embarked on even more far- reaching reforms as the Soviet Union broke up into its constituent republics and formed the Commonwealth of Independent States.
 +
 +==== Conversion to a Market Economy ====
 +
 +{{ :​o3gorby.gif?​direct&​200|}}
 +
 +Communist Party of the Soviet Union. CENTRAL COMMITTEE
 +
 +Not for publication TOP SECRET
 +
 +MINUTES Of Meeting No. 2 of the Politburo of the Central Committee of the CPSU September 20, 1990
 +
 +Chairman: Comrade M.S. Gorbachev
 +
 +
 +... I. On the state of the nation and the problems facing the CPSU in connection with the conversion to a market economy. (Comrades Gorbachev, Burokiavichius,​ Gurenko, Dzasokhov, Ivashko, Karimov, Luchinskii, Masaliev, Makhkamov, Nazarbaev, Prokof'​ev,​ Rubiks, Semenova, Sillari, Sokolov, Stroev, Shenin, Baklanov, Gidaspov, Kuptsov, Manaenkov, Falin, Ryzhkov, Aganbegian, Shatalin, Abalkin, Masliukov, Sitarian, Pavlov, Beliakov)
 +
 +We adopt the position that was elaborated during the discussions of the Politburo of the Central Committee on the further activity to be taken by party organizations in connection with the conversion to a market economy, with the proviso that this matter is to be reviewed at the next Plenum of the Central Committee.
 +
 +[ ... ]
 +
 +SECRETARY OF THE CENTRAL COMMITTEE OF THE COMMUNIST PARTY OF THE SOVIET UNION [signed] M. GORBACHEV
 +
 +A conference convened in Leningrad in October, 1990, by the conservative communist organization "​Unity--for Leninism and Communist Ideals"​ demanded radical changes in Mikhail Gorbachev'​s policy of perestroika and its implementation. Participants in the conference accused Gorbachev of following a course that would restore capitalism in the Soviet Union, and they appealed to party organizations and members to demand convocation of an extraordinary Party Congress to remove Gorbachev from power. This resolution was given to the Central Committee on November 29, 1990, and assigned for action to two Politburo members by V. Ivashko, who notes on the document, "​Please think about this, and let's talk."
 +
 +==== Resolution ====
 +
 +The Resolution is available as three images. click on them, to retrieve a full size copy.
 +
 +{{:​ab3unit1.gif?​direct&​200|}}{{:​ab3unit2.gif?​direct&​200|}}{{:​ab3unit3.gif?​direct&​200|}}
 +
 +Resolution by the Society "​Unity,​ for Leninism and Communist Ideals,"​ October 28, 1990, expressing lack of confidence in the policies of Gorbachev as General Secretary of the Central Committee.
 +
 +To the TSK KPSS
 +
 +R E S O L U T I O N
 +
 +of the 3rd All-Union Conference of the Society "​Unity,​ for Leninism and Communistic Ideals"​
 +
 +October 28, 1990, Leningrad
 +
 +ON THE LACK OF CONFIDENCE IN THE POLICIES OF THE GENERAL SECRETARY OF THE CENTRAL COMMITTEE OF THE COMMUNIST PARTY OF THE SOVIET UNION [CC CPSU] M.S. GORBACHEV
 +
 +Faced with catastrophic consequences for the people, the country, and the party due to M.S. Gorbachev'​s policy of so-called "​Perestroika",​ and in view of the fact that this policy has absolutely revealed its bourgeois-restorationist character, and in consideration of the fact that we are on the brink of an even graver national catastrophe in connection with the planned implementation in the country of the "​stabilization program"​ from the International Monetary Fund, which is disguised as a transitional program toward a market economy, the 3rd All-Union Conference of the Society "​Unity,​ for Leninism and Communist Ideals,"​
 +
 +expresses its lack of confidence in the policies of M.S. Gorbachev as General Secretary of the CC CPSU.
 +
 +We feel that the only force in the country capable of changing the course of the events in a constructive way, without leading to civil war, to date continues to remain the Communist Party.
 +
 +We invite all honest, socialistically- and patriotically-oriented members of the CPSU, members of the Central Committee and the CC CPSU, party organizations at all levels, and the communist parties of all union republics to request the convening of a special meeting of the CPSU, to raise the question of:
 +
 +The dismissal of M.S. Gorbachev and his more zealous associates, who were involved in the unleashing of a bourgeois counterrevolution in the Soviet Union, from all elected party posts and about their exclusion from the ranks of the Communist Party of the Soviet Union.
 +The recall of M.S. Gorbachev and said persons from deputy posts, to which they were appointed only because they were party functionaries.
 +The immediate removal of the country from this general national crisis not along the path of the restoration of capitalism but of socialist renewal.
 +An investigation into the real reasons and processes that formed this crisis situation during 1985-1900, which is unprecedented in terms of severity and danger for the Soviet government, and calling the guilty to account before the party and the country.
 +The All-Union Society "​UNITY"​ recommends that all members of the organization develop propaganda campaigns for this resolution at the local level, firstly, by means of conducting open party, trade-union and similar meetings, to achieve the concurrence of CPSU party organizations.
 +
 +Forward the proceedings from the open All-Union Party Conference to Call M.S. Gorbachev to Account before the Party to the CC CPSU, to newspapers, and to the political executive committee of "​Unity"​.
 +
 +The resolution was accepted unanimously.
 +
 +Chairman of the political executive committee of the All-Union Society "​Unity--for Leninism and Communist Ideals"​
 +
 +[signed] N. ANDREEVA
internal_workings_of_the_soviet_system.txt · Last modified: 2018/04/21 03:42 (external edit)